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‘The continuum in Rwanda after the genocide and in Indonesia after the  Tsunami 
were typical of the unstructured processes which accompany the transition from 
humanitarian relief to development. The extent to which local ownership of gov-
ernments and civil society is prepared and empowered to take charge following 
man-made or natural disasters is a major determinant of the length and sustain-
ability of recovery. In the absence of standard patterns and processes, we are left 
with sets of principles and values, which are ultimately much more valuable as 
a guide to action. This book does well to distinguish the very different circum-
stances of recovery, both from natural disasters and from conflict.’
—Stephen Browne, former UN Humanitarian and Development Coordinator
‘The aid world is split into development and humanitarian assistance. This book 
tackles the long-standing question of how different aid instruments can best be 
combined to meet human needs defying categorization. It provides a rich series 
of case studies, as well as a unique Japanese perspective on the continuum of aid.’
—Julia Steets, Director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)
‘This is an ambitious and honest effort to address and deconstruct the on- going 
dilemma of responding to one crisis after the other in increasingly complex en-
vironments. This collection of articles demonstrates the non-linear nature of 
recovery and reconstruction. It is recommended reading for practitioners and 
scholars.’
—Margareta Wahlstrom, President of Swedish Red Cross 
and former Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General for Disaster Risk Reduction
‘An important contribution to current global conversations around crisis preven-
tion and sustaining peace. Through detailed case studies from some of the most 
difficult conflict and disasters of the past 30 years, this book brings new analysis 
to the dilemmas around linking emergency response and long-term development 
that have eluded the aid sector for decades.’
—Christina Bennett, Humanitarian Policy Group, 





In addressing humanitarian crises, the international community has long under-
stood the need to extend beyond providing immediate relief, and to engage with 
long-term recovery activities and the prevention of similar crises in the future. 
However, this continuum from short-term relief to rehabilitation and development 
has often proved difficult to achieve. This book aims to shed light on the contin-
uum of humanitarian crisis management, particularly from the viewpoint of major 
bilateral donors and agencies. Focusing on cases of armed conflicts and disasters, 
the authors describe the evolution of approaches and lessons learnt in practice 
when moving from emergency relief to recovery and prevention of future crises.
Drawing on an extensive research project conducted by the Japan Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency Research Institute, this book compares how a range 
of international organizations, bilateral cooperation agencies, NGOs, and re-
search institutes have approached the continuum in international humanitarian 
crisis management. The book draws on six humanitarian crises case studies, each 
resulting from armed conflict or natural disasters: Timor-Leste, South Sudan, 
the Syrian crisis, Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, the Indian Ocean earthquake 
and tsunami in  Indonesia and Typhoon Yolanda. The book concludes by propos-
ing a common conceptual framework designed to appeal to different stakeholders 
involved in crisis management.
Following on from the World Humanitarian Summit, where a new way of 
working on the humanitarian-development nexus was highlighted as one of five 
major priority trends, this book is a timely contribution to the debate which 
should interest researchers of humanitarian studies, conflict and peace studies, 
and disaster risk-management.
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Despite important gains against poverty around the world, many people are still 
affected by humanitarian crises. The lives and dignity of people are threatened 
by conflicts, natural disasters, extremism, hunger, worsening refugee situations, 
and infectious diseases, among others. In addressing such humanitarian crises, 
efforts by the global community are not limited to offers of short-term relief but 
also include support for long-term recovery and development activities, as well as 
the establishment of foundations for the prevention of similar crises in the future. 
Consequently, it is imperative to catalyze collective action effectively in order 
to achieve the best possible outcomes in these areas. This need for collective ac-
tion was articulated at the outset of the present humanitarian system by the uN 
General Assembly in Resolution 46/182 of 1991 as a ‘continuum from relief to 
rehabilitation and development.’ Since the inception of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency’s (  JICA’s) operational strategy of providing integrated and 
‘seamless’ assistance in 2008, JICA has dealt with several challenges from actual 
emergencies and in their aftermaths. The integration of the different phases of 
inter-linked activities—from humanitarian relief to long-term development with 
prevention—as a single crisis management process requires the improvement of 
our assistance system.
Japan’s approach in international cooperation has been consciously geared 
towards helping partner countries become self-reliant states and working with 
them on an equal footing. In pursuing our philosophy of international cooper-
ation, and aspiring to the creation of a free, peaceful and prosperous world for 
everyone, JICA continues to find and provide tailored and context-specific assis-
tance for places in crisis. Hence, it is crucial to study the needs of recipient coun-
tries and design development cooperation effectively in partnership with them.
This volume is a tangible proof of our commitment to the uN 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development that states that ‘no one will be left behind,’ and to 
the outcomes of the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 in Istanbul. At JICA, 
we explore the challenges faced by bilateral cooperation agencies in doing more 
than just providing relief after humanitarian crises to be more effective in dealing 
with them. In this regard, as this book clearly shows, the understanding of the 
non-linear transition across all phases within the crisis response process contin-
uum should be recognized among both humanitarian and development agencies. 
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In order to develop assistance strategies that will leave no one behind, interna-
tional and local partners need to consider the great challenge of advancing all 
types of prevention activities, and the central role that local actors can play in 
addressing crises. The wide-ranging reviews and perspectives on the practices of 
crisis management offered in this book will help readers develop an understand-
ing of the current situation and its associated obstacles, as well as ideas on how 
we should change the system to realize the continuum.
Shinichi Kitaoka
President
Japan International Cooperation Agency
In 2015, the Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute ( JICA- RI) 
initiated a three-year project, the ‘Comparative Study of Humanitarian Crisis Man-
agement from the Perspective of Bilateral Cooperation Agencies.’ The aims of the 
project were developing a better understanding and drawing attention to the dif-
ficulty of linking humanitarian and development actions. Originally, the project 
sought to evaluate human security in practice in  Japanese ODA through the lens of 
JICA’s ‘Seamless Assistance’ approach. However, this was transformed into a more 
inclusive review and evaluation of various approaches and tools across a variety of 
crises in different parts of the world.
This eleven-chapter volume is composed of contributions from established 
practitioners and academics in the field of human security and humanitarian 
crisis management. In order to see this history of crisis management in detail, 
the research is comprised not only of reviews of policies and consultation with the 
headquarters of major organizations, but also includes selected case studies that 
present humanitarian crisis management experiences over the last two decades. 
These case studies were chosen on the basis of their scale and impact on affected 
communities, the range of actors in crisis areas, geographical diversity, and the 
new challenges they brought to humanitarian crisis management. The book val-
idates and assesses the continuum of humanitarian crisis management for both 
natural disasters and conflict-affected areas.
This book is organized into three key sections. Part I provides the background 
and analytical framework of the book. Chapter 1 presents the evolutionary pro-
cess that led to the rise of international humanitarianism, important trends and 
reforms initiated in the international community as well as the theoretical and 
practical gaps that have emerged over the years. Chapter 2 delivers the analytical 
frameworks in response to the issues and challenges identified in Chapter 1. The 
authors propose a multi-layered activity model to understand the continuum and 
describe its strengths and weaknesses.
Parts II and III present two clusters of case studies to validate the continuum 
in humanitarian crisis management. Part II locates the development of peace-
building as an approach to the continuum in the management of the aftermath of 
armed conflicts. Chapter 3 sets the tone for this section by introducing previous 
international efforts and practices in providing support for post-conflict countries̀  
Preface
Preface xvii
transitions from conflict to peace and by examining the continuum in managing 
post-conflict states. Case studies of armed conflict such as those in Timor-Leste 
(Chapter 4), South Sudan (Chapter 5), and the Syrian crisis ( Chapter 6) offer nar-
ratives on achieving post-conflict peacebuilding and sustainable peace. The case 
of Timor-Leste introduces a magnified view of a prolonged struggle for peace and 
the menaces brought about by the relapse into conflict. Despite the successful at-
tainment of independence the case study from South Sudan considers reasons for 
the continuous relapse into conflict and the consequent long humanitarian crisis 
despite the tremendous amount of assistance from the international community 
in building a new state. The conflict in Syria illustrates the need for early imple-
mentation of a continuum approach and how the polarization of aid hinders this 
attempt.
Part III concentrates on the continuum as observed in disaster management. 
Chapter 7 explores its evolution in the disaster-risk reduction community based 
on humanitarian and developmental perspectives, and provides the background 
on which the subsequent case studies are developed. This section is substantiated 
by case studies of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras (Chapter 8), the Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia (Chapter 9) and Typhoon Yolanda in the 
Philippines (Chapter 10). Representing the Latin American region through the 
case of Honduras after Hurricane Mitch (1998), this volume is able to present 
a disaster scenario over a protracted period and consider the challenges of en-
gendering prevention against future disasters. The 2004 India Ocean tsunami 
in Indonesia is one of the large-scale disasters that paved the way for the emer-
gence of the current disaster risk reduction mantra of ‘build back better’. Lastly, 
 Typhoon Yolanda, which devastated the central Philippines in 2013, was as-
sessed as a model for the present continuum realization and challenges.
The Conclusion (Chapter 11) integrates all the ideas presented in this book. 
The editors summarize the key findings from the case studies, provide a synthesis 
of the factors identified in the two streams of crises, and discuss the implications 
for further improvement of international crisis management.
The book deviates from the typical compilation of international cooperation 
and aid case studies. Instead, it attempts to validate a theoretical model of hu-
manitarian crisis management by examining the continuum through diverse case 
studies of crises. The editors and authors anticipate contributing to the scarce yet 
vital literature on the humanitarian-development nexus from the perspective of 
bilateral cooperation agencies.
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the era of unprecedented humanitarian crises
In recent years, finding ways to deal with humanitarian crises has become one 
of the most compelling issues for the international community. Humanitarian 
crises encompass large-scale disruptions to people’s sense of a ‘normal’ life, all 
too often affecting their survival, livelihood and dignity. The scale of human 
suffering nowadays has grown since World War II. More than 164.2 million 
people around the world need humanitarian assistance for survival (Develop-
ment Initiatives 2017). At the end of 2015, 65.3 million people, or one in every 
113 persons, had been displaced from their homes due to conflict or persecution 
(edwards 2016), while an estimated 377 million people were affected by natural 
disasters in 2016 alone (Development Initiatives 2017, 19). Fears of famine once 
again plague the Horn of Africa and Yemen, while the rapid spread of infectious 
diseases continues to highlight our interconnected vulnerabilities.
Whenever such serious threats attract global attention, it is widely anticipated 
that donors, aid organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
will provide solidarity and active engagement. In principle, state actors from the 
affected countries are in charge of addressing disaster situations. However, when 
crises overwhelm their capacity to implement solutions because of the scale and 
complexity of the threats, or when governments themselves become the primary 
source of danger, support from external actors for the population at risk becomes 
necessary. This support has grown steadily—from about uS$800   million in 
1989 to some uS$4.4 billion in 1999, reaching uS$27.3 billion in 2016 (Weiss 
2013; Development Initiatives 2017). The budget allocated for humanitarian 
funds is normally around 10% of the total Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) budget in most of the major donor countries. However, this grew to 18.8% 
in 2016, generating discussions among the international community over what 
might be expected from this increase.
The practice of collective engagement from the international community 
in addressing humanitarian crises commenced only after the end of the Cold 
War. In the aftermath of World War II, the international community’s work on 
peace and security was based on the sovereign state system, which became the 




Yukie Osa and Atsushi Hanatani
4 Y. Osa and A. Hanatani
global confrontations. During the Cold War period, the reconstruction of war-
torn countries and long-term development of newly independent countries were 
the main agendas of donors, while humanitarian action was largely left to non- 
governmental institutions, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs (Crisp 2007). It was only after the end 
of the Cold War that collective humanitarian support by the international com-
munity became fully functional through the uN. This was symbolically marked 
by the united Nations Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, which 
provided the justification for an international response to the refugee crisis in 
northern Iraq in the aftermath of the first Gulf War (Hammerstad 2014, 180).
Successive crises in ensuing years made it clear that no single entity could fully 
serve the needs of an entire affected community in the crisis management process 
(Friis and Jarmyr 2008), resulting in the increased involvement of multiple actors 
in such endeavors. What started as a non-governmental undertaking has now 
become a concerted effort among inter-governmental organizations, sovereign 
states, the uN system, regional organizations, militaries and the private sector. 
In this way, the generation of broad concern and goodwill is a great achievement 
when compared with the preceding period of hot and less hot wars. Nonetheless, 
despite good intentions, the diversity in priorities and mandates of all the actors 
presently involved in the response to emergencies, as well as the ever-changing 
needs on the ground, make crisis management a very difficult task. Hence, when 
faced with present-day humanitarian challenges, more comprehensive and better 
managed humanitarian activities are urgently required.
Improving crisis management: coordination and the 
humanitarian-development nexus
Over the past 20 years, the international community has invested heavily in the 
intellectual and organizational development of the humanitarian crisis man-
agement concept and system. Two major areas requiring attention from the 
very beginning were (1) humanitarian coordination and (2) the humanitarian- 
development nexus. The coordination and nexus strategies in responding to the 
intricacies of several crisis contexts—together with the engagement of a great 
variety of actors with different visions—make humanitarian crisis management 
particularly challenging.
Of these two areas, coordination took precedence in the process of institu-
tionalizing humanitarian action in the uN. The landmark General Assembly 
Resolution 46/182 in 1991 became a kind of new ‘Magna Carta’ in providing 
a basic framework for the international humanitarian system (Oshima 2004). 
The resolution established new arrangements for humanitarian coordination in 
the uN system (OCHA 2012) and strengthened the position of the uN Disaster 
Relief Coordinator by raising it to the level of under Secretary General and 
renaming it the emergency Relief Coordinator. The resolution also gave way 
to the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which later became 
the uN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998. 
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Further reforms led to the creation of the Humanitarian Reform Agenda in 
2005, by which the Cluster System for the coordination of humanitarian action 
was introduced to enhance predictability, accountability and partnership among 
multiple actors, particularly UN agencies. This was followed by the introduction 
of the transformative agenda in 2011, which stressed leadership, accountability 
and improved coordination.
Despite all this progress on coordination reforms, the issue of the humanitarian- 
development nexus has remained on the margins. During the 1990s, a major 
debate on improving the humanitarian crisis management revolved around 
the question of a disconnect between humanitarian assistance and develop-
ment cooperation. It attempted to link the different forms of assistance to the 
changing nature of crises and needs, particularly in relation to protracted in-
ternal conflicts. Discussions stemmed from the recognition that there were 
certain gaps between humanitarian and development assistance in terms of 
(1)  funding  (temporal period of engagement and types of activities eligible for 
funding); (2) institutions ( philosophy, mandates, strategies, approaches); and 
(3)  partnerships and coordination (between different actors and between capitals 
and field offices within the same organizations). While it was more or less clear 
that the provision of life-saving assistance implies relief and that going back to 
non-crisis normality constitutes development, whatever lies in the middle (includ-
ing prevention and preparedness) is less well understood.
The first-generation concept of a ‘relief to development continuum’ model was 
based on the idea of a linear or chronological transition from short-term relief by 
humanitarian actors to long-term development by traditional donors. It sought 
to bridge funding gaps that may arise between these two phases and actors. This 
was later replaced by the ‘contiguum’ model, where different phases and elements 
of assistance are thought to exist concurrently, with emphasis on shared respon-
sibility between humanitarian and development actors rather than a temporal 
transition between them.1 While continuum and contiguum vary in emphasis, 
they both highlight three aspects of linking: (1) applying development principles 
early on in emergency settings to ensure the ground for development is prepared, 
(2) ensuring a smooth transition as well as continuity and coordination between 
interventions, and (3) using development cooperation to support prevention and 
disaster risk reduction (Steets 2011).
Several other approaches have been developed to analyze and address the 
nexus based on those two concepts, many of which are still used today. Some of 
these approaches include the long standing Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development (LRRD), which was originally proposed by the European Union 
(EU) in 1996; the Development(al) Relief approach, which was suggested by 
the United States (US) in the early 1990s together with other related concepts 
such as Relief to Development and Transition; the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP)-led Early Recovery, which is a part of the Humanitar-
ian Cluster System; and the Gap approach spearheaded by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World 
Bank in 1999, that originated from the Brooking Process (Crisp 2007; Suhrke 
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and Ofstad 2005). There is also the Seamless Assistance emerging from the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA)’s strategy, and the Resilience 
Approach which appeared in several bilateral donor’s papers such as EU institu-
tions, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United 
Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and various UN 
agencies during the past ten years. These will all be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. It is fair to say, however, that the use of these approaches 
still remains within the confines of the respective donors or organizations who 
invented them.
Bridging the nexus and remaining issues
Responding to the rise of these debates, donor policies on humanitarian devel-
opment and security have also undergone major changes. Donors have created 
new funding instruments and offices or have devised bureaucratic procedures to 
fill the gap between humanitarian and development assistance and improve their 
ability to deal with ‘transitional’ activities. Among these are ECHO’s Global 
Plans, the EC’s Humanitarian Plus funding, the UK’s Global Conflict Preven-
tion Pool (GCCP), and the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit and Post-Conflict 
Fund. Such trust funds are usually operationalized and managed by UN agen-
cies and the World Bank. Donors have applied these instruments to enable ap-
propriate financing to countries in prolonged periods of crisis and those suffering 
from major natural disasters.
In the 2011 World Development Report, the World Bank selected the theme 
‘Conflict, Security and Development’ to address the cyclical nature of violence 
and emphasize that the repeated spiral model of institutional transformation 
and confidence are pathways to break the vicious cycle of conflict and violence 
(World Bank 2011). In the same year, OECD countries, together with inter-
national organizations and financial institutions, agreed to support conflict- 
affected and fragile countries through the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile 
Countries’ (New Deal) at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Busan, Korea. One of the principles of donor engagement in fragile contexts is 
‘trust’, predicated on the commitment to risk-sharing between fragile countries 
and donors to ensure continued engagement even in times of transition (OECD 
2011). The New Deal is upheld as a guiding principle for OECD donors’ en-
gagement in fragile contexts through the fora of dialogue among donors (IN-
CAF: International  Network on Conflict and Fragility), and between donors 
and countries in fragile situations (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding).
In regard to humanitarian actors, 17 donor governments—along with the Euro-
pean Commission, OECD, International Red Cross and Red Crescent  Movement, 
NGOs, and academics—gathered and formulated the ‘Principles and Good Prac-
tice of Humanitarian Donorship’ (Good Humanitarian  Donorship 2003). The 
23 identified principles and good practices provided both a framework for guid-
ing official humanitarian aid and a mechanism for encouraging greater donor 
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accountability, support for the transition to development, and the prevention of 
future crises.2 Another effort that deserves mention is the Sphere Project, which 
has tried to develop standards for action that NGOs can use to increase their pro-
fessionalism after the chaotic response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Yet, all 
of these innovations remain as work in progress and, as the former uN Secretary- 
General Ban Ki-moon said in his remarks after five years in office, ‘we will not 
create a safer and more secure world without building a more global,  accountable 
and robust humanitarian system’ (united Nations Secretary- General 2012).
Some evaluation studies on the relationship between humanitarian and devel-
opment aid suggest that there is still a long way to go in achieving a better system 
for humanitarian crisis management (Macrae and Harmer 2004; Steets 2011). 
It is argued that the international community for humanitarian action is still a 
rather messy assemblage of actors and activities lacking a leader (ALNAP 2015, 
18). Despite various coordination and cooperation frameworks, the entire process 
of humanitarian action remains unmanaged. Another criticism is the unremit-
ting lack of evidence-based studies on this topic. Much of the available literature 
consists of secondary desk reviews. While much has been written from a human-
itarian perspective, there are insufficient studies written from a development per-
spective (Hinds 2015). Moreover, as the authors of this book suggest, there is even 
disagreement on what the problem is behind the continuum of humanitarian cri-
sis management—not just among development practitioners but also from com-
munities working specifically on disasters, peacebuilding and other types of crises.
the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit
Amid this context, the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was held on May 
24–25, 2016, in Istanbul with the thematic goals of (1) re-inspiring and reinvig-
orating commitment to humanity and the universality of humanitarian princi-
ples, (2) initiating a set of concrete actions and commitments aimed at enabling 
countries and communities to better prepare for and respond to crises, and 
becoming resilient to shocks, and (3) sharing of best practices that can help save 
lives around the world, putting affected people at the center of humanitarian 
action, and alleviating suffering. The uN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
expected the WHS to be
an opportunity for ‘we the peoples’—Heads of State and Government, rep-
resentatives of affected communities, national and international aid organ-
izations, global opinion leaders, private sector leaders and others—to agree 
that we can and must do better to end conflict, alleviate suffering and reduce 
risk and vulnerability.
(united Nations General Assembly 2016, 3)
In the global consultation leading up to the Summit, a synthesis report entitled 
‘Restoring Humanity: Global Voices Calling for Action’ was discussed in Geneva 
in October 2015. This preceded the Secretary-General’s Report, ‘One Humanity: 
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Shared Responsibility’ in February 2016. The uN Secretary- General’s report 
advanced five core responsibilities, namely:
1  global leadership to prevent and end conflict;
2  uphold the norms that safeguard humanity;
3  leave no one behind;
4  change people’s lives—from delivering aid to ending need; and
5  invest in humanity.
From all these responsibilities, points 4 and 5 specifically addressed the problems 
of the humanitarian-development nexus and the inherent challenges of coordi-
nated and strategic crisis management.
under the fourth responsibility, the report includes some ambitious recommen-
dations for the transcendence of the humanitarian and development divide to 
deliver collective outcomes, a division that, as the report stresses, makes no sense 
for the affected populations. The report suggests that ‘we must commit to work 
according to comparative advantage, under one leadership, and to move beyond 
the comfort of traditional silos, mandates and institutional boundaries to operate 
with a greater diversity of partners and in support of local and national actors’ 
(united Nations General Assembly 2016, para. 177). One of the recommenda-
tions called upon donors to move beyond humanitarian- development divisions 
that foster fragmentation in aid towards an approach that allows strategic out-
comes to be achieved in a predictable and sustainable manner (ibid., para. 157).
The fifth responsibility, focused on addressing financial concerns, yielded 
the most considerable achievement during this Summit—the development of 
a Grand Bargain for effective funding and expenditure methods. The Grand 
Bargain proposal covers ten goals with a total of 51 commitments, including a 
strong emphasis on supporting and including locals and the joint and efficient, 
long-term commitment beyond humanitarian actors. This proposal articulates 
the need to work together efficiently, transparently and harmoniously, not only 
with humanitarian and development workers but with new and existing partners, 
including the private sector, individuals and non-traditional sources of funding 
(IASC 2017). Bridging the gap between the humanitarian and development di-
vide is therefore an important aspect and comprises one of the ten work streams 
through which the Grand Bargain is being implemented. However, progress has 
so far remained unclear (Horvath, Ruppert and Steets 2017).
The WHS generated more than 3,000 commitments to action and launched 
more than a dozen new partnerships and initiatives to turn the ‘Agenda for 
 Humanity’ into a meaningful change for the world’s most vulnerable people. In 
particular, the Grand Bargain and the agreement on collective outcomes across 
the uN system potentially mean a new era for humanitarian assistance which 
works more closely with development, climate change, disaster-risk reduction, 
peacebuilding and other communities of practice. Furthermore, in the WHS 
summary report (united Nations General Assembly 2016), the Secretary- General 
noted that a new and coherent approach is required in addressing root causes, 
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increasing political diplomacy for prevention and conflict resolution, and bring-
ing humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts together. Although a 
reform of the humanitarian system has not been realized as some expected, the 
overall effects of the Summit should not be underestimated.
As with Resolution 46/182, the basic assumption of the Summit was that 
more coordinated and cooperative actions among related actors would lead to 
a solution to the problem. However, it remains to be seen if such an actor-based 
 approach will result in a system that is greater than the sum of its parts or will end 
up obscuring each actor’s responsibilities. The WHS is just a single step towards 
effective humanitarian crisis management, and continued efforts to fully imple-
ment the commitments are required.
About this book: the continuum of humanitarian 
crisis management
From all these reforms and debates, a number of fundamental questions can be 
raised: To what extent have these new ideas and institutions resulted in better 
management of humanitarian crises? What factors or conditions promote or 
hinder cooperative actions among actors? And does the difference between cri-
ses and contexts matter in realizing coordinated actions among different actors, 
and if so, in what ways? There are therefore good reasons to assess the level of 
achievement to date and to identify what remains to be done based on concrete 
case studies of humanitarian crisis management. Critical perspectives can be 
shared by different actors based around these questions.
As the road towards the WHS indicates, the relationship between humani-
tarianism and development is at the center of the need for reform in crisis man-
agement. Hilhorst (2016) stressed this difficulty of distinguishing between crisis 
and normality: conflict and disasters are visible breakpoints in the social order, 
creating a considerable degree of chaos and disruption but are also marked by 
processes of continuity and re-ordering. Humanitarian aid appears clearly in 
the realm of crisis, but a new set of practices should be interpreted as an appre-
ciation of aid that builds people’s capacities to manage their own lives. This has 
also been emphasized by the present uN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, 
who pointed out the need ‘to build and sustain peace across the continuum, from 
prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping to peacebuilding and long-term 
development’ (united Nations Secretary-General 2017; emphasis added). The 
underlying reason is that the critical phase of emergencies is only the tip of the 
iceberg of a much more complex phenomenon requiring comprehensive, long-
term strategies for a wider range of actors to reach sustainable solutions or, as 
another previous head of uNHCR Sadako Ogata succinctly described, the rec-
ognition that ‘there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems’ 
(Tan 2005).
Shedding light on this predicament is the main purpose of this book. It is the 
result of a three-year research project funded by Japan International Coopera-
tion Agency Research Institute since January 2015 entitled ‘Comparative Study 
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of Humanitarian Crisis Management from the Perspective of Bilateral Coopera-
tion Agencies.’ Reflecting on the history of practice and research on the problem 
of linking humanitarian and development action, several features of the research 
design deserve mention.
First, the driving concepts of the research were the continuum—the task of 
providing more than relief by connecting the phases of response, recovery and 
 prevention—and crisis management, which is defined as the overall process of aim-
ing to realize such a continuum. In Chapter 2, Gómez and Kawaguchi explore 
this ‘humanitarian-development’ framework in detail, looking at the continuum 
both in terms of actors and phases, and the degree to which the established hu-
manitarian mandates constrained their effective performance. Crisis manage-
ment is used as a proxy of the humanitarian-development nexus wording for 
two reasons: first, since the gray zone between them is what is under question, 
it is necessary to have a neutral framing that avoids the traps of sectionalism 
underlying a monolithic conception of humanitarian action and development; 
besides, such framing also recognizes the wider spectrum of actors involved in 
doing more than providing relief, as described above.
Moreover, the ‘humanitarian-development’ framing starts by approaching 
the problem of the continuum from the point of view of the international sup-
ply side; however, whether this is the best way to approach humanitarian crisis 
management has to be questioned. From the recipient side, the difference be-
tween humanitarian and development actors makes little sense, as local actors 
and contexts are critical for success throughout all phases of relief, recovery and 
prevention (OCHA and DARA 2014). Framed within this context, the authors 
approached the discussion based on the phases of the crisis and their continuum, 
focusing on people’s needs while evaluating how two or more epistemic commu-
nities can work together to address changing needs after an emergency.
Second, this book has taken a special interest in the approaches of major bilateral 
donors (i.e., the uS, the uK, Japan and the european union, as a quasi- bilateral 
actor). There are concerns regarding the ‘bilateralization’ (Macrae and Harmer 
2004) of humanitarian action due to the large proportion of humanitarian funding 
provided by governments (see Figure 1.1). Despite concerns over the categorical 
diminution of aid independence and neutrality, there is a scarcity of research on how 
these actors actually contribute to realizing the continuum of crisis management.
As early as the mid-1990s, there have been several approaches and tools (such 
as in-kind, technical and financial assistance) to address the problem of realiz-
ing the continuum. For example, the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (now 
 Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, DCHA) was created by the 
united States Agency for International Development (uSAID) in 1992 (Olson 
2005). eCHO was created in 1992 and, in the same year, the united Kingdom 
Overseas  Development Administration (now the Department for International 
 Development, DFID) modified its structure to cover relief assistance. In April 
1992, the International emergency Relief Division was created by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan to manage disaster- related emergency assistance. By 
separating management of humanitarian issues from the rest of ODA, the need 
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for improving humanitarian-development nexus increased, with donor agencies 
playing the key role in realizing it.
Subsequent efforts by different governments to realize the continuum of human-
itarian crisis management deserve objective review and evaluation. In addition to 
these government agencies, contributions from bilateral donors appear as windows 
of opportunity to resolve sectionalism through their long-term programming and 
diplomatic significance. Bilateral donors/agencies, especially embassies and devel-
opment agencies, are expected to have a longer presence in crisis-affected areas, 
allowing them to develop a more holistic perspective of the problem. In sum, the 
deep examination of policies and past experiences of the bilateral donors and agen-
cies offers a meaningful opportunity to improve humanitarian crisis management.
In order to see this history of crisis management in detail, the research for this 
volume was not only limited to reviews of policies and consultations with the head-
quarters of major organizations. It also comprises a series of case studies that present 
humanitarian crisis management experiences over the last two decades. The book 
validates and assesses the continuum of humanitarian crisis management across 
selected case studies in the streams of both natural disasters and conflict- affected 
areas. each of the two types of crises is preceded by an introduction that highlights 
specific ways that practitioners and scholars have approached the problem of the 
continuum from their own experiences and with different tools (Chapters 3 and 7). 
Similar actors appear in both types of crises, although their paths and strategies are 
meaningfully different. understanding the differences of the continuum in both 
types of crisis scenarios is also one of this project’s goals.
Figure 1.1  Distribution of international humanitarian assistance and top seven govern-
mental and eu institutional donors, 2016 (uS$ billions).
Note: eu institutions are included separately for comparison. Turkey is shaded differently because 
the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC is largely composed of hosting Syrian 
refugees in Turkey.
Source: authors, based on Development Initiatives (2017).
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Case studies were selected on the basis of their globally significant impacts, the 
balance in the presence of actors in crisis areas, geographical diversity, and the 
new challenges they brought to humanitarian crisis management. The disasters 
that were induced by armed conflict such as Timor-Leste (Chapter 4), South 
Sudan (Chapter 5), and the Syrian crisis (Chapter 6) provide accounts of achiev-
ing post-conflict peacebuilding and sustaining peace. The case of Timor-Leste 
introduces a magnified view of a prolonged struggle for peace and the periodic or 
subsequent menaces brought about by the relapse into conflict. Despite the ear-
lier attainment of peace, the case of South Sudan explores the recurring relapse 
into conflict and the long humanitarian crisis. The conflict in Syria illustrates the 
early need for development and promotion of the continuum.
On the other hand, the section on humanitarian crisis management in dis-
aster contexts is substantiated by case studies of Hurricane Mitch in  Honduras 
 (Chapter 8), the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia  (Chapter 9), 
and Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines (Chapter 10). Looking at Honduras 
after Hurricane Mitch (1998) presents a long-term disaster scenario representing 
the Latin American region through which the challenge of engendering preven-
tion after a catastrophe is protracted. The 2004 India Ocean tsunami in Indo-
nesia was also a globally significant large-scale disaster, paving the way to the 
emergence of the current disaster risk reduction mantra of ‘build back better.’ 
Lastly, Typhoon Yolanda, which devastated central Philippines in 2013, is as-
sessed as a model for the present continuum realization and a consideration of the 
challenges in undertaking this word.
The team has conducted interviews with international organizations, bilateral 
cooperation agencies, NGOs, government officials and research institutes at the 
headquarters and field levels in 13 countries. In May 2016, the research team 
produced some messages for the WHS that were distributed to introduce this 
research project to relevant stakeholders and field practitioners.
This book aims to find ways forward in humanitarian crisis management from 
an academic perspective, while retaining an awareness of the existing history of 
efforts. Despite all of the attention on the nexus problem, there are few publica-
tions dedicated to understanding the continuum and the evolution of approaches. 
The IFRC made some early efforts through the works of Hagman, Beer and 
Röda Korset (1984), Hagman (1988) and McAllister (1993), as well as Anderson 
and Woodrow (1989). Afterward, there are multiple works of gray literature, con-
sultant reports, policy papers, and some journal articles; however, there is scarcely 
any academic monographs dedicated to this theme—perhaps with the exception of 
Macrae’s (2001) book on political emergencies. This dearth of publications on the 
humanitarian- development nexus is attributed to the excessive attention given to 
coordination— the other major issue in the emergence of the humanitarian sector in 
global governance, as described above (Smillie 1998). Another possible explanation 
is that consolidating humanitarian affairs as a separate operational branch has until 
now been the main priority. In any case, the nexus has unfortunately not been fol-
lowed by the development of a dedicated academic research community.
In addition to the WHS, there has been a series of major events in 2015 and 
2016 such as the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris 
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 Declaration on Climate Change, a review of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
architecture, and the Sendai Framework for Action in Disaster Risk Reduction, 
among others. These events have reinforced the need for crosscutting coherence 
between different approaches to the global governance of humanitarian crises. 
This book is intended to provide the basis for such coherence, moving beyond the 
humanitarian- development nexus by conceiving of a humanitarian crisis manage-
ment that is better informed by the past and more relevant to present challenges.
Notes
 1 More recently, linking humanitarian and, development aid to political and security 
objectives is attracting international attention, especially in conflict and fragile envi-
ronments (Hinds 2015).
 2 There are currently 42 members of the Good Humanitarian Donorship group. See: 
https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/about-us/about-ghd.html.
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Introduction
The notion that ‘relief alone is not enough’ is common to all actors involved in 
the management of humanitarian crises. This notion was officially framed at the 
united Nations (uN) in 1991 as a ‘continuum from relief to rehabilitation and 
development,’ and up until today, this remains a challenging task in the agenda 
of international assistance organizations, as we saw in Chapter 1. Support by the 
international community to the full picture of humanitarian crisis management 
is not merely a token of altruism, but close to a duty. In fact, absence or failure to 
offer adequate protection and assistance in the face of crisis is heavily criticized, 
motivating a great deal of soul-searching, usually followed by renewed compro-
mises for doing better. That has been the case after famines in the Horn of Africa 
in the 1980s, sadly repeated in 2011, the mass atrocities in Rwanda and Kosovo, 
a devastating tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, to name but a few events 
behind the prominence of humanitarian crises on the international agenda.
Recent reviews on the topic show that there is no conceptual clarity or agree-
ment on what realizing the continuum actually means (Steets 2011; Otto 2013) 
and despite much talk, it generally include negative reports about progress in 
practice. However, the continuum is important not only because of the possible 
gains in efficiency, but also because aid that fails to recognize the dynamics of 
a crisis can harm already embattled populations. For instance, free provision of 
goods and services can destroy the jobs of local actors who provide those things 
during normal times. unmanaged recovery may also interfere with the plans for 
building back better, making societies less resilient. Besides, giving priority to 
the continuum opens opportunities to include crisis prevention and preparedness 
in established development activities. Recognizing and acting within the con-
tinuum throughout humanitarian crisis management is thus a human security 
challenge that deserves more attention (see Kaldor, Martin and Selchow 2007; 
Gómez 2014; Kamidohzono, Gómez and Mine 2016; Tanaka 2015).
Given this lack of conceptual clarity, we put forward in this chapter a theoret-
ical model for studying the continuum of humanitarian crisis management. The 
model is based on the main approaches devised after the Cold War by multilat-
eral and bilateral actors, and a critical approach to their consistency/coherence 
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with the original problem at hand. Moreover, we suggest that one of the reasons 
why shared understanding on the continuum has not been possible is due to the 
paucity of efforts to clarify its meaning in a way that leads to an understanding 
compatible with both humanitarian crises in general and crisis-specific settings. 
Therefore, the model we suggest is also conceived in conversation with other epis-
temic communities working on peacebuilding and disaster risk reduction, which 
are reviewed in depth in the introductions to the corresponding case studies. 
These allow us to suggest an analytical framework good enough to orient case 
studies, which we could later report through the research findings.
Before moving on, a couple of clarifications are however necessary. First, it 
should be clear that by sticking to the original framing of the problem as the 
continuum, we are not favoring any single approach or specific policy. We use 
the word ‘continuum’ as a neutral, analytical concept to describe the prob-
lem of ‘doing more than relief ’ and allow comparisons across different poli-
cies and approaches. In the 1990s, the word ‘continuum’ was put forward as 
an approach to the problem, but one that emphasized a linear sequence of 
phases and actors, and was strongly criticized for its inaccuracy (DHA 1995). 
This explains its early disappearance from some organizations’ parlance, such 
as the uN Development Programme (uNDP) (Smillie 1998, xxviii) and the 
european Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (eCHO). This 
criticism still can be heard (Macrae 2001), especially when new approaches are 
presented; yet no alternative to describe the problem has been agreed. Other 
candidates have important limitations: the term ‘contiguum’ has received lit-
tle attention outside its european proponents, and it is not properly a word; 
the concept of a ‘gap’ is too generic, and is historically too close to the work 
of the uN High Commissioner for Refugees (uNHCR) (Crisp 2001). While 
the ‘humanitarian- development nexus’ is an appealing name, it conceals what 
may be in fact part of the problem—for those affected by crisis, the difference 
between humanitarian and developmental aid makes no sense (OCHA and 
DARA 2014). Mindful of these criticisms and ready to reflect them through our 
analysis, the concept of the continuum still seems an attractive option to frame 
our discussion of the problem.
Second, in this paper, realizing the continuum is presented as the heart of crisis 
management, by which we understand the comprehensive effort of the interna-
tional community to deal with humanitarian emergencies. This understanding is 
not central to the scholarship on crisis management (Boin, McConnell and Hart 
2008), but through the process leading up to the World Humanitarian Summit 
in 2016, it has been put forth as an umbrella concept that tries to align in the 
field certain mandates that sometimes work in silos at the international level: 
humanitarian relief, peacebuilding, disaster risk reduction, development and cli-
mate change.1 Therefore, management implies attention to the different phases 
of a crisis, and thus our research is not limited to relief only. Multiple phases and 
actors reflect the dynamic change of needs throughout a crisis and its aftermath, 
requiring both short-term and long-term commitments to achieve the final goal 
of securing humans. Thus, ‘management’ is preferred over mere assistance and 
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aid because the term reflects the changing nature of the global commitment, 
suggesting there is some sort of system covering all phases of crisis, as well as the 
multiplicity of actors involved.
Lastly, while conceptual in spirit, the present research is also the result of 
a series of 50 semi-structured interviews made with different stakeholders in-
volved in crisis management. Two rounds of face-to-face interviews were held 
in February and May–June 2015 at headquarters in Tokyo, Brussels, Geneva, 
London, New York, and Washington DC., together with complementary video-
conferences, consultations, and interviews. Interviewees included the employees 
of bilateral agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and academics and practitioners who work in single mandate or 
multi-mandate organizations. All have experience in the approaches covered by 
the research. In addition, insights gained from several events held during the 
2015 World  Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, as well as the 2016 World 
Humanitarian Summit and its preparatory activities, provided important inputs 
to the research.
In the next section, we start by distilling the basic elements that require consid-
eration when theorizing on the continuum as it was originally introduced in the 
1991 uN resolution. After that, we review the most relevant, direct approaches to 
define and realize the continuum by both bilateral and multilateral actors. From 
these experiences, we proceed to sketch a model that could be used to study the 
continuum empirically. The last section sums up the discussion, offering a syn-
thesis of the model of the continuum and its limits.
A framework for comparison
The uN Resolution 46/182 presented the ideal of the continuum as an essen-
tial goal and tool for the emerging humanitarian system in general. This reso-
lution was not the first time such a vision had been put forward (see Kent 1983; 
 McAllister 1993; Barnett 2011) but because it is a widely recognized landmark in 
global humanitarian affairs, it offers an appropriate starting point for our work. 
The resolution gave impetus to the emergence and consolidation of humanitar-
ian affairs through the uN system, as well as among donors, who created specific 
divisions to deal with humanitarian affairs in the following years, as described 
in Chapter 1.
The resolution is, nonetheless, ambiguous in its description of the continuum: 
in some sections it is presented as a matter of phases, and in others as a matter of 
actors. In terms of phases, the resolution emphasizes the importance of prevention 
and preparedness, explaining that ‘economic growth and sustainable develop-
ment are essential’ for this purpose. Then, once a crisis occurs, the continuum im-
plies ‘a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development’ (united 
Nations General Assembly 1991). In other sections, it also refers to ‘reconstruc-
tion’ and ‘recovery,’ evidence of the multiplicity of similar concepts resulting 
from a lack of general agreement on an established definition. Regarding ac-
tors, the resolution distinguishes between development assistance organizations 
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and ‘those responsible for emergency and recovery,’ who are merely expected 
to collaborate. The resolution also warns against contributions to humanitarian 
assistance affecting existing contributions to international cooperation efforts for 
development.
This ambiguity between phases and actors regarding the crux of the contin-
uum offers an appealing frame to compare existing approaches. While the two 
components overlap, and both are necessary in practice, they represent different 
perspectives on what the problem is. Realizing the continuum in terms of phases 
suggests the problem is devising the strateg y for undertaking in a timely manner 
the different types of necessary post-crisis activities. On the other hand, describ-
ing the problem in terms of actors implies that coordination is the main hurdle 
preventing or promoting the realization of the continuum. If we take strategy to 
be the major concern, covering needs is more important than who actually does 
the job. Contrastingly, coordination assumes that actors and their mandates are 
fixed, so success is mainly a matter of joint efforts. Comparing the weight given 
to either phases or actors in approaches to the continuum during the last quarter 
century will help elucidate the commonalities and discrepancies between these 
approaches.
Finally, there is an additional factor that deserves special mention: funding. 
How money flows during the management of a crisis greatly influences the kinds 
of problems that are relevant in realizing the continuum. Does it help to develop 
strategies that connect phases? Or does it help to coordinate actors? Or both? Or 
neither? For instance, the resolution established contingency funding dedicated 
exclusively to emergencies, so it hindered from the very beginning the process of 
transforming relief money into recovery money. Observe how Steets (2011), in 
her analysis of the continuum/contiguum, argues for distinguishing the discon-
nect between humanitarian and development assistance and the funding gap, as 
two issues deserving separate treatment. While we consider the two to be close 
enough to make overall suggestions, we take her point and include funding as an 
additional parameter for comparison.
General approaches to the continuum: multilateral 
and bilateral experiences
Following the 1991 uN resolution and focusing on bilateral actors, there are at 
least four major efforts to directly address the problem of the continuum, namely: 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), ‘Relief to Develop-
ment’ or ‘Developmental relief,’ the Seamless Approach, and Resilience. Besides, 
there are two major multilateral efforts that deserve mention because they keep 
receiving attention in practice: the gap approach and early recovery through 
the humanitarian cluster coordination. That said, it should be noted that many 
other organizations during the nineties and afterwards developed their own tools 
to address the continuum through their own expertise. Smillie (1998) presents 
uNHCR’s Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) as an example of how the organiza-
tion stretches its mandate to do development-like activities. In its transformation 
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from a development agency to a humanitarian or hybrid one, the World Food 
Program (WFP) also created tools for transition, such as Protracted Relief and 
Recovery Operations (Shaw 2011), through which the change from relief to ser-
vice delivery and autonomy is supported. The united Nations Children’s Fund 
(uNICeF) also has a double humanitarian-development mandate although, by 
1998, Macrae and Bradbury (1998) suggest the agency only reluctantly became 
involved in crisis; yet, nowadays uNICeF leads the education cluster, which has 
been evaluated as functioning very well (Steets et al. 2010). The uN Development 
Programme (uNDP) was set for a slow start, creating in 1995 an emergency Re-
sponse  Division, which became the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
(BCPR), seeking to become the ‘uN Coordinator for Recovery’ (Mark Malloch 
Brown, quoted by Suhrke and Ofstad 2005, 9), a bureau that was dissolved in 
2014 (Call and Collin 2015, 11); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM) have also activities tailored to recovery and transition.
In this section, we introduce each of them before analyzing their commonali-
ties and differences in relation to the elements identified in the previous section. It 
is worth noting that other organizations developed their own approaches for their 
internal work, as Higashiura and Gómez describe about the Red Cross  Movement 
in Chapter 7 of this volume, and as has also been reported on uNICeF (Macrae 
and Bradbury 1998) and the WFP (Shaw 2011). Still, we focused on those efforts 
that tried to reach consensus beyond the original organization involved.
LRRD by the European Union
Among ‘bilateral’ approaches, eu’s Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Develop-
ment (LRRD) (eC 1996) is perhaps the longest standing example of an approach 
to the continuum. LRRD was originally the eu’s proposal to realize the con-
tinuum, although a footnote suggests that this should be replaced by ‘the con-
tiguum’ to reflect how operations are simultaneous in the field. There have been 
two eC communications devoted to it (1996, 2001) and it was later part of the 
 european Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (eC 2007); LRRD is usually associ-
ated with eCHO, although ideally it was to involve also the Directorate-General 
for International  Cooperation and Development (DeVCO) for development,2 
and even the  european  external  Action Service (eeAS, previously ReLeX) in 
charge of common foreign and security policy.
The LRRD approach focuses on pointing out the main issues that are prob-
lematic in the gray zone between relief and development. These include:
•	 strategic planning policy comprising political, developmental, social and 
technical aspects,
•	 coordination both between donors and internal to the eu;
•	 timing for smooth handover and articulation between different aid 
approaches;
•	 faster decision-making procedures;
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•	 selection of adequate implementing partners, which includes a wide range of 
actors, such as NGOs (60%), uN agencies (20%), and the Red Cross (15%); 
and
•	 ability to mobilize resources—but not necessarily new mechanisms.
Besides, the communications recognize the existence of other issues beyond the 
reach of the LRRD approach that affect what can actually be achieved, such 
as the approval from the recipient country and the trade-off between speed and 
flexibility and quality control.
While these issues apply in general to the continuum, the LRRD has a clear 
focus on coordinating eu’s aid internally. However, a 2014 review (ADe and 
Humanitarian Futures Programme 2014, 90) suggests that this has been largely 
unsuccessful, particularly because ‘humanitarian aid strives to remain inde-
pendent, while development aid seeks to align with recipient governments.’ Also 
problematic is the perception that, in the end, LRRD has been mainly about 
how to handover eCHO projects to other instruments of the european union, 
which is a non-starter. At the implementation level, there have been efforts of 
enhanced collaboration beyond handovers and exit strategies, such as the Joint 
Humanitarian- Development Framework ( JHDF) methodology; yet, overall, 
Morazan et al. (2012, 21) observe that ‘what has been missing … is the political 
will to understand and support these complex dynamics of crisis resolution and 
LRRD in a meaningful manner.’
Relief to Development by the United States
united States Agency for International Development (uSAID) is other organi-
zation that has put emphasis on the continuum even before 1991. The Office of 
uS Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was created in 1964 as part of uSAID 
in charge of initial relief, which in the seventies and eighties was broadened to 
disaster assistance, implying prevention/preparedness as well as recovery and 
rehabilitation (Olson 2005). This overstretch of functions was not welcomed by 
all in OFDA and it is still a source of conflict over mission boundaries. The 
uneasiness also reflects a general disinterest of development with disasters and a 
difficult relationship between uSAID and OFDA, which, similar to the eu, has 
been the focus of the agency action on the continuum. Besides, it should be borne 
in mind that other branches of the federal government also have a direct role in 
responses to humanitarian crises, like the Departments of State and Defense, 
while some other offices may jump in depending on the needs on the ground, 
complicating coordination.
Yoshikawa (2013, 11) affirms that the ‘uS government has no strategy or lead 
office with a mandate or dedicated resources for managing transitions from relief 
to development,’ but instead several bureaus in different departments play roles. 
This has resulted, as Koddenbrock and Büttner (2009, 130) suggest, in a less fo-
cused debate, where several concepts exist: development-relief, relief to development, or 
relief, transition, and development. These examples tend to be crisis-specific, such as 
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the Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) created in 1994 to work mainly in con-
flicts (Mendelson-Forman 2014, 40), or uSAID long standing work on food se-
curity, which has been central to uSAID approaches to the continuum.3 In this 
sense, a report related to the President Clinton Greater Horn of Africa Initiative 
created in 1994 to improve food security and prevent conflict, deserves especial 
mention. The report (Inter-Agency Team on Rapid Transitions from Relief to 
Development 1996) puts forward some principles and operating guidelines for 
the realization of the continuum, summarized in four basic points:
1  local responsibility for the transition;
2  international responsibility to assure positive impact through strategic 
coordination;
3  relief programs reinforcing development; and
4  development designed for prevention or mitigation.
Then, the report provides a meticulous analysis of uSAID constraints to put 
these in practice, dealing with the corporate culture, legislation and regulations, 
financial and human resources, program planning and policies and procedures.
The Gap Approach
An early example of trying to bridge the division between humanitarian uN 
agencies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) was the Brookings  Process 
spearheaded by uNHCR and the World Bank in 1999 (Crisp 2001). The Bank 
had created in 1997 its own Post-Conflict unit and uNHCR was looking for 
other partners while trying to provide permanent solutions to displacement. Two 
gaps were the focus of the attention: institutional arrangements and funding sys-
tems. As a solution, the uNHCR and the World Bank proposed ‘not another co-
ordinating mechanism, nor a global trust fund. It is an action- and field-oriented 
coalition formed on a voluntary basis and aimed at ensuring a more predictable 
coherent, flexible and timely response of the key players in a given post-conflict 
situation’ (uNHCR 1999, cited by Crisp 2001). While this initiative has sur-
vived with other names, the Brooking Process barely got off the ground (Suhrke 
and Ofstad 2005). Suhrke and Ofstad suggest that behind this was resistance by 
donors to developing a regime demanding more funds and a new bureaucratic 
layer, preferring instead control over the money and more coordination.
Seamless assistance by Japan
After leaving uNHCR, Sadako Ogata became the president of the Japan In-
ternational Cooperation Agency ( JICA), where she continued supporting initia-
tives exploring the gap agenda (Kamidohzono, Gómez and Mine 2016). During 
her long tenure, a seamless assistance ‘that spans everything from prevention of 
conflict and natural disasters to emergency aid following a conflict or disaster, 
assistance for prompt recovery, and mid- to long-term development assistance’ 
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became one of the organizations’ main strategies until 2017. Pressure to attend 
emergencies has resulted in multiple tools and organization changes, such as a 
fast track system for technical cooperation and more deployment of staff to local 
offices. Seamless assistance has been especially important in the area of natural 
hazards, involving concerns about (1) timeliness, (2) sectors, (3) levels of national 
governance and other actors involved, and (4) how to combine structural and 
non-structural measures for mitigation and adaptation ( JICA 2015). JICA is, 
nonetheless, only in charge of implementation of ODA, and only of bilateral, 
development flows, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) manages the 
core of Japan’s humanitarian assistance. Therefore, JICA’s seamless assistance 
is only about JICA’s assistance itself, in contrast to eu’s LRRD and resilience 
approaches addressing the differences between humanitarian, development and 
foreign affairs institutions.4 From MOFA’s side, the first humanitarian policy was 
drafted in 2011. It includes smooth transition5 as a policy of response in reference 
to the different phases of crisis management, although somehow limited to ref-
ugee crises. The policy endorses the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, 
but it presents nothing more than linear thinking about the continuum without 
further detail (MOFA 2011).6
Early recovery through the Humanitarian Cluster System
early recovery was one of eleven clusters through which humanitarian organi-
zations are coordinated nowadays. Initially, early recovery was about generating 
‘self-sustaining, nationally owned, and resilient processes for post-crisis recovery. 
early Recovery encompasses governance, livelihoods, shelter, environment and 
social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations’ (IASC 
2006, 1). The initial model comprises two major phases being linked by early 
recovery activities. early Recovery is also described as a multidimensional pro-
cess, guided by development principles in a humanitarian setting, in which the 
national ownership and leadership is vital. In practice, the early Recovery clus-
ter has been seen as one of the less effective (Taylor et al. 2012), overlapping with 
cluster coordination because it covers sectors for which other clusters already 
exist. Steets et al. (2010) show how the cluster helped closing gaps left by other 
clusters, for instance street cleaning in Haiti, but such a catch-all approach was 
not sustainable, generating doubts about what early recovery actually is (Bailey 
et al. 2009) and whether having a cluster was not actually part of the problem 
(Steets et al. 2010, 122). In 2012, it was decided that this cluster would be estab-
lished only exceptionally, ‘where early recovery areas are not covered by existing 
clusters or alternative mechanisms’ (IASC 2012).
The 2015 revision of the reference module for cluster coordination at country 
level (IASC 2015) further reflects the evolution of the system in relation to the 
continuum. First, it opens with a new section on clusters and government-led sec-
tors, through which it is suggested that adequate and not constrained government 
capacity may conduce to no activation of clusters, but work through national 
sectors. The continuum is thus ideally subordinated to the local process. Second, 
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two phases of the crises are recognized: emergency and recovery; where the latter 
during which de-activation or transition of the clusters ‘to national emergency or 
recovery and development coordination structures’ takes place. Clusters are due 
to transition or de-activate, even merge, at their own pace, modifying their ac-
tivities to support local capacity and preparedness. In principle, this appears as a 
handover of the operation (i.e., a linear transition)—although in practice several 
of the same agencies and organizations with flexible mandates will continue as 
development partners. So, for instance, the BCPR created tools for livelihoods 
and economic recovery, with a model more sophisticated than the original one of 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), identifying different interacting 
levels through which recovery takes place (uNDP 2013; see Figure 2.1).
Resilience
In 2011 a famine struck once again the Horn of Africa, triggering attention to 
what a comprehensive approach to crisis management implied. This resulted 
in the emergence of resilience, a concept equally embraced, at least in paper, by 
 uSAID (2012), DFID (2011) and the eu institutions (eC 2012, 2013, 2015). The 
definition is mostly common, referring to ‘the ability of people, households, com-
munities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks 
and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclu-
sive growth’ (uSAID 2012). There is less emphasis on crisis phases and more on 
forging a shared vision for all actors that need to be involved to do their share. 
While the appeal is general, all the organizations highlight their internal prob-
lems coordinating humanitarian and development branches. Issues are similar to 
those from decades ago in relation to programming, common analysis, coordina-
tion and better financing mechanisms, with the important addition of learning 
and innovation.
Resilience is still regarded an experimental approach. uK’s DFID has 
made efforts to embed the approach in all country programs, starting from a 
Figure 2.1  Timing and intensity of the three tracks for livelihoods recovery.
Source: uNDP (2013, 9).
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Multi-hazard Disaster Risk Assessment, and from there on influencing the pro-
gramming. It has also made available multi-year resources for implementing 
partners to develop their own capabilities as well as tools for better understand-
ing of resilience impact of interventions. The large number of works on resilience 
published by the Overseas Development Institute, an influential London based 
think tank, suggests commitment, although the OeCD (2014) points out that 
the implementation is weak. The eu appears to be a step ahead pushing imple-
menting partners to operationalize (eCHO 2014) and gathering a wide range of 
relevant experiences in order to inform forthcoming practice (eC 2015). uSAID 
tried joint planning cells in order to help humanitarian and development areas 
work together in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, but the experiment did not 
spread. While there is agreement at the senior, headquarters level, implementa-
tion is not clear—it was mentioned that some local offices may not even know 
about the concept.
Comparative analysis of general approaches 
to the continuum
In this section, we look across the approaches described above, using the strategy- 
coordination-funding framework in relation with phases and actors to organ-
ize the presentation. The aim is to highlight commonalities and divergences, as 
well as emerging trends that could be useful when proposing a model that links 
crisis-specific views of the continuum challenge. Particularly interesting here is 
the emphasis on coordination, which tends to concentrate attention on problems 
internal to each donor, or among a couple of agencies. We present a summary 
of the main characteristics in Table 2.1, which includes a row summarizing the 
main issues highlighted by each of the approaches.
Phases and strategy
The first row in Table 2.1 gathers the phases included in each of the approaches 
reviewed. The phase in these approaches reflects how intervener transfer phases 
in their strategy. Relief and development are common on four of the six ap-
proaches, but in between these two, different terms such as rehabilitation, emer-
gency, prevention, prompt recovery, are included in two of the six approaches. 
While the term rehabilitation is used, its meaning is not well-understood (Rebelle 
1999, 36; Steets 2011), and instead recovery has become a more standard word 
for this phase. uNDP’s early recovery policy (uNDP 2008) stresses that early re-
covery is not a stage in the continuum, though the seamless approach and others 
present it as such (Steets 2011).
Perhaps the most interesting feature is the way Resilience places less empha-
sis on distinguishing phases. Definitions of resilience do include an overall idea 
of different activities, for instance when the terms ‘mitigate, and adapt to and 
recover’ appear in the uSAID case. However, the essence of the approach is 
defined by the efforts taken to avoid the identification of phases. A key message, 
Table 2.1 Summary of general approaches to the continuum
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which originates on the LRRD and is reaffirmed in the proposition of Resil-
ience, is that all activities occur in parallel. A commitment to resilience pursues 
contiguous participation during the entire crisis. Moreover, it is worth observing 
that prevention is not conceived as a phase in these propositions, but rather as a 
major issue to be internalized in humanitarian and developmental action. To be 
clear: there is no lack of support for preparedness and prevention, but this is not 
conceived as a phase in the process. Other specific issues, such as timing and im-
plementing partners, are also ambiguous about the essence of the problem of the 
continuum. So, as far as it can be seen from the viewpoint of phases, it is difficult 
to distinguish whether activities or actors with fixed mandates are emphasized.
Actors and coordination
Seen from the viewpoint of their origin, general approaches tend not to go be-
yond the organizations that propose them. LRRD is mostly about connecting 
eCHO with DeVCO, whereas Developmental Relief and the Seamless Approach 
focus on connecting projects and programs internal to the country and their 
 organizations—across uS agencies, including uSAID/OFDA, and inside Japan. 
They reflect a trend among donors to adopt the so-called whole-of- government ap-
proach (WGA); ideally developing cross-governmental structures for decision mak-
ing, planning, coordination and funding under a single strategy, and encouraging 
some donors to ‘integrate humanitarian and development responses and bridge 
aid, security and peacebuilding’ (Bennett 2015, 14). While the proposition of the 
WGA is, in principle, motivated by the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitar-
ian crisis management, accountability and value for money also play an important 
role (ibid., 11)—which explains the observations about funding presented below.
The Resilience approach, as presented by the eu, and by other bilateral agen-
cies and NGOs, has tried to go beyond donor-centric action, and the eu com-
pendium of activities showcases progress (eC 2015). Large initiatives that are 
still ongoing have been tested on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Yet, tools 
presented as joint planning cells (uSAID), Joint Humanitarian- Development 
Framework ( JHDF) methodologies (eCHO-DeVCO),7 and Multi-Hazard 
 Disaster Risk Assessments (DFID), suggest internal practices are the main en-
gine for action.
underlying the Resilience approach’s lack of emphasis on phases is the push 
for deeper and more meaningful coordination. This concern for coordination 
is common to most of the approaches, and is highlighted in the extent to which 
the terms ‘humanitarian’ and ‘development’ refer not to phases but to actors. 
Now, and twenty years ago, making different kinds of organizations sit down and 
work together is difficult. In the case of the uSA, the fact that the Secretary of 
State oversees refugee situations, the Department of Defense also plays a distinct 
role and commands an independent budget, and that twenty other government 
offices are also involved in assistance, makes coordination even more complex 
(Koddenbrock and Büttner 2009). Resilience aims partly to offer a common 
framework for all these actors.
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Issues included in Table 2.1, and the tools described above, are efforts to 
get everyone on the same page, at least in terms of understanding each crisis. 
 Difficulties ensuing from different planning and funding cycles are the target 
of these tools, but ulterior problems are also pointed out. For instance, as noted 
above, humanitarian independence and development partnership with the gov-
ernment tend to conflict. The evaluation suggests that the issue of getting hu-
manitarian and development actors to talk has all along been challenging. The 
call for political will, shared objectives, and governance embraced through Re-
silience is a consequence of this background.
It is also worth noting that the Seamless assistance is an outlier in this sense, in as 
much as its focus on coordination is mainly on different levels of local actors, rather 
than on the donor or international level. This does not mean that other approaches 
have no consideration for these actors. They explicitly put more vulnerable people 
in the center and recognize local responsibility. Nonetheless, it is not clear in an 
overall sense to what extent the other approaches include affected populations, 
not to mention conferring on them the actual ownership of cooperation activities.
Funding
Funding is scarcely mentioned by the bilateral approaches listed, mainly because 
these address internal arrangements, but for multilateral approaches is funda-
mental. It also follows that these approaches are not necessarily supported by 
new resources, but instead focus on improving the use of existing funds, which 
explains the difference between bilateral and multilateral. The case of the eu in-
stitutions is also a little different since they deal with several pots of money, which 
are intended for different purposes. This situation is common to the Japanese 
system, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controls humanitarian funding, 
while JICA uses mainly development funds. The dedicated report on LRRD and 
eu financing instruments by Morazan et al. (2012), discusses in detail the pros 
and cons of considering the need for new, transition-oriented pots of money, ver-
sus adding flexibility to existing instruments favoring the latter. However, in the 
case of  Japan, the Seamless Assistance does not address the division of funds in 
any way.
It is worth observing that early Recovery is one of the clusters receiving less 
support from donors, which is one of the reasons its emphasis has been trans-
formed into crosscutting support for other clusters. This certainly has to do with 
the lack of understanding about what early recovery means, and also with the 
fact that in recovery situation different actors come into play, especially IFIs, who 
may see no need in channeling resources through the cluster system (OCHA, 
uNDP and DOCO 2015, 37). IFIs promote and administer their own donor 
pooled funds (Fengler, Ihsan and Kaiser 2008), and these are different from those 
the OCHA uses for resource allocations during emergencies that on principle are 
limited to funding life-saving activities and humanitarian needs. Nevertheless, 
such funds only represent a very small portion of all the resources (4.4% of the 
total humanitarian response in 2014; Development Initiatives 2014). 
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Conceptualizing the continuum
From the presentation of efforts on the continuum following the 1991 uN resolu-
tion, two major components on its conceptualizations can be distinguished. First, 
a model through which the challenge of realizing the goal of the continuum is 
rationalized and, second, a list of issues which needs to be addressed in order to 
succeed in this goal. In the following two sub-sections, we advance a synthesis of 
the examples reviewed so far.
A model for convergence in humanitarian 
crisis management
The most basic depiction of the continuum between the approaches reviewed 
is as a linear movement between phases and/or between actors. Therefore, a 
general model should at least address these two issues: the issue of linearity, and 
the issue of giving prominence to phases or actors. These two issues are closely 
interlinked, so we need to discuss them in tandem.
As we mentioned in the introduction, linearity was a major reason of disa-
greement on the use of the continuum as an approach. The linear understand-
ing originates from presentations such as ‘from relief to development,’ for which 
there is total correlation between phases and traditional actors. Linearity takes 
usually the shape of a handover between aid providers and between funds. The 
presumption is that humanitarian and development are well-defined, static iden-
tities of actors. However, it should be noted that this may apply, and only to 
a limited extent, to those actors with strict mandates such as OCHA, uNDP, 
uNHCR, OFDA, or eCHO, but it seems to be less important for the rest of the 
actors, particularly for most of the NGO implementers, for bilateral assistance 
in general (Yoshikawa 2013) and, perhaps more importantly, for local actors 
(OCHA and DARA 2014).
Including a phase or a gray zone in the middle of relief and development dis-
rupts the correlation between phases and actors, but the idea of linearity is not 
necessarily changed. The gray zone in the middle has received multiple names: 
rehabilitation, early recovery, reconstruction, with early recovery becoming a 
standard term for the Cluster System, and recovery a standard for natural disas-
ters. The gray zone implies that for crisis management the traditional division of 
actors is not enough, requiring:
1  some expansion of their work;
2  joint work between them; and/or
3  the help of new actors.
A continuum model based on actors would promote (2) in the form of coordina-
tion, while a model based on phases would encourage the innovation and trans-
formation of organizations implied by (1) and (3). Given the challenging nature 
of crisis management, we suggest that changing mandates and mindsets must 
remain an option, and so is the emphasis on phases over actors.
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There is another compelling reason to favor phases: the centrality of local actors in 
pursuing the continuum. By downplaying phases, the actor coordination- oriented 
understanding of the continuum accommodates external actors, particularly those 
with established humanitarian and development mandates. However, this is at the 
cost of overlooking those actors without such constraints, beginning with local gov-
ernment, which ideally should lead all the phases, and not merely be treated as 
one actor among many. In other words, an actor-based conceptualization of the 
continuum tends to become an international coordination guide, rather than a 
demand-driven crisis management model. The fact that phases also play a crucial 
role conveying the idea of progress is not a minor point. The idea of progress is the 
basic motivation of affected populations, local authorities, and even aid providers.
Adopting phases at the heart of the model does not mean linearity (see Figure 
2.2). The point about contiguity and joint work highlighted through coordination 
models is still valid and needs to be internalized. Indeed, it could be said that the 
importance and the challenge of continuum conceptualizations is to ensure that 
a framework based on phases does not interfere with the multiple, non- linear pro-
cesses that are ongoing in the affected areas. As we suggest in Figure 2.3, the dif-
ferent phases should be presented as layers that overlap for long periods, although 
they present different intensities as the crisis progresses. Note that this multilay-
ered activity model combines sequencing and layering in so far as changes within 
the dominant phase follow one after the other, but still for extended periods of 
time activities belonging to different phases overlap on the ground, addressing 
diverse, quickly changing needs as the crisis evolves. 
Figure 2.2  Linear model.
Source: authors.
Figure 2.3  Multilayered activities model.
Source: authors, rearranged based on Wisner and Adams (2002) and FeMA (2011).
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To keep phases to a minimum compatible to all crises, the model is made up 
of only three of them. Relief relates to emergency activities to guarantee short 
term survival, while recovery covers activities oriented to restore or improve 
living conditions before the crisis. We then include prevention—including mit-
igation and preparedness—as a different phase demanding explicit attention, 
as in the case of natural disasters. Prevention here includes actions beyond 
recovery that are devised to stop or attenuate the occurrence or effects of future 
crisis.  However, contrary to the common practice, we suggest that the pre-
vention  activities that are necessary after the crisis, even from day one, are the 
ones in need of recognition from the point of view of the continuum and crisis 
management.
Issues and limitations of the model
The discussion above suggests only a minimum common understanding, so what 
the model can explain is limited. Our model suggests a frame for the contin-
uum through humanitarian crisis management, but does not cover all the issues 
we found through the above examination in terms of strategy, coordination and 
funding. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight explicit issues and limitations of 
the model that need to be explored empirically.
First, it should be verified whether our decision to frame the model in terms of 
phases and strategies is the most convenient way to study the continuum; espe-
cially because the most basic division of phases may not be good enough to cover 
all types of crises. This is critical in armed conflicts, where relief is not part of 
the peacebuilding agenda, and a different arrangement of armed and unarmed 
relief is preferred. A general model of the continuum must therefore allow for 
different configurations of phases to exist. Besides, protracted crises require the 
inclusion of several episodes of crisis in the model, something that the World 
Bank (2011) has attempted with 3D spiral representations. This approach is also 
used for recurrent disasters ( JICA 2015). We could do the same with our model, 
but those models either sacrifice clarity or the contiguity of phases, so we stick to 
the simple 2D version, which can be combined to represent other types of crises 
as in Figure 2.4.
Also in relation to phases, it has to be stressed that the position of prevention as 
part of the management process was not clear through the approaches reviewed. 
Case studies should explore how in the long term prevention activities are in-
cluded and given priority after relief and recovery. The models reviewed suggest 
that scrutinizing the relationship between prevention and development is key to 
understand the existing dynamics, although it should be noted that a framing of 
prevention—mainly as preparedness—has been also present among discussions 
of humanitarian actors work, particularly after disasters.
The compendium of eu experiences on resilience (eC 2015) also makes 
clear that there are strategy issues at different levels in the management of hu-
manitarian crises. So far we have presented visions or concepts that cover the 
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headquarters of the agencies and somehow their implementing partners, but 
strategies have to be updated and adapted for the situation of each specific crisis 
in which it is to be implemented, at least to the extent that local ownership is 
aimed to. It is at this point when the continuum model should match or become 
subordinated to a different strategy or vision: that of local governments or in-
tegrated missions in charge. In other words, the continuum strategy cannot be 
seen in isolation for a single actor, but should be placed in context of the umbrella 
strategy of each specific crisis.
In this sense, the centrality of local actors that we imply through our model 
should be understood as an invitation to avoid approaches to the continuum that 
are focused exclusively on how each organization or donor links its own humani-
tarian and development activities. In the worst-case scenario, mighty actors may 
attempt to supplant locals in commanding the process, which is a recipe for fail-
ure. In the best case, achieving continuity between each external organization 
action would be meaningless in the midst of local disarray. This is, we believe, 
why assessments about continuum approaches always paint a dismal picture. 
Contributions to specific components of the continuum are of course welcome, 
but they will not shine without progress on the bigger picture. And that bigger 
picture is beyond what a single actor can influence.
Still coordination and actor-based approach would remain important, per-
haps not in general, but in particular sectors and through different means of 
implementation. Relationships internal to donors or to the recipient society, as 
well as between multilateral actors and local offices are also of particular in-
terest.  Inside of donors, there are different ministries and agencies which deal 
with different function of the crisis management, such as diplomacy, security, 
development and humanitarian. Other important dimension for coordination 
relates to the actual implementation of aid, namely: at the executive level for 
policy decisions, at the managerial level for the distribution of tasks, and/or 
at the operational level for the actual implementation. each of these levels 
implies the interaction of different actors, for instance inside governments, 
between cooperation agencies, with local authorities, or with implementation 
partners. Not all the dimensions and levels of coordination may have the same 
level of importance in realizing the continuum, yet this is a question to be 
solved empirically.
Figure 2.4  Multilayered activities model applied to a protracted crisis.
Source: authors.
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Funding seems to have been slow in reflecting the overlapping of phases, and 
how actors can actively bridge those phases regardless of budgetary constraints. 
Matters of principle underlie funding arrangements that undermine the realiza-
tion of the continuum. The 1991 resolution created structures explicitly exclusive 
for relief, resulting in differentiated structures, even within donors. Different pots 
of money were originally created not to overlap, and thus structurally the system 
started, if not against the continuum, then without it in mind. Changes of lead-
ership derived from the strategy (e.g., moving, at least nominally, from the relief 
phase to the recovery phase) may also have implications on the way  resources flow: 
criteria for allocation, procedures required, actors involved, and so. An additional 
problem is whether strategies and coordination tools bring along resources, or if 
funding mechanisms rather constraint proposed solutions. empirical evidence of 
whether this is the case needs to be looked at through the case studies.
Separate humanitarian and development budgets reinforce the identities of 
actors. This separation is rooted not only in multilateral institutions but also in 
donors, who theoretically have no single mandate, but both through funding and 
operations sustain parallel systems. Nonetheless, in practice several actors do 
move across phases, and so do their bit in the general continuum. Multi-mandate 
actors abound and put forward different strategies on the field, but somehow the 
policy dialogue remains one about humanitarian and development assistance. 
However, the multi-mandate approach does not mean that actors do not spe-
cialize on specific activities, a potential problem that authors such as Smillie 
(1998) and White and Cliffe (2000) expressed skepticism about, but means that 
the sectors within which they work are covered across phases. This is the direc-
tion the Humanitarian Cluster System seems to be evolving towards, dovetail-
ing with national sectors that should lead recovery and preventive development. 
Case studies should verify whether humanitarian and developmental identities 
actually are important on the ground and whether they are relevant in address-
ing the continuum.
Finally, it must be observed that issues outside the model will certainly arise 
through the case studies and should be used to correct and enrich the model. 
Differences between types of crises are of especial concern. Besides, it should be 
also tested whether the multilayered nature of the model has any practical impli-
cations on the face of linear transitions between phases and actors.
Conclusion
Through this chapter, we put forward a model to study the continuum of hu-
manitarian crisis management based on a critical review of existing approaches 
by bilateral and multilateral actors. We suggest that the best way to visualize 
the process is as a multilayered sequence of phases to which the multiple actors 
involved commit. Issues of strategy, coordination and funding are also stressed 
as fundamental to understand how this process of crisis management takes place, 
which need to be investigated empirically. From this analytical perspective, the 
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following case studies will tackle the questions: to what extent different actors’ ap-
proaches have addressed the continuum in managing humanitarian crises? How 
phases are defined in each of their strategies? What factors or conditions promote 
and hinder these strategies and cooperative actions among actors? Through the 
book conclusion, we will come back to all these questions.
Notes
 1 The european union external Action does recognize, at least in principle, the full 
picture of the continuum as part of crisis management (see Tercovich 2014).
 2 eCHO’s name changed to the Directorate-General for european Civil Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid Operations in 2009, but kept its acronym. Besides, inside 
DeVCO, the Fragility and Resilience unit was created in 2013 partly to be in charge 
of LRRD.
 3 A commended tool to make available resources from existing projects for disaster 
response in crisis-prone countries is the ‘crisis modifier’ (Yoshikawa 2013).
 4 According to Halperin and Michel (2000), from all major donors only Japan and the 
eu do not implement all aid by a single organization.
 5 The word in Japanese is also not the same as the one used in JICA (2015), which is at 
the same time different from that on JICA strategy home page. The idea is nonethe-
less the same.
 6 The Development Cooperation Charter revised in 2015 (MOFA 2015) is the first time 
that relief is included as part of the implementation of development cooperation.
 7 At the field level this works between eCHO and the eu delegation.
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Advancing the ‘continuum’ in post-conflict 
transitions to peace
At his first formal appearance at the united Nations Security Council on January 
10, 2017, Secretary-General António Guterres, who had just assumed the position of 
chief administrator of the world body, took the opportunity to make what he believed 
to be a critically important appeal. He called on members of the most powerful 
organ of the uN to jointly advance efforts ‘to build and sustain peace across the 
continuum, from prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping to peacebuilding 
and long-term development’ (Guterres 2017). Two outright concerns are likely to 
have motivated this plea: firstly, today’s armed conflicts have become more complex, 
intractable and interconnected than ever; and secondly, the continued lackluster per-
formance of the international community, which has remained largely fragmented 
in addressing multiple crises. In his speech, the notion of the ‘continuum’ was used 
by Mr. Guterres to highlight the need to bring together all the relevant actors, neces-
sary policy tools and funds—ensuring their effective integration and sequencing in a 
proper strategic context—in order to promote peacebuilding and sustaining peace.
In the case of armed conflict, developing the right model to describe the con-
tinuum is not an easy task. All armed conflicts are violent, political and tragic. 
each conflict, however, has its own historical background, underlying socio -
economic causes, and unique power dynamics. Most parties involved do not trust 
each other and may disagree in their interpretations of the issues at stake—thus a 
‘one size fits all’ prescription is difficult to apply. Moreover, the conflicts of today 
can be exacerbated by global threats such as terrorism, transnational crime, cli-
mate change and massive population movements. Consequently, past failures to 
implement the kind of policies necessary to address the root causes and effects of 
conflicts have led to missed opportunities and wasted resources.
In this overview, we attempt to critically review some previous international 
efforts and practices to support the transition from conflict to peace. under the 
notion of a strategically conceived ‘continuum,’ we identify key factors required 
to help bring relevant actors, necessary resources and useful policy instruments 
together for the purpose of better managing local processes to advance self- 
sustaining peace in post-conflict states or regions.
Figure 3.1 illustrates eight different sets of intervention models in the tran-
sition between conflict and peace, providing an overall picture of the activities 
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that tend to be employed in countries emerging from armed conflict (OeCD 
2010; Bailey et al. 2009). Among these, stabilization normally includes rapid re-
action and  military activities, but it also can include humanitarian assistance, 
recovery, and development activities (Rotmann and Steinacker 2014; Collinson, 
elhawary,  and  Muggah 2010, 3). Figure 3.1 also shows the central role that 
peacebuilding occupies in post-conflict countries in their transition from conflict 
to peace. For example, state-building is recognized as an essential aid for sup-
porting fragile states in transition, which allows a stronger role for peacebuilding 
but places a lower emphasis on relief. On the other hand, early recovery emerges 
from relief activities, but may also be an activity that can contribute to peace-
building. As we will see below, recent discussions regarding peacebuilding have 
enlarged its scope to encompass other approaches, something those other ap-
proaches may not have. Therefore, peacebuilding seems to provide a promising 
avenue for examining how the international community can realize the contin-
uum after armed conflict. We explore this in more detail in the following sections.
What is peacebuilding?
The notion of peacebuilding has been developed mainly through the uN. In 1992, 
the Report of the Secretary-General, ‘An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping’ (widely known as An Agenda for Peace), introduced 
the idea of peacebuilding as a uN approach to address the issue of armed conflict, 
Figure 3.1  Overlapping intervention models between peace and conflict.
Source: authors, based on OeCD (2010, 2) and Bailey et al. (2009, 8).
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following preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Peacebuilding 
is described as post-conflict ‘action to identify and support structures which will 
tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros-
Ghali 1992, para. 21). Before peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy aims to avoid 
armed conflict through confidence building, early warning, fact-finding, preven-
tive deployment and demilitarized zones. However, when conflict breaks out, 
mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping come into play. 
Peacemaking embraces a wide range of measures such as mediation and nego-
tiation efforts, sanctions and the use of military force. Peacekeeping is primarily 
limited to maintaining ceasefires and providing crucial support for political ef-
forts by peacemakers. Once these have achieved and sustained their objectives, 
cooperative work in peacebuilding to deal with the underlying economic, social, 
cultural, and remaining humanitarian problems can take place. Post-conflict 
peacebuilding primarily overlaps with development activities, and is also referred 
as ‘post-conflict recovery’ and ‘reconstruction.’ In terms of phases, An Agenda for 
Peace showed a fundamentally linear understanding of crisis management.
Later, the ‘Report of the Panel on united Nations Peace Operations’ in 2000 
(uN 2000) refined the four uN approaches to armed conflict, reducing the num-
ber to three: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-
building. In doing so, the uN avoided a linear presentation of the approaches, 
emphasizing instead how they overlap. The ‘united Nations Peacekeeping 
 Operations: Principles and Guidelines’ document (referred to as the Capstone 
Doctrine) in 2008 further reaffirmed this overlapping nature by developing new 
categories of approach: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-
building and peace enforcement, noting that they rarely occur in a linear or 
sequential way but mutually reinforce each other (uNDPKO and DFS 2008, 
18–19). As can be seen in Figure 3.2 from the Capstone Doctrine document, there 
are no relief or prevention phases. However, the model emphasizes how relevant 
actors, including international financial institutions and other donors, uN agen-
cies, and civil society organizations, can work together throughout all phases and 
share the same tasks, such as DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-
gration of former combatants). However, the timeline of the three phases of tran-
sition in Figure 3.2—stabilization, peace consolidation, and long-term recovery 
and development—still demonstrates a linear understanding, with a focus that is 
exclusively on the recovery phase (uNDPKO and DFS 2008).
In the policy area of peacebuilding, yet another reform endeavor was devel-
oped for the sixtieth anniversary of the uN in December 2005. The uN Peace-
building Commission (PBC), a dedicated intergovernmental advisory body in 
the uN system, was established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council in order to bring forward a more strategic and in-
tegrated support for peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected countries. As its 
founding resolutions stress, the PBC was mandated to:
1  bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and 
propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; 
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2  focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts neces-
sary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated 
strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and 
3  provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of 
all relevant actors within and outside the united Nations, to develop best 
practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities 
and to extend the period of attention given by the international community 
to post-conflict recovery (uN 2005).
The PBC was established based on the premise that peacebuilding is essentially 
a political process as much as an operational challenge. While it is often under-
estimated, the basic approaches and directions that the commission prescribed 
to support post-conflict states were well structured and reasonable. What con-
strained the PBC’s performance was its weakness, both institutionally and po-
litically, to play the role expected of it in the process. For example, the powerful 
Security Council was not yet accustomed to hearing the advice from the commis-
sion, which is just one of its subsidiary bodies. In guiding policy discussions, the 
newly created secretariat, called the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), was 
very small and no match for the well-established Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) nor the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in the uN 
bureaucracy. North–South divisions often penetrate PBC political debates, in 
which members from wealthy states tend to represent the donor-side views while 
the members from developing countries are sympathetic to the recipient side. If 
the commission had been equipped with sufficient political clout, many of the 
indicative post-conflict tasks laid out in Figure 3.2, along with the many actors, 
might have been coordinated more effectively from within the PBC platform. 
Contributions from bilateral donors could also have been guided to better syner-
gize with the strategic priorities set by the PBC on a country-specific basis. 
It was therefore unfortunate that this ideal was unsuited to the political realties 
both at the uN headquarters in New York and in the field within post-conflict 
Figure 3.2  The core business of multi-dimensional united Nations peacekeeping operations.
Source: adapted from uNDPKO and DFS (2008, 23); timeline and details added by the authors.
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countries. even so, as seen in Figure 3.2, there is a need to implement those in-
dicative tasks and manage key political processes, as indicated by circles. This 
can be accomplished by involving all of the different stakeholders, with sufficient 
respect for ownership of local government and stakeholders, in appropriate se-
quencing of activities from stabilization to peace consolidation, moving eventu-
ally to long-term recovery and development. This is necessary if we are to help 
bring peace successfully to the target country or region. 
Bridging peacebuilding and humanitarian 
relief in the continuum
Recognizing the inherent limitations of the PBC, the Advisory Group of  experts 
reviewed the uN peacebuilding architecture, leading to a report titled ‘The 
Challenge of Sustaining Peace’ (uN 2015). The report, issued on the occasion of 
the tenth anniversary year of the commission, presented a number of key anal-
yses and recommendations that were later incorporated into additional concur-
rent resolutions adopted unanimously by both the Security Council and General 
Assembly in April 2016 (uN 2016). In relation to our discussion of the peace 
continuum, the following two developments should be given particular attention 
as we elaborate an effective strategy and policies to manage the post-conflict 
transition to peace.
The first is the expansion of the notion of peacebuilding. Indeed, the Advi-
sory Group experts came to conclude that the scope of peacebuilding should no 
longer be limited to the post-conflict context. Based on this new understanding, 
uN members now agree that ‘peacebuilding is an inherently political process 
aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, recurrence or continuation of con-
flict’ and it ‘encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, and human 
rights programmes and mechanisms’ of the united Nations (uN 2016, pream-
ble). Here, the idea of peacebuilding comes to be more closely associated with 
conflict prevention. 
The second is the introduction of the new notion of ‘sustaining peace.’ To draw 
the definition from the above concurrent General Assembly and Security Coun-
cil resolutions, member states of the uN now agree that ‘sustaining peace’ should 
be broadly understood as ‘a goal and a process to build a common vision of a 
society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into 
account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, esca-
lation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting 
parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving 
towards recovery, reconstruction and development.’ They also stress that ‘sus-
taining peace is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the 
Government and all other national stakeholders, and should follow through all 
three pillars of the united Nations engagement at all stages of conflict, and in all 
its dimensions, and needs sustained international attention and assistance’ (uN 
2016, preamble). This is indeed an extensive and even expansive understanding 
of the goal and the process that we are encouraged to manage in our pursuit of 
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peace. Furthermore, the above definition of ‘peacebuilding is fully embedded in 
the text. In this respect, what is expected of the novel notion of ‘sustaining peace’ 
can be interpreted as the joint efforts to advance peace in the ‘continuum,’ cut-
ting across prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
long-term development.
In fact, the resolutions encourage ‘the importance of a comprehensive ap-
proach to sustaining peace’ and enumerate all the following tasks, namely: 
the prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes, strengthening the 
rule of law at the international and national levels, and promoting sustained 
and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social develop-
ment, sustainable development, national reconciliation and unity including 
through inclusive dialogue and mediation, access to justice and transitional 
justice, accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable institu-
tions, gender equality and respect for, and protection of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
(uN 2016, preamble). 
Thus the continuum for sustaining peace is expected to cover at least these tasks 
and approximately overlap with the contents of peacebuilding.
One clear deficiency of peacebuilding as a continuum strategy is the difficulty 
of encompassing humanitarian relief. For example, eide et al. (2005) pointed out 
how a humanitarian dilemma, especially focused on uN integrated missions, arose 
from the relationships between humanitarian, political, security and development 
actors. Humanitarian principles—especially neutrality and  impartiality—make 
it possible to access all conflict areas and ensure communication with all actors in 
order to save lives. These principles are, however, sometimes incompatible with 
the political position of the uN and donors. This is due to the requirement for 
these parties to remain neutral and impartial, which necessitates refraining from 
taking sides in hostilities or engaging at any time in controversies of a political, ra-
cial, religious or ideological nature. In practice, the uN and donors need to rely on 
internationally recognized transitional governments to push the process towards 
peace. Linking the phases of the continuum may be desirable, yet these two ap-
proaches to armed conflict crisis management—peacebuilding and humanitarian 
assistance—cannot easily overcome such dilemmas and integrate relevant actors 
into one single strategy. This is why extra attention needs to be paid to this specific 
disconnect, to ensure that post-conflict policy management tools are placed in the 
full ‘continuum.’ For that purpose, it would prove to be useful, both conceptually 
and practically, to learn that the recent international discourse has broadened the 
scope of peacebuilding to include a prevention perspective. Moreover, the intro-
duction of the concept of ‘sustaining peace’ enables us to link policies and activities 
for peace and security, sustainable development and human rights, and humani-
tarian relief, bringing them closer together into one big strategic picture. 
Managing a transition across this wide spectrum of the continuum does in-
deed constitute a challenge. However, we need to align our divergent supportive 
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activities as much as possible to mutually enhance their effects and avoid hinder-
ing each other in order to maximize the outcome of collective efforts. Toward 
that purpose, it is always important to plan support for projects not only from 
‘supply side’ logic (i.e. the views from aid providers), but also from a ‘demand-side’ 
perspective, namely, the standpoint from the people who seek protection and as-
sistance. It may of course be argued that no action can be taken without thinking 
about the welfare of the recipients. However, it is the prerogative from the side of 
the providers to eventually decide whether to limit or widen the choices of means 
to intervene. On top of that, there are certainly dos and don’ts for each provider 
of troops and contributions from their technical and operational standpoints or as 
a matter of policy. But in the final analysis, all these actions are undertaken for the 
people and populations on the ground, particularly the most vulnerable ones in 
dire need. Peace is only truly sustainable if it includes this people-centered point 
of view. This is probably the fundamental reason why the notion of ‘sustaining 
peace’ is, and should be, introduced in order to achieve the continuum from relief 
to recovery and prevention in a way that makes sustainable development possible.
Actors and financing for continuum 
after armed conflict
The multiplicity of approaches to armed conflict suggests the presence of a con-
stellation of actors that find it difficult to work under a single roof. Besides the 
uN and its agencies, the World Bank and regional development banks also fund 
development programs, while the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) provide hu-
manitarian and development assistance as final implementers. The role of the 
private business sector has also been attracting more attention recently. Bilateral 
donors are now involved as mediators, personnel providers for peace operations, 
funders to multilateral organization, and implementers working parallel through 
bilateral assistance programs.
Coordination appears to be the more critical issue for realizing the continuum 
in armed conflict crises. At the multilateral level, there have been discussions 
about coordination among humanitarian actors in the relief phase, including 
protracted relief, and between humanitarian actors and others in both relief and 
recovery phases through the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator 
(HC/RC) and the Civil–Military Coordinator. Also, there have been discus-
sions within donor governments, such as the eu and the uS, about whether 
they should link humanitarian assistance and development, security, foreign, 
and economic policies or not, due to concerns over humanitarian principles 
(Steets 2009). Donors are not restricted by a single humanitarian or development 
mandate, but they still have independent humanitarian structures, such as the 
european Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection (eCHO) and the Office of uS Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), 
partly to maintain neutrality through distinct portfolios. Separate portfolios al-
low bilateral donors to provide humanitarian funding to multilateral agencies 
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and NGOs, which to a certain point avoids the need to raise the humanitarian 
dilemma. Those portfolios, however, increase the demand for coordination be-
tween implementing partners and even inside donor governments.
The peacebuilding strategies reviewed above, such as An Agenda for Peace and 
Capstone Doctrine, primarily focus on how to coordinate international actors. 
These strategies assume that peacebuilding initiatives will occur later, follow-
ing the handover from international actors to local governments. In this sense, 
local governments are passive recipients in peacebuilding. However, the review 
of uN peacebuilding architecture highlights a broad inclusivity of national 
stakeholders— not only of national elites but also of people and actors who are 
stationed in conflict-affected areas. Since peace cannot be imposed from the out-
side, locals are the best actors to understand the dynamic context of any conflict 
(uN 2015). In other words, ‘national ownership’ has been enlarged to cover local 
people as well as government. Still, in conflict-affected societies, promotion of 
national ownership is not an easy task, as local governments are often authori-
tarian and mistrusted by people, and local capabilities have not been extensively 
developed.
Many donors have developed domestic strategies and coordination mecha-
nisms as a solution to this problem. They have done this in order to provide more 
effective and efficient humanitarian crisis management, particularly for conflicts 
and are thus deserving of mention. On paper, the so-called ‘whole-of- government’ 
approach (WGA) implies that a long-term perspective of development and pre-
vention is embedded in responses. However, cross-governmental decision- making 
in the capital has yet to translate well in the field (Bennett 2015). The most ad-
vanced form of WGA for addressing armed conflict is the uK’s  Stabilization 
unit.  under ‘the Building Stability Overseas Strategy,’ the  Department for 
 International  Development (DFID), the Foreign and  Commonwealth Office 
(FCO), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) jointly work to provide expert staff at 
short notice, and to support interdepartmental analysis and planning for practi-
cal implementation on armed conflict and stabilization (DFID, FCO and MOD 
2011). As  Rotmann and Steinacker (2014, 16) point out, the Stabilization unit 
is designed to link activities for pre-crisis prevention, response, and recovery to 
build structural stability. However, Rotmann and Steinacker show that this ob-
jective remains far from realized in field operations. Other examples of WGA are 
the Danish Whole of Government Board, and the  Canadian Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Task Force (START), while the Australian government is now 
developing a new humanitarian strategy able to combine preparedness, relief, 
and recovery together under the newly formed Department of Foreign Assistance 
and Trade (DFAT).
Issues related to financing in post-conflict contexts are most visible in the seg-
mentation of the aid architecture from a macro perspective, as well as in the 
prioritization of peacebuilding sectors from a micro perspective. There is a great 
imbalance between allocations available for peacebuilding and global funding, 
either for humanitarian responses or for peacekeeping operations (uN 2015; 
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OeCD 2010). An OeCD analysis of aid flows in 2010 demonstrates that donors 
provide substantial financial support to post-conflict countries, and that the re-
sources are drawn from different budgetary lines, humanitarian, development 
and defense. Due to the segmentation of such aid architecture—including the 
separation of ODA and non-ODA funding and the different mandates and re-
mits of aid instruments and agencies—critical activities in the early peacebuild-
ing period may go unfunded (OeCD 2010).
From the micro perspective, ODA spending on conflict, peace and security is 
relatively small, comprising only 2.5 percent of total ODA (Development Initia-
tives 2015). Funding for some activities like governance, demobilization of former 
soldiers, and security-sector reform remains a challenge for donors, while fund-
ing for traditional development sectors such as health, education, infrastructure, 
and agriculture receive most of the donor attention. Activities occurring early 
in the peacebuilding process receive much less funding than humanitarian or 
development activities, mainly because of the limitations of the different instru-
ments available during the period, and a lack of flexibility to shift such funding 
between different instruments once donors have allocated money (OeCD 2010). 
To address the issue, some donors have developed specific funds for transition 
activities, using pooled funds combining ODA and non-ODA financing to offer 
a flexible response in crisis situations requiring a more holistic view of peace-
building. There are several examples of this, such as the uK’s Conflict, Stability 
and Security Fund, the Peace and Stability Fund of Denmark, and the eC’s 
Instrument for Stability.
It is worth adding that there have been various attempts to embed na-
tional ownership through different aid modalities, such as peacebuilding 
funds, multi- donor trust funds, and quick impact projects, for instance, in 
 Afghanistan,  Central African Republic, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan. They 
are all important initiatives to ensure more predictable and sustained financ-
ing for peacebuilding activities. These and other diverse efforts on the part 
of international community should be explored across the peace continuum. 
At the same time, frequently faced with a lack of recipient government ca-
pacity to absorb and operationalize these resources promptly, it is also urgent 
that the international community provides much-needed capacity- building 
opportunities, including financial management skills and expertise in an 
accountable way.
Implementing the continuum in armed 
conflict contexts
In this chapter, we have critically reviewed the international efforts and prac-
tices to support post-conflict countries in their transition from conflict to peace, 
placing particular emphasis on peacebuilding, and identified key elements 
that are required to help bring together relevant actors, resources and policy 
instruments for the better management of local processes for self- sustaining 
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peace on the ground. In this process, consolidating local ownership and inter-
national support in the form of the ‘continuum’ for peace is no longer a matter 
of choice but of necessity. Therefore the question to be asked is not whether to 
implement the continuum but how it can be done and finding ways of doing 
it better. 
The following chapters take up three case studies, namely Timor-Leste South 
Sudan and the Syrian crisis, which look at the process of realizing the contin-
uum in conflict-affected countries. These case studies allow us to examine the 
connections of different phases of crisis management, as described in Chapter 2. 
Moreover, they offer further evidence of how such a managerial process is not 
linear at all. Close attention is given to the roles played by the various bilateral 
donors, such as the united States, the european union, Australia and Japan, as 
well as to other international organizations and NGOs. 
First, in the case of Timor-Leste Yukako Sakabe Tanaka and Tomoaki 
Honda (Chapter 4) analyze the interplay among the newly established Timorese 
 Government, its local civil society, and international actors such as the uN and 
bilateral donors. The activities of three donor agencies from Australia, Japan and 
the united States are reviewed to examine how they performed to realize the 
continuum for sustaining peace at the local level. Through interviews and sur-
veys of local civil society members and community participants, the authors find 
a major gap between prevention needs felt by local civil society and the attention 
provided by international actors and government, which they highlight as an 
important obstacle for the continuum. 
The second case examines South Sudan and is written by Chigumi  Kawaguchi 
(Chapter 5). This is a challenging example of linking humanitarian relief and 
development assistance in an extremely volatile situation. Among the many in-
ternational actors involved, three key donor agencies from the uS, the eu and 
Japan are selected. By careful examination over a 20-year period from a relief- 
centered period in the 1990s to peacebuilding after the comprehensive peace 
agreement in 2005, and after the conflict relapse in December 2013, the chapter 
offers a detailed comparative analysis of different phases, highlighting how donor 
agencies address the dilemma of often-competing imperatives between political 
and purely humanitarian-oriented perspectives while maintaining the contin-
uum for peacebuilding.
The final case discusses the Syrian crisis, which has become one of the most 
significant humanitarian crises in recent years. Ryoji Tateyama (Chapter 6) 
examines international efforts to realize the continuum, especially by the uN, 
uK, eu and uS. He highlights three obstacles to the continuum: the human-
itarian dilemma of the uN humanitarian operation, the difficulty of remote 
management, and the relationships between humanitarian relief and political 
objectives set by donors. All of these are related to the question of politicization 
of aid. The challenge is enormous but we should recognize that even inside 
Syria, many actors are trying to implement both emergency relief operations as 
well as undertake mid- and long-term activities for building resilience, despite 
many obstacles. 
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The case studies allow us to explore how international donors, including mul-
tilateral and bilateral organizations, have conducted (or ignored) multi-layered 
approaches to peacebuilding in different contexts—both during and after con-
flict. Their detailed descriptions help us to understand how the post-conflict 
peacebuilding approach has been used, as well as its strengths and weaknesses. 
The cases suggest we need to have a more comprehensive and non-linear under-
standing of peacebuilding in order to realize sustaining peace. unfortunately, 
humanitarian crises caused by armed conflicts persist, with little likelihood that 
they will end soon. In this regard, these case studies offer some useful lessons for 
the future. 
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Introduction
‘Goodbye conflict, welcome development’ is a symbolic message that was pro-
moted by the Timorese Government in 2010. The message reflects the ‘wish 
to ensure that the current transit[ion] toward longer-term development be sus-
tained without a reversion to conflict’ (RDTL 2010). Prime Minister de Araújo 
shared this view, adding that ‘we are inheriting a country that is stable, safe 
and peaceful’ and ‘with strong economic growth’ (RDTL 2015). These messages 
are underpinned by an ample state budget in which over 90 percent of the gov-
ernment’s revenue is derived from petroleum products and relevant tax reve-
nue. This would seem to indicate that financial contributions from donors are 
no longer expected. Managing the revenue from petroleum in a sustainable way 
is crucial to planning a healthy budget, and, therefore, the Petroleum Fund of 
Timor-Leste was established in order to manage oil revenues in a financially 
sustainable manner.
Given that Timor-Leste has now persevered through a 15-year post-conflict 
situation, it might appear that Timor-Leste seems to be on track towards de-
velopment after overcoming crises and establishing a sustainable peace, yet this 
transition could be undermined as a result of vulnerability to several factors. The 
Timorese government has used oil revenue to finance veterans’ pensions and the 
Program of Integrated District Development. Both programs have provided a 
peace dividend to the population and reduced the chances of conflict (RDTL 
2014). However, it is a rather striking statement to say that peace and stability 
can be achieved as a result of abundant financial resources. As Peake (2013) has 
argued, new industries must be established to take the place of petroleum produc-
tion. In other words, it is doubtful whether peace in today’s Timor-Leste is sus-
tainable. In fact, as of 2014, half of the country’s population still lives under the 
national poverty line while Timor-Leste’s Gross Domestic Income per capita is 
uS$2,680 (World Bank 2016). In order to boost the economy to reduce poverty, 
the government expects growth in non-oil sectors such as agriculture, tourism, 
and downstream petroleum production (interview with RDTL Vice-Minister of 
Finance, H. e. Helder Lopes, March 10, 2016).
4 Should the ‘continuum’ 
for peacebuilding focus on 
development or conflict 
prevention?
The case of Timor-Leste
Yukako Sakabe Tanaka and Tomoaki Honda
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Peacebuilding has been a challenge not only for domestic actors but also in-
ternational actors. Timor-Leste achieved its independence only after 25 years 
of war against Indonesia and through a referendum under the authority of the 
united Nations (uN) in 1999. The international community grappled with mul-
tiple tasks within the fledgling new country, from building a new state to promot-
ing peace and supporting people’s needs. After just four years of independence, 
renewed political turmoil in 2006 resulted in ten percent of the population once 
again becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs). This demonstrated that the 
country’s peacebuilding efforts were off-track. The clash between the police and 
the army showed that externally led peacebuilding efforts needed to be reconsid-
ered. As of 2016, the peacebuilding path is once again perceived differently, with 
some actors believing that ‘money has bought peace’ (Peake 2013).
This chapter considers whether there is a gap in the peacebuilding ‘continuum’ 
between bilateral aid agencies and other stakeholders, arguing that international 
actors, the government, and local actors all have distinctive perspectives how 
to address issues of peace/conflict prevention into humanitarian- development 
continuum. The concept of peacebuilding can be interpreted broadly. The 
 Organisation for economic Co-operation and Development (OeCD 2008, 13) 
definition, for example, is ‘actions undertaken by international or national ac-
tors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of conflict and at least a 
modicum of political process.’ While the uN interim authority focused on peace-
building from a security perspective and the core functions of administration, the 
donors’ views were attributed ‘to institutionalize peace’ through ‘recovery’ or ‘re-
construction.’ Bilateral agencies, sharing the view that Timor-Leste was aiming 
towards building a new state, were able to visualize ‘development’ as designed to 
fulfill social needs and economic growth beyond ‘recovery’ and ‘reconstruction.’ 
However, the political turmoil in 2006 reminded the international community 
that the government was not yet at full capacity in its ability to conduct rule of 
law practices, and that there was still embedded potential for social conflicts. 
Backsliding into ‘prevention,’ bilateral agencies attempted different approaches 
in order to realize the continuum from their own perspectives. Alternatively, civil 
society was concerned with possible on-the-ground conflicts and thus established 
community-based systems aimed directly at conflict prevention.
We selected Australian Aid (Australia), the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency ( JICA), and the united States Agency for International Development 
( uSAID) from among the six primary donors to Timor-Leste to analyze bilateral 
agency approaches. These agencies commenced Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) disbursements prior to 2002 and have continued to support Timor-Leste’s 
national strategy. After 2006, Australia doubled its disbursements in response 
to the crisis, while uSAID and JICA maintained their funding volumes. Other 
countries, such as the united Kingdom, decreased support (see Figure 4.1).
The following section provides an overview of the humanitarian crises in 
Timor-Leste and the strategies of the Timorese Government. It also describes 
how the country attempted to manage peacebuilding with international support. 
Subsequent sections analyze the programs of the three agencies, revealing that 
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each agency has its own perspective regarding the continuum. After this, we 
argue that civil society has a distinctive view of the country’s situation and has 
established its own system for conflict prevention. We then discuss the distinctive 
approaches to realize the continuum that have been adopted by the government, 
international actors, and local counterparts. Such a gap emerged from varied 
perceptions toward peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the implications of crisis/aid management in a post-conflict situa-
tion based on the experience of Timor-Leste.
Overview of the humanitarian crises and 
strategies in timor-Leste
Humanitarian crises
Since the 1970s, the Timorese people have experienced insecurity as a result of 
the resistance movements that emerged against the Indonesian invasion as well 
as conflicts between Timorese political actors over the position of Timor-Leste. 
This strife resulted in the deaths of over 102,800 people through violence, hun-
ger, and illness in an area with a population of less than one million (CAVR 
2005, 44). While attention to this crisis increased as a result of international 
Figure 4.1  ODA disbursements to Timor-Leste (uS$ millions).
Source: authors, based on data generated from OeCD QWIDS
Notes: uS (united States), uK (untied Kingdom), eu (european union), JPN ( Japan), AuS (Australia), 
POR (Portugal).
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media coverage in the early 1990s, the popular consultation backed by the uN 
in 1999 resulted in yet another humanitarian crisis. As soon as the results were 
released indicating that over 78.5 percent of the people had voted for independ-
ence, Indonesia declared martial law, authorizing militias and the Indonesian 
military to carry out ‘scorched earth plans’ (Molnar 2010). This resulted in over 
1,400 casualties and the forcible displacement of 300,000 (CAVR 2005, 110). 
While humanitarian crises have persisted in Timor-Leste for more than two dec-
ades, the 1999 crisis was the first crisis in which bilateral donors responded to 
support the needs of the Timorese people. This included not only assisting with 
safe return home, as well as food and shelter, but also the delivery of services to 
help them rebuild their lives in this new country.
Four years after achieving formal independence in 2002, Timor-Leste experi-
enced another humanitarian crisis. The immediate cause of the 2006 crisis was 
a demonstration by petitioners from the army that escalated into riots and loot-
ing, mainly in the capital city of Dili. The most severe incident was the collision 
between the Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (FDTL) and the Policia Nacional 
de Timor-Leste (PNTL) in late May. This second crisis resulted in 38 casualties 
and 150,000 IDPs (OHCHR 2006, para. 100). The uN concluded that the 2006 
crisis stemmed from the vulnerability of state institutions and the rule of law 
(OHCHR 2006, para. 2). Yamada (2015) further noted that the leadership did 
not follow the rule of law, while Hasegawa (2013) attributed it to the elite competi-
tion between President Gusmão and Prime Minister Alkatiri. The violent actors, 
scattered throughout Dili, consisted primarily of youth, members of gangs and 
martial arts groups (MAGs), many of whom were unemployed (e.g., Scambary 
2006). Geographical and social divisions, such as those between east and west, 
and urban and rural, as well as ethnic divisions within communities are said to 
be the causes of increased violence (e.g., Kingsbury 2008).
While intense support was provided to IDP camps in Dili, for the 70 percent of 
the population residing outside the capital, poverty reduction has remained a chal-
lenge. Therefore, relevant stakeholders faced multiple challenges as a result of the 
2006 crisis: stabilizing security, restoring the rule of law, responding to the needs 
of IDPs, as well as continuing to address development through economic growth.
National and international strategies
It was generally recognized by donors that the immediate response to the 1999 
crisis was insufficient because it was also necessary to support the building of a 
new country. In essence, the goals were to assist with both peace and development.
From 1999, two international devices functioned to provide direct support to 
Timor-Leste; the uN missions/multilateral forces and the national/ international 
strategy. The uN Transitional Administration in east Timor (uNTAeT) was 
responsible for the interim government up until independence. Later, it supported 
the country’s core administration and maintenance of law and order. In response 
to the 2006 crisis, the uN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste  (uNMIT) was man-
dated to restore the police service. uNMIT ended its mandate in 2012 when the 
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PNTL regained full responsibility for internal security. In the very early stages of 
the crisis, multilateral forces led by the Australian Defence Force were dispatched 
to stabilize the situation. In other words, peacebuilding efforts— especially 
security— were primarily led by multilateral forces, while the uN missions played 
the core role of building and sustaining the functions of the new governance.
The task of formulating strategies for relief and development was initially led 
by the international community and then, gradually, the Timorese Government 
assumed the primary responsibility. Responses to the humanitarian needs that 
emerged after the 1999 crisis were made by the Consolidated Inter-Agency 
 Appeal for east Timor Crisis (CAP), composed of international organizations 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For recovery and development is-
sues, the World Bank-led Joint Assessment Mission ( JAM), composed of bilateral 
donors, international agencies, and Timorese representatives, was dispatched in 
late 1999 in order to assess mid- and long-term needs ( JICA 2002). Following 
this, the Timor-Leste Government provided a descriptive account of the National 
 Development Plan (NDP) road map (for the reconstruction of Timor-Leste).
In the middle of 2000, donors quickly shifted their focus from relief to recov-
ery matters by pledging uS$30 million for Timor-Leste’s recovery and develop-
ment projects at a second donors’ meeting held in Lisbon ( JICA 2002).1 Donor 
countries also agreed that the program must be conducted under an efficient aid 
coordination system and must accept the independence of Timor-Leste. Such ac-
tivities indicate that most international donors shared an awareness that it would 
be necessary to support the state-building process for Timor-Leste through de-
velopment assistance. As an example of humanitarian crisis management from 
the perspective of the continuum, Timor-Leste is considered to be one of the first 
attempts to integrate the recovery and development process in the early stages of 
peacebuilding.
In December 2002, the government and donors communicated about imple-
menting the NDP (RDTL 2002). The NDP was formulated based on nationwide 
consultations and had two development goals: to reduce poverty and to promote 
economic growth while improving health and education (Planning Commission 
2002), an approach that was also linked to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Following this, 17 Sector Investment Programs (SIPs) were formulated 
to coordinate government policy, the budget, and donor support with a mecha-
nism known as Sector Working Groups (SWGs). However, operating SWGs in 
line with SIPs was a burden to some line ministries whose capacity was not fully 
functioning (e.g., Sakabe 2008).
The total amount of international support to Timor-Leste was drastically de-
creased from uS$500 million in 2000–2001 to uS$150 million in 2005–2006 
(RDTL 2006). Nevertheless, international assistance, per capita, was high at 
uS$189 in 2005 compared to uS$17, the average for low-income countries (World 
Bank 2005). Humanitarian aid during the 2006 crisis was coordinated first 
through a uN Flash Appeal requesting uS$24 million. Thereafter, the  Central 
emergency Response Fund (CeRF) began contributing; and they eventually re-
ceived 103 percent of the requested amount. The largest donor was Australia 
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followed by Japan and the european Commission/the Directorate-General of 
european Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (eC/eCHO), 
disbursing uS$4–5 million each (Hidalgo 2007).
In response to the multiple needs that emerged following the 2006 crisis, the 
government launched the National Priorities Process (NPP), a coordination mecha-
nism for diplomatic, defense, and development actors (the ‘3Ds’) to work together to 
ensure the sustainability of peace. As appropriately stated by RDTL (2010), ‘Timor- 
Leste would have to first identify and address the most pressing issues hampering 
the safety of its citizens and devise solutions to address both the root causes of these 
issues and their immediate effects.’ While the NPP encompassed food security and 
rural development, social services, access to justice, and good governance issues, in 
2008, the government initiated the NPP with the goal of enhancing the interactions 
of actors to downgrade ‘safety and security’ from being the highest priority to the 
lowest (7th) priority by 2010 (RDTL 2010). Although there was an assassination 
attempt against the president and the prime minister in 2008, the government’s op-
erational services continued and the rebels from the 2006 crisis surrendered. This 
outcome brought confidence to stakeholders that Timor-Leste was stabilizing.
The Strategic Development Plan (SDP) was then launched in 2011 to promote 
mid- and long-term plans for the country’s development. The SDP is composed 
of four subsections (social, economic, infrastructure development, and govern-
ance) that comprehensively cover all relevant national development sectors. The 
Development Policy Coordination Mechanism (DPCM) is currently in operation 
to facilitate the implementation of the SDP between donors and line ministries in 
accordance with the New Deal principles endorsed at the 4th High-level Meeting 
for Aid effectiveness in 2011 (MoF RDTL 2014).
In sum, the international community was the dominant force behind the for-
mation and coordination of peacebuilding strategies as well as state-building. 
Accordingly, the international community responded swiftly to emerging needs 
after the 2006 crisis. While the Timorese Government gradually took the initia-
tive in leading building strategies while maintaining a close relationship with the 
international community, international organizations divided up the roles to ad-
dress multiple needs. Multilateral forces were tasked with security issues, the uN 
concentrated on state-building, and bilateral aid agencies subsequently supported 
development issues. under such circumstances, bilateral agencies launched their 
activities based on a shared concept that their role in Timor was to contribute to 
state-building by conducting recovery and reconstruction projects.
In the next three sections, we analyze the actions of the bilateral agencies from 
the perspective of the continuum for peacebuilding.
uSAID
Aid to Timor-Leste from the perspective of the continuum
Since 2002, uSAID has continuously earmarked approximately uS$2.5 million 
per year (see Figure 4.2), mainly focusing on the governance sector. In fact, a 
Figure 4.2  ODA sectoral disbursements by donor2 (uS$ millions).
Source: authors, based on data generated from OeCD QWIDS.
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governance-centered approach is a characteristic of uSAID’s strategy, as de-
scribed below. In addition, following the 2006 crisis, uSAID made efforts to 
build social infrastructure such as establishment of a comprehensive land tenure 
system.
In December 1999, uSAID and the Office of uS Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) sent staff members to Timor-Leste to monitor the situation and coordi-
nate assistance with other humanitarian aid organizations. At that time, the uS 
Government pledged uS$41 million in response to Timor-Leste’s humanitar-
ian crisis. uSAID and OFDA provided nearly uS$11 million, primarily for the 
provision and transport of relief commodities such as humanitarian aid. This is 
a significant point for this section because it shows that the continuum does not 
simply link one phase to another. Instead, it shows that both humanitarian and 
recovery phases were incorporated into the early planning stages.
In parallel with emergency assistance, in 2000, uSAID commenced mid- and 
long-term support toward advancing peace and democracy by establishing the 
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in Timor-Leste. OTI is not just a uSAID 
in-house organization but was strategically designed to support uS foreign pol-
icy objectives to achieve peaceful democratic change.3 OTI was mandated to 
identify and recruit national commissioners, to plan and implement logistical aid 
projects, and to act as a liaison for donors with longer-term funding support. The 
concrete programs that OTI initiated involved the following tasks: supporting 
community development; supporting reconstruction and employment projects; 
enabling key local civil society organizations to participate as equal partners in 
relief, reconstruction, and state-building activities; providing in-kind ‘startup’ as-
sistance and technical assistance to independent media outlets; and supporting 
east Timor’s political leadership and reconciliation (uSAID 2000, 64). The roles 
played by OTI simply indicate that uSAID and the uS Government supported 
Timor-Leste under a clear strategic aim: that is, democratic state-building.
In 2004, uSAID drafted a new aid strategy to support Timor-Leste in place of 
the TSP (Transition Support Program), in conformity with Timor-Leste’s NDP. 
Simultaneously, uSAID conducted a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) 
to provide recommendations for uSAID support to Timor-Leste over the fol-
lowing ten years (uSAID 2004). The key recommendations in the CVA were as 
follows:
•	 to apply a dialogue-building, conflict prevention approach as a cross-cutting 
theme; and
•	 to prioritize the districts most vulnerable to conflict as a function of their 
economic situation.
The CVA concluded that the top-priority risks leading to conflict were ‘poverty, 
unemployment, and limited access to basic services’ (uSAID 2004). Based on 
this assessment, uSAID formulated a new strategy in 2005 entitled the  ‘uSAID 
Strategic Plan for east Timor: A New Nation Moving Forward.’ uSAID then 
allocated its budget to three development sectors: economic growth (50%), 
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democracy and governance (30%), and health (20%). This strategic document 
provided the starting point for the successive and unchanged uSAID program 
for Timor-Leste through 2012.
After the re-occurrence of conflict in April 2006, uSAID conducted a sur-
vey that focused on clarifying the causes of the conflict and considered a new 
approach (uSAID 2006). uSAID reiterated that its primary strategy involved 
a long-term development approach for a stable country and therefore, it was 
therefore unable to utilize this directly in responding to the crisis of April 2006. 
 However, uSAID also emphasized the results of conflict provided an opportu-
nity for allocating additional resources for conflict management and stabilization 
as well as reconciliation and peacebuilding. While the results of the CVA in 2006 
were not groundbreaking compared to the CVA two years before, uSAID staff 
emphasized the continuity of the uSAID approach both before and after the 
2006 crisis (interview with uSAID staff, March 10, 2016).
In 2012, uSAID publicized a new strategy titled the ‘Country Development 
Cooperation Strategy: 2013–2018’ (CDCS), which focused more specifically on 
development issues. The goal of the new strategy was a more prosperous, healthy, 
and democratic Timor-Leste (uSAID 2012). Despite several revisions, there has 
been little change in uSAID’s approach in Timor-Leste and the uS has under-
taken every project in accordance with this strategy. This is a consequence of the 
particular situation of Timor-Leste. Briefly stated, the situation involved short-
term humanitarian assistance and mid- or long-term recovery support existing 
in parallel.
Conflict prevention focusing on the daily lives 
of the local people
Staff members at the uSAID office in Dili who were engaged in support from the 
early period emphasized that, from the perspective of the continuum, OTI was 
a key in-house uSAID organization. In fact, the uSAID east Timor Planning 
Framework (uSAID 2000) mentioned OTI’s contribution to a smooth transition 
along the continuum through its coordination of relevant stakeholders in a timely 
manner. For example, the Transitional employment Program (TeP), the largest 
program sponsored by OTI with a budget of uS$254,000, provided immediate 
employment to locals in public works facilities. The program was implemented in 
conjunction with uNTAeT District Administrators in all thirteen districts and 
created jobs for approximately 50,000 Timorese people by July 2000. Through 
this effort, uSAID helped to provide income sources to local people through co-
ordination of projects to repair basic social infrastructure such as houses, roads, 
and community centers.
In parallel with those transitional projects, uSAID also tackled issues relating 
to land disputes. The lack of a land tenure system was recognized as a bottleneck 
in Timor-Leste’s development. Without an established land ownership system 
and legally protected rights to land based on a legitimate land registration sys-
tem, local people were restricted from engaging in related economic activities. 
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For this very reason, uSAID initiated the Land Law Program (LLP) from 2002 
in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice. The LLP was designed to provide 
informed policy recommendations and to support the development and imple-
mentation of transparent and representative land laws. The LLP contained two 
objectives: the first was lasting economic development and the second was con-
flict prevention. According to uSAID’s evaluation of the LLP, the role of transi-
tional land law is to provide a legal basis for registration (Lopes 2008). It involves 
the following four issues:
1  recognizing the ownership rights of consensual owners (in undisputed cases);
2  establishing criteria to resolve disputed cases where overlapping rights exist;
3  converting previous property rights and long-term peaceful possession into 
ownership rights according to established legal criteria; and
4  establishing the administrative mechanisms and processes that will allow 
the Timorese state to manage the regularization of property rights in an 
effective and efficient manner.
In the first program, LLP 1 (2003–2004), uSAID conducted a comprehensive 
basic survey regarding land disputes in Timor-Leste. The survey concluded 
that complex land authorization, the foundation of which is derived from var-
ious sources, placed limitations on private and public investments. Therefore, 
uSAID helped to create a land law system that would relieve the bottleneck 
and facilitate economic development. LLP 1 included policy proposals with 
drafts of legislative bills targeted at the centralization of land asset manage-
ment by the Timor-Leste Government and to build a system to address for-
mal land disputes and other issues. Following the results of the LLP 1 report, 
 uSAID implemented LLP 2 from 2004 to 2006 with the goal of developing a 
legal infrastructure and facilitating capacity-building. One of the new goals of 
LLP 2, which uSAID staff members highlighted in their interviews, is to assist 
in the establishment of pilot projects for an electronic land registration system 
in certain districts.
In 2007, the electronic land registration system was placed under the au-
thority of the National Directorate of Land and Property in the Ministry of 
 Justice. The LLP continued through a project titled ‘Ita Nia Rai’ (Strengthening 
 Property Rights in Timor-Leste Project, or SPRTL), which was managed by the 
 Timor-Leste Government and local associations. uSAID reached the conclu-
sion that Ita Nia Rai and the LLPs made meaningful contributions to the de-
velopment of laws related to land and real property. With this outcome, uSAID 
believes that the program achieved the transition of the initiatives to local organ-
izations in 2007. These successful efforts by uSAID, which focus on building an 
effective land tenure system, can be viewed as uSAID’s approach to ‘covering 
the continuum.’ The approach was centered on the issue of the type of govern-
ance that directly affects people’s economic situations and on the belief that such 
an issue should be primarily addressed by nationals. This is why the LLP was 
swiftly transferred to the government and local organizations.
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JICA
Aid to Timor-Leste from the perspective of the continuum
JICA is not an organization with a mission to conduct humanitarian or recovery 
efforts in post-conflict situations. At the time when Timor-Leste experienced its 
humanitarian crisis in 1999, it was very rare for JICA to conduct recovery assis-
tance activities in post-conflict situations. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
efforts were not given explicit status in JICA’s mandate because JICA is a bilat-
eral ‘development’ agency. Nevertheless, JICA engaged in providing support to 
Timor-Leste in 1999 by dispatching staff with the goal of preparing recovery 
projects and providing some humanitarian assistance. This staff deployment 
was the most significant part of JICA’s approach to addressing the continuum 
in  Timor-Leste. Because JICA concentrated on development activities in 1999, 
it did not have a concrete strategy to connect the humanitarian phase with the 
development phase at that time.
JICA also had an inherent interest in Timor-Leste as the site of its first practi-
cal engagement with peacebuilding. Japan began to look for a way to contribute 
to the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention in 1999. In other words, 
Japan’s support for Timor-Leste was provided in the context of its initial goal 
of supporting post-conflict or conflict-affected countries. under these circum-
stances, JICA started to provide early recovery assistance in Timor-Leste.
In December 1999, donor countries, international aid organizations, and 
NGOs participated in the first meeting of Timor-Leste donors in Tokyo. Japan, 
as the host nation for the meeting, pledged more than uS$130 million over the 
subsequent three years to rebuild Timor-Leste. At the same time, Japan pro-
posed three areas that to be addressed in JICA’s basic aid policy in Timor-Leste: 
human resource development, rebuilding of infrastructure, and agricultural 
and rural development. In 2002, during the sixth donors’ meeting held in Oslo, 
 Japan pledged approximately uS$60 million over the subsequent three years 
and to contribute to ‘the consolidation of peace’ (heiwa no teichaku in Japanese) as 
the fourth focus area of aid to Timor. Japan further renewed its commitment to 
 Timor-Leste in 2005 at the donors’ meeting in Dili to continue its support, pledg-
ing approximately uS$20 million per year.
In response to the 2006 crisis, while Japan ceased nearly all of its efforts, in-
cluding NGO projects commissioned by the Japanese ODA, it donated approx-
imately uS$1 million in food relief through the World Food Programme (WFP) 
for emergency assistance.4 Following this disruption in aid assistance, Japan 
recommenced its development assistance in Timor-Leste with the objective of 
maintaining continuity. However, efforts toward enhancing security and conflict 
prevention—the focus of other donors who took the 2006 crisis seriously—were 
not addressed by JICA. This is simply because such projects require multilat-
eral coordination, including coordination with uN missions and multinational 
forces, and because JICA, in principle, was not permitted to perform military- 
related activities as per Japan’s ODA Charter.5
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Infrastructure and economic sectors
At the commencement of its activities in 2000, during the humanitarian assis-
tance period, JICA dispatched a number of assessment teams to examine the 
infrastructure, economic, and agricultural sectors. For example, for the rehabili-
tation of the social infrastructure sector, JICA conducted a ‘Study on the urgent 
Rehabilitation Plan in east Timor’ (SuRPeT) from February to August 2000. 
Because over 70 percent of infrastructure in Timor-Leste had been damaged or 
destroyed during the 1999 crisis, there was a huge need for infrastructure reha-
bilitation. under such circumstances, JICA conducted a survey with the goal 
of designing a concrete rehabilitation strategy in the infrastructure sector. The 
concrete objective of SuRPeT was ‘restoring the roads, bridges, ports, irriga-
tion and power of east Timor’ (uNTAeT and JICA 2000, 57). Thus, during 
the humanitarian assistance period, JICA’s primary goal was the urgent devel-
opment of a rehabilitation plan to address these issues. JICA assessment teams 
also considered small-scale development projects, including plans for small-scale 
agricultural community development.
A report prepared by the JICA Timor-Leste Office, ‘JICA Cooperation 
in  Timor-Leste’ ( JICA 2015) stated that JICA had concentrated on ‘nation- 
building’ support through the urgent rehabilitation of various infrastructures in 
its initial efforts in Timor-Leste.6 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) also 
provided an emergency aid grant through the united Nations Office for Project 
Services (uNOPS), focusing on the rehabilitation of infrastructure from 2000 to 
2001. JICA’s third assistance period was from 2004 to 2006 and included full-
scale development projects through the commencement of a grant scheme. In this 
period, several projects were launched, such as the power supply rehabilitation 
project in Dili in 2004, the water supply improvement project in Dili in 2004, 
the capacity-building project for road maintenance in Timor-Leste in 2005, the 
capacity-development project for the training of personnel and preparation of 
road guidelines and manuals in 2006, and other projects. In addition to these 
aid projects, JICA began to dispatch experts for long-term technical cooperation 
projects in 2004. For this aid scheme, JICA sent two advisors to the Ministry of 
Transport Communications and Public Works (MTCPW), a policy advisor on 
infrastructure-building and a road sector advisor.
JICA summed up these approaches in the above-referenced document ( JICA 
2015), articulating that ‘JICA is one of the oldest development partners to 
 Timor-Leste since before its independence’ and emphasized its long-term and 
continual support for Timor-Leste. According to JICA, its 15-year efforts in 
 Timor-Leste can be divided into three phases as follows:
1  2000–2006, support for reconstruction and rehabilitation;
2  2006–2011, sustainable development for building self-reliance; and
3  post-2012, development cooperation emphasizing an end of the rehabilita-
tion stage of Timor-Leste.
JICA discussed its activities conducted from 2000 to 2006 from the perspec-
tive of the continuum. Japan provided numerous aid projects with a focus on 
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rehabilitation from an early stage. Following this stage, based on these achieve-
ments, JICA continued with management and maintenance projects through 
its technical cooperation scheme ( JICA 2008). With the sudden shift in April 
2006, most of these projects were interrupted and, instead, MOFA provided 
uS$5  million to support IDPs through other international organizations. In the 
autumn of that year, JICA resumed operations on all projects.
In the context of Timor-Leste, the continuum as viewed by bilateral donors 
spans all the points from humanitarian crisis and rehabilitation or recovery to 
development. In fact, JICA is the first donor that began providing loan aid to 
Timor-Leste. JICA initiated a supply road rehabilitation project (120 kilome-
ters from Dili to Baucau at approximately uS$500 million) with a five-year aid 
scheme beginning in 2012. JICA and Japan began considering providing loan 
aid to Timor-Leste in around 2008. The goal of providing loan aid was not only 
to carry out large-scale projects but also to restore confidence in Timor-Leste 
as an established country. Indeed, Mr. Kitahara, the Japanese ambassador to 
Timor-Leste at that time, emphasized that Japan’s loan aid project would deliver 
a message to the international community that the ‘Timor-Leste Government 
deserved the confidence of loan projects because they have the capacity to repay.’
Australian aid/Australia
Aid to Timor-Leste from the perspective of the continuum
Australia became the highest contributing donor after 2006 and has disbursed 
over uS$100 million since 2010 (Figure 4.2).7 Australia’s financial contributions 
to Timor-Leste were the third largest during the relief and recovery phase after 
the 1999 crisis. Following the 2006 crisis, the contributions were especially de-
voted to social infrastructure and governance. Additionally, Australia provided 
Au$75 million towards the uN mission and an additional Au$20 million for 
humanitarian support. These contributions emerged from Australia’s national 
interest in Timor-Leste’s prosperity and peace as one of its nearest neighbors 
(ODe 2014).
While its financial contributions have been considerable, Australia evaluated 
its own aid performance as having mixed results due to the lack of an overrid-
ing strategy. Australia had no clear country program until 2009 and instead, 
it responded to the acute needs of Timor-Leste. It is therefore difficult to assess 
the outcomes. Immediately after the 1999 crisis, the aid program focused on hu-
manitarian responses and recovery, especially in the areas of health, education, 
water supply, and food production, which were delivered through multilateral 
institutions and NGOs. After 2002, the program shifted to development, with 
the goal of building the government’s capacity (AusAID 2011). The 2006 crisis 
was a challenge for Australia to plan and manage aid programs—which had 
doubled—while staff were under-resourced (ODe 2014). Since 2007, the pro-
gram has aimed to align itself with Timorese policy planning. In 2011, when 
the country’s political stability allowed for the establishment of a policy-level 
agreement, the ‘2009–2014 Australia and Timor-Leste Country Strategy’ was 
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finalized. This strategy clarified its earlier focus on rural development, such as 
rural roads, water, and sanitation, health, education, governance, and security, 
which falls within the scope of the SDP.
Interestingly, Australia speculated that continuous efforts are needed to develop 
an appropriate strategy and operational skills in low-capacity, conflict-affected set-
tings such as Timor-Leste: ‘As the largest donor in Timor-Leste and as a close neigh-
bor, Australia has been under considerable pressure to assist every sector’ (NDAe 
2012a, 5). Consequently, ‘Australia’s flexibility and responsiveness in the post- conflict 
phase has pulled the program in many different directions’ (AusAID 2009, 6).
The police program
Among many other projects, the Australian Federal Police Timor-Leste Police 
Development Program (AFP-TLPDP) is a long-standing Australian assistance 
program. AFP-TLPDP was launched to assist the PNTL in building a more 
effective and accountable police service for the people. Initially organized in 
2004, AFP-TLPDP was a four-and-a-half-year program co-funded by the uK 
with a relatively optimistic view of security development. The program over-
came several challenges and became one of the main programs articulated in the 
2009 country strategy (ODe 2014). At the beginning, the annual disbursement 
was uS$750,000. Following the 2006 crisis, it was increased to uS$28 million, 
reaching its peak in 2010 as a part of ODA (data from OeCD QWIDS 2015).
From Australia’s perspective, the program was a result of a whole-government 
approach driven by the strong national interests of Timor-Leste. At a strategic level, 
the launch of the International Deployment Group (IDG) in 2004, a standing po-
lice team with an initial capacity of 550 personnel, has developed into a main unit 
under the AFP and was given approval for expansion to 1200 personnel in 2008 
(McFarlane 2007). Hameiri (2009) argues that this revolution of IDG has been en-
abled by the structural shift of the National Security Council under the  Howard 
government to involve the chiefs of military, intelligence, and police to form security 
policies, concerning the security risks to Australia. So far, the IDG has dispatched 
personnel to the uN mission in Cyprus, the Solomon Islands as part of the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) as well as Papua New Guinea, 
Nauru, Vanuatu, Samoa, and Tonga for policing capacity- development programs/
missions (AFP undated). In other words, policing assistance has become Australia’s 
mainstream method of support for fragile states in the region.
In Timor, Australia was one of the primary contributors to the uN mission 
to send AFP personnel as uN police officers. Between 1999 and 2004, the uN 
mission had two mandates for the police sector: maintain law and order and 
police-building. After the 2006 crisis, the uN authorized uNMIT to support 
police functions as well as to rebuild and mentor the PNTL. At the same time, 
the original programs were designed for capacity-building in investigation, op-
erations, training, and development, in collaboration with a contracting com-
pany focused on crime prevention, community safety, and administration issues 
 (edwards and O’Donnell 2011).
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In principal, the AFP-TLPDP program is recognized as a ‘training program’ 
in the Police Training Centre (PTC), but edwards and O’Donnell (ibid.) empha-
size that the program does more than just provide formal training. In short, the 
program included mentoring and the provision of advice, tools, and support for 
infrastructure, as well as the provision of advice and support for the Secretary of 
State-Security (SoSS) and the Office of the Prosecutor General (NDAe 2012b). 
After the 2006 crisis, Australia resumed training in December of that year and 
eventually reorganized its program under a leadership group to address issue 
of capacity-building and networking between relevant stakeholders including 
senior government officials, PNTL counterparts, and donors between 2008 and 
2010. This process was considered vital to the TLPDP program, although it was 
occasionally ‘under-appreciated’ (edwards and O’Donnell 2011). The TLPDP 
also faced a changing donor environment and organizational structure in the 
security sector. For example, uNMIT had the primary task of supporting the 
PNTL through 2008 (uNSC Resolution no. 1704), and then withdrew in 2012 
(NDAe 2012b). The promulgation of the new PNTL organic law entitled the 
‘Career, Salary and Promotion Regime’ between 2008 and 2009 also presented 
challenges for the AFP-TLPDP to reflect these capacity development changes on 
an operational level.
While doubts were cast on the skills of AFP to implement these capacity- 
building projects (e.g., Wilson 2008), the experience gained from other missions 
facilitated a convergence between the TLPDP and other aid programs, such as 
those in the justice sector (ODe 2014). In terms of program management by 
DFAT and AFP, the gap between aid philosophy and its approach to capac-
ity development has shrunk after many years of coordination. edwards and 
 O’Donnell (2011) opined that by utilizing a structured evaluative process, the 
AFP- TLPDP’s efforts and flexibility to respond to the changing needs and prior-
ities were enhanced by including a variety of experts in the team. Furthermore, 
the program has the potential to play a complementary role in other aid pro-
grams, such as those in the justice sector, supported by Australian Aid.
Strategies for coordination with other stakeholders were in place, yet evalu-
ations of such coordination vary among researchers. The Portuguese Gendar-
merie Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR) conducts police training at the 
police academy and community policing is developed in cooperation with the 
New zealand police force, the Asia Foundation, as well as JICA and Singapore 
(Deniz 2015). Funaki (2009) and Wilson (2012) were concerned about the lack 
of meaningful coordination between donors because of the lack of an overall 
strategy in the Police and Security Sector Reform (SSR). After the withdrawal 
of uNMIT, dialogue increased between Australia, New zealand, uS, uN 
 Development Programme (uNDP), and Japanese support systems within the 
government-led coordination mechanism. However, non-traditional donors such 
as Portugal, Brazil, China, and Indonesia have continued to work individually 
with the government (Dewhurst, Saraiva and Winch 2016).
Overall, the notable performance of the AFP-TLPDP can be attributed to the 
constant efforts to build long-term relationships with Timorese counterparts as 
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well as relevant stakeholders in the rule-of-law sector. Building relationships can 
bring about a consensus regarding aid objectives, which can lead to an align-
ment with the recipient government and can close the strategic, coordination, 
and funding gaps. Simultaneously, the Australian experience suggests that in-
ternal management of aid programs is expected to meet the shifting needs of a 
post-conflict environment. Coordination with other donors in supporting police 
development is another challenge. These lessons imply that long-term involve-
ment and focused attention on the changing needs are conditions that enable 
the continuum initiative but at the same time, such initiatives may also require 
further integration of actions by the government and donors.
Local perceptions and reactions
The efforts of these three bilateral donors were undertaken in close cooperation 
with the government. As a result, bilateral donor programs have been established 
in line with national strategies. However, as discussed in the introduction, attrib-
uting the current peace to government payments to veterans and disbursements 
to local programs is questionable.
With such questions in mind, the following section articulates some percep-
tions of local in relation to peace and order. While local perceptions of externally 
led peacebuilding efforts have already been explored in a separate research arti-
cle (Tanaka 2018), the following section considers the concerns of Timor-Leste’s 
civil society that the government’s outlook on peace and order is largely oblivious 
to the fragile situation among some Timorese communities.
Concerns of local NGOs
One of main concerns for local NGOs is the country’s diminishing revenue from 
petroleum production (interview with the Director of La’o Hamutuk,  September 5, 
2015; interview with the Director of Fundasaun Mahein,  November  23, 2015). 
The rapid and continuous decline in international oil prices from 2014 to 2017 
had seriously undermined the oil-based Timor-Leste economy. In the course of 
receding oil prices, Timor-Leste’s oil income (per month) has been cut in half 
(La’o Hamutuk 2005). Furthermore, the volume of petroleum production has al-
most consistently declined over the last five years, and there is a prediction that 
Timor-Leste’s oil yield will be exhausted within ten years (interview with the di-
rector of La’o Hamutuk, September 5, 2015). Civil society echoes the opinion that 
Timor-Leste must develop new industries for economic growth and must empha-
size education as well as the continuing expansion of international support (ibid.).
Civil society is also concerned with the quality of the government’s perfor-
mance and the need for additional efforts to improve the security sector. Local 
NGOs are aware that there is broad support from the public to respect the rule 
of law, including government officials themselves, and laws for addressing local 
disputes are vital to stable development with lasting peace. In addition, as there 
are no quick solutions to such fundamental problems, local NGOs have stressed 
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the importance of grass-roots efforts and the necessity for accurate monitoring of 
government policy (interview with the members of Fundasaun Mahein, March 9, 
2016).
Further, members of civil society have pointed to land disputes and veteran 
issues as potential sources of conflict in current Timorese society. Citizens in 
both urban and rural areas share these concerns, saying that, upon returning to 
their homes after fleeing violence, they found others occupying their land, thus 
leading to disputes because no effective legal documents had been filed (Tanaka 
2018). A member of a local NGO feels this issue will continue because of the lack 
of attention by the government and stated:
Any citizen in this country needs a piece of land. In my opinion, if the land 
issue is not resolved right now, the issue could bring instability to the country 
in the future. Land conflicts can happen almost anywhere in a post-conflict 
country, so it would be wise for the government to resolve this. Big persons, 
the authorities, own large parcels of land in Timor-Leste. That situation 
could also lead to social jealousy.
(Interview with the director of Fundasaun Mahein, 
March 9, 2016)
Another concern derives from the verification process for pension payments for 
retired soldiers. Citizens feel that pension funds and support for the children of 
veterans—such as scholarships—are not distributed in a fair and appropriate 
manner (Tanaka 2018). A local NGO member pointed out that veterans have 
played an important role in the country’s independence. Therefore, they are in-
fluential and can even bring instability if the government does not pay attention 
to their requests for payment (interview with the director of Belun, November 26, 
2015; eTLJB 2014).
Efforts toward ‘on-the-ground’ conflict prevention
Regarding the fragility of peace in Timor-Leste, local NGOs have engaged in 
bottom-up conflict prevention efforts. For instance, a local NGO known as Fun-
dasaun Mahein (FM) was established in 2009 with the purpose of preventing 
violence in the daily lives of Timorese people. FM has also set its sights on in-
fluencing security-related policymaking based on grassroots viewpoints through 
monitoring and advocacy.8 As a practical matter, FM works with the PNTL and 
the FDTL by advocating and advising on improvements regarding the perfor-
mance of these institutions. It also acts as a watchdog for officials.
Another notable mechanism launched by the initiative of local NGOs is the 
‘early Warning System’ (eWS).9 eWS is essentially run by communities them-
selves to monitor the security situation, thereby preventing potential disputes 
from escalating. The system is supported by NGOs to gather information and 
solve problems promptly. The system advises and warns the government of poten-
tial conflicts via information-sharing. In this regard, the FM Director, Mr. Belo, 
68 Y. S. Tanaka and T. Honda
stated: ‘With the power and authority that the government has, we believe that it 
can use the information we provide to prevent conflict.’ These activities of local 
NGOs stem from on-the-ground concerns regarding social conflict and can be 
referred to as ‘grass-roots conflict prevention.’
Discussion
Bilateral development agencies have been able to focus on ‘development’ from 
an early stage because of the international red-carpet assistance provided to 
Timor-Leste. First, uN missions in Timor-Leste focused on security and gov-
ernance issues. While enhancing security was the responsibility of multilateral 
forces, both uNTAeT and uNMIT were mandated to create stable and sus-
tainable state functions for Timor-Leste, including police functions in the secu-
rity sector. Here, the uN missions faced ‘some of the choices, challenges, and 
dilemmas encountered in development’ (Morrow and White 2002). Second, 
 Timor-Leste has been considered a blessed country due to generous assistance 
and a sufficient income from the oil industry. In spite of being a small country, 
as far as bilateral donors, there are approximately 50 organizations that provide 
development services in Timor-Leste.10 For this reason, Timor-Leste is referred 
to as a ‘Beloved Land’ (Peake 2013). Third, the aid environment in Timor-Leste 
has been structured primarily by the international community, followed by the 
Timorese Government, to establish ‘a multi-layered model’ that has incorporated 
stakeholders in development efforts since 1999. Similarly, after the 2006 crisis, 
in order to address the strategy gap, the government established the NPP as a 
means of aligning the development efforts of internationals.
At the agency level, bilateral aid donors had their own strategies and means 
to achieve development along the continuum for peacebuilding. uSAID carried 
out projects utilizing an uninterrupted approach, with solid assistance strategies 
for Timor-Leste based on its original assessments. In concrete terms, the OFDA 
engaged in emergency relief at the first stage but OTI put forth a strategy target-
ing transition in early 2000 to avoid a coordination gap. OTI took on a crucial 
role from uSAID’s continuum perspective because OTI led the uSAID strat-
egy in promoting mid- and long-term economic development, with periodical 
assessments. That strategy provided a platform for uSAID’s assistance during 
the transition period, which was a period that would continue until Timor-Leste 
reached a stage of absolute development where no risks of conflict were con-
firmed. In acknowledging that the transition period ended when uN missions 
withdrew, uSAID handed over their programs, including the LLPs, to local 
organizations.
There have also been some criticisms of uSAID’s approach. Neves (2011), for 
example, pointed out that uSAID has not produced or promoted good results 
through its land management projects. Another criticism indicates that  uSAID 
did not consider the impact of aid, that the draft law lacked community con-
sultation, and that the government was insufficiently ready to take over the 
program.11 Thus, the uSAID’s continuum approach may take into account of 
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smooth transition from relief, recovery to development by transferring initiatives 
to local at the earliest opportunity.
JICA consistently followed its basic aid policy for Timor-Leste focusing on 
three to four sectors, namely, infrastructure, the economy (including agriculture), 
human resource development, and the consolidation of peace. Since early 2000, 
JICA has adopted two methods for realizing the continuum: a gradual and evo-
lutionary approach to developing projects by coordinating several schemes for 
humanitarian and recovery phases. In other words, JICA’s basic approach to 
realizing the continuum was to apply existing developmental aid schemes to re-
lief and recovery. Additionally, JICA’s projects have been implemented under a 
fundamentally unchanged principle from the beginning of the post-crisis period 
and with careful internal management. Thus, JICA’s ‘continuum’ approach is 
likely to value warily preparing and conducting development projects since hu-
manitarian phase following the ‘do no harm’ principle.
Australia self-evaluated that they have offered significant amounts of 
assistance— especially after the 2006 crisis—yet management suffered due to the 
lack of an aid strategy. However, backed by strong national interest, the police 
support program evolved over time in volume and quality in accordance with 
accumulation of capacity-building skills within the IDG. It was a success in terms 
of building cordial relationships between government officials, communities, and 
donors so that the program could assimilate voices and eventually enhance the 
program’s quality. Nevertheless, Australia also emphasized that sufficient staff 
and a structured management system are vital to being sensitive to shifting de-
mands. Further, coordination among donors is challenging because no overall 
SSR strategy was launched in the country. Also the IDG’s role in building police 
capacity can be critically evaluated, as its impact on local government as well as 
communities is enormous (Harris and Goldsmith 2012).
Concerns and the reaction of civil society have highlighted deep perception 
gaps regarding Timorese leadership and the aid community, which have focused 
on development issues. Civil society has warned that current public peace is vul-
nerable due to the ‘buying of peace’ policy, backed by an unsustainable budget 
and low public service performance, including within the security sector. Because 
of the government’s reluctance to fully deal with land disputes and veterans is-
sues, people are concerned about potential resource conflicts. In response, civil 
society has taken on an advocacy role in monitoring the government. In addition, 
locals have adopted their own mechanisms such as eWS to mitigate potential 
conflicts at the community level. We conclude that actions taken by civil society 
are signs that the conflict prevention perspective has been absent from ongoing 
Timor-Leste assistance projects.
Conclusion
The international community assigned multiple tasks to various organizations 
supporting peacebuilding in Timor-Leste; however, the division of labor seemed to 
neglect an important issue. Bilateral aid agencies were in a position to incorporate 
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programs for reconstruction (or rehabilitation) and, eventually, ‘development’ 
from the initial phase of a humanitarian crisis with the established mechanism 
of aid management and a substantial inflow of funding. Because Timor-Leste 
was aiming to build a new state, crisis management has not only targeted peo-
ple’s immediate needs but also provided livelihood support from scratch. A shared 
mindset among stakeholders in the early phase of the crisis drove aid agencies to 
support the long-term needs of the people directly, while the uN missions and the 
multilateral forces were primarily in charge of peace and security issues.
In parallel, bilateral aid agencies adopted their own perspectives and strategies 
to respond to changing needs. In other words, each agency used its instruments 
to act on the continuum to support Timor-Leste’s national development. The 
OTI of the uS led to the formation of a strategy at the country level and pro-
grams accordingly fit into both Timor-Leste’s needs and the uS strategy of focus-
ing on governance. In contrast, JICA had no specific mechanism to respond to 
the needs of weak states or strategies for peacebuilding at that time, and therefore 
maximized its contribution by utilizing development schemes. Australia eventu-
ally fostered the police capacity-building program along with the institutional 
evolution of the IDG. As a result, while agencies had shared understanding on 
Timor-Leste’s development, their challenges to realize the continuum in peace-
building differed in terms of organizational goals, structures, and values.
Alternatively, the concentration of development efforts by the government and 
donors invoked a range of alternative local actions from civil society following 
the 2006 crisis. To fill in the gap of perception toward peace, local NGOs have 
focused, a priori, on alleviating possible on-the-ground conflicts.
The findings in this chapter imply that adopting the approach to realize the 
continuum towards development in a new, post-conflict, fledgling state was not 
sufficient to address the conflict prevention perspective at a grass-roots level. Con-
cerns regarding the fragility of peace raised by civil society show a contrasting 
view of the government’s positive view of peace. In Timor-Leste, the development- 
oriented approach has been successfully linked with relief, recovery and develop-
ment efforts through donors’ selections of specific sectors but this approach left an 
important need aside. Bilateral donors may continue to face difficulties with the 
task of corresponding to needs and demands in post-conflict situations.
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Notes
 1 Donors had already pledged over uS$500 million over three years for Timor-Leste in 
the first Donor Meeting held in Tokyo on December 17, 1999.
The case of Timor-Leste 71
 2 For convenience, the components of the graph are reorganized from the original 
OeCD QWIDS. In concrete terms, the CRS purpose code (for the 100s group) for 
‘social infrastructure and services’ is divided into ‘social infrastructure’ components, 
such as education, health, water, and sanitation sectors in code 110 through to the 
140s, and the 160s, ‘governance’ in code section 151, and ‘peace and security’ in code 
section 152.
 3 The uS defines its support to Timor-Leste in terms of realizing uS national interests 
such as (1) promoting democracy internationally and in Southeast Asia, (2) being a 
part of Indonesia’s democratic transformation, and (3) as successfully completing a 
uN-directed undertaking (uSAID 2000, 2).
 4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan holds jurisdiction over the ODA regarding 
international organizations.
 5 Japan’s first Official Development Assistance Charter (established on June 30, 1992) 
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1999/ref1.html
 6 ‘Nation-building’ is generally used with the sentence ‘consolidation of peace’ by Japanese 
officials. In short, the Japanese government defines peacebuilding as the consolidation of 
peace and nation-building (‘heiwa no teityaku to kunidukuri’).
 7 AusAID (Australian Agency for International Development) was integrated into the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) on September 18, 2013.
 8 FM’s vision is a Timor-Leste in which every citizen feels safe and secure in his or 
her own country and that this condition will be based on the universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the Constitution of Timor-Leste (see www.fundasaunmahein.
org/kona-ba-fundasaun-mahein/deklarasaun-mahein).
 9 For instance, details on Belun’s eWS operations can be found on the website that 
updates security-related information (see www.belun.tl/en/early-warning-and-early- 
response-ewer).
 10 There were about the same numbers of international donors (multi-donors) as there 
were bilateral agencies, with both playing an active role in Timor-Leste.
 11 See also the website for Habitat International Coalition (www.hic-net.org/news.
php?id=pWlozA==#.WB1Smi2LSCh).
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Introduction
South Sudan is a challenging to realize the links between relief, recovery, and 
development under the conditions of a fragile peace. As Sudan has been plagued 
by crisis for more than half of the century, debates among aid communities have 
persisted on how to provide more-than-relief aid to create the conditions for a sus-
tainable peace. As Maxwell, Santschi, and Gordon (2014, 3) noted, aid programs 
in Sudan are necessary in order to build capacity: regardless of the outcome 
of the war, when peace eventually comes and whoever is in charge, skills and 
capacities and infrastructure will be required. This leads to the question of how 
donors can provide such aid programs. The aim of this case study is to examine 
donor approaches to ‘realizing the continuum’ in South Sudan before the sign-
ing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 (hereafter, the 2005 CPA) 
up to the beginning of 2016. The approaches implemented by united States of 
America (uS), the european union (eu), and Japan were selected because as 
the key humanitarian and development assistance donors, they have realized the 
relief-to-development continuum at policy and operational levels.
The basic notion of the continuum concerns how humanitarian and develop-
ment strands (normally seen as opposing ends of the continuum) can be inter-
twined to simultaneously address both humanitarian needs and deeply rooted 
socio-economic and political issues (van Dijkhorst 2013, 241). In the context of 
a protracted humanitarian crisis in Southern/South Sudan, ‘more-than-relief’ 
activities are required. Donors utilize different names in referring to this pro-
cess, including ‘developmental,’ ‘rehabilitation,’ ‘recovery,’ and ‘reconstruction.’1 
In particular, ‘rehabilitation’ programs before the 2005 CPA typify a relief- 
development continuum. After 2005, ‘peacebuilding’ becomes the overarching 
concept in crisis management, embracing ‘relief,’ ‘recovery’ and ‘state-building’ 
(which also includes development) rather than ‘gap-filling.’
This case study focuses on three donors in particular: the uS, eu, and  Japan. 
As introduced in Chapter 2 of this volume, among all donors to South Sudan, 
these three donors have incorporated general continuum approaches into their 
humanitarian or development aid strategies. The uS has supported South Sudan’s 
5 Comparative analysis 
of donor approaches to 
the continuum under a 
fragile peace
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independence and peacebuilding and is now its largest financial donor. The char-
acteristics of uS approaches to the continuum relates to the promotion of its own 
geo-political interests in Southern/South Sudan. Two agencies,  uSAID and the 
humanitarian-mandated uSAID-OFDA have cooperated from the early 1990s 
in furthering their political goals through activities in gray areas—or in other 
words, activities that lie between humanitarian aid and development.
The eu, as a long-time leader of approaches for linking relief, rehabilitation 
and development (LRRD), has started its assistance before the 2005 CPA and 
has been the second-largest humanitarian donor to South Sudan. The eu’s 
main driver is the humanitarian-mandated agency, the european Commu-
nity  Humanitarian Operations (eCHO), in cooperation with the development 
agency, the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation 
and Development (DeVCO). The eu’s approach is characterized by the incor-
poration of humanitarian principles.
Japan has supported humanitarian relief and development on a comparatively 
large scale since the 2005 CPA. Interestingly, among the three donors, Japan is 
the only one that does not have a humanitarian-mandated agency for conflict 
situations. Thus, relief comes only in the form of aid provided by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs through international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). The Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA), as 
a development-mandated agency, covers a gray area from the both perspective 
of development and peacebuilding. Comparative analysis of these three large 
donors should provide some illustration of the varieties of continuum approaches 
by bilateral donors. It is important at the outset to examine each of the bilateral 
donors’ motivations to start gray area activities in South Sudan, how they have 
been implemented, and finally, how each donor’s approach towards the contin-
uum could be characterized.
This case study is based on literature review, 16 semi-structured interviews 
in Juba in February 2016 with donors, multilateral agencies, NGOs, and cor-
respondences with donor government officials, aid workers, and academics.2 
 unfortunately, I was unable to conduct interviews directly with South Sudanese 
government officials for this chapter.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: a brief overview of the crisis in South 
Sudan followed by a chronological examination of donor approaches to the con-
tinuum in different periods. The last section provides a comparative analysis of 
donor approaches and examines possible factors that could promote or prevent 
better realization of the relief-to-development continuum.
Overview of crisis and aid in South Sudan
Two armed conflicts and independence of the South
South Sudan gained its independence from the Republic of the Sudan (hereafter 
referred to as Sudan3) in July 2011. For more than fifty years since its independ-
ence in 1955, Sudan has been riven by armed conflict between the government in 
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Khartoum and rebel groups. The conflict was most marked between the North and 
the South on the grounds of religion (Muslims and Christians) and ethnicity (Arabs 
and Africans). Additionally, many people in the South believed they were being 
exploited by the North and desired to see this relationship transformed. The first 
armed conflict took place from 1955 to 1972; the second began in 1983 and ended 
with the signing of the 2005 CPA in January 2005. The 2005 CPA was signed be-
tween the Government of Sudan (GoS) on the one hand, and the  Sudanese  People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and other rebel groups on the other. The 
agreement was also supported by the regional organization IGAD (Intergovern-
mental Authority on Development) and by Western countries as well as Japan. 
Terms of the agreement included ensuring administrative autonomy for the South, 
a new Government of South Sudan (GoSS) headed by the SPLM/A, and a six-year 
interim period until a referendum for independence was held in 2011.
underpinning the North–South conflict was a mixture of different types 
of conflicts in the region. These include disputes over resources between local 
groups, challenges against the government, and conflicts between states. Another 
conflict—in Darfur—began in 2003 when rebel groups backed by the South 
fought against the government in the North. This resulted in large-scale forced 
movement, starvation and death. The Darfur conflict and its outcomes embody 
the complexity and dynamics of conflict in Sudan.
The GoS—the regime in Khartoum—was able to count on a state appara-
tus with considerable strengths, including centralized control over wealth, re-
sources, and security forces (Haslie and Borchgrevink 2007, 12–13). However, 
this was not the case for the South, where there were no modern, democratic 
governmental structures prior to signing of the 2005 CPA. Historically, southern 
Sudan has been a severely under-developed area with very limited infrastruc-
ture and administrative capacity. In SPLM/A-controlled areas, during the pe-
riod of conflict, there were traditional authorities and a military administration, 
with service delivery provided largely by NGOs. According to the OeCD/DAC 
 (Organisation for economic Co-operation and Development/Development As-
sistance Committee) Report, Sudan (both North and the South) encompassed all 
dimensions of fragility: it could be variously grouped with countries undergoing a 
post-conflict/crisis and political transition, facing deteriorating governance envi-
ronments, demonstrating gradual improvement, as well as countries in prolonged 
crisis or impasse (Haslie and Borchgrevink 2007, 13). The 2005 CPA, rather 
than marking the beginning of recovery or reconstruction, is widely considered 
to mark the point at which the South began to build a state from scratch (Harvey 
2009). This perspective implies that agenda for the continuum in the South is not 
to fill the gap between relief and recovery but to generate synergies between relief 
and state-building.
The third conflict in 2013
Two-and-a-half years after the Republic of South Sudan became independent, vi-
olence recurred in December 2013, leading to a deterioration of the humanitarian 
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situation. Before the new conflict broke out, the humanitarian community fore-
cast that the situation in South Sudan showed the potential for improvement in 
2014 and beyond: it was the first time since 2011 that humanitarian needs had 
not increased (OCHA 2013). However, even though South Sudan was regarded 
as having positive development prospects before the conflict (AfDB, OeCD, and 
uNDP 2015, 3), significant humanitarian needs and a chronic lack of develop-
ment persisted (OCHA 2013). unfortunately, the violence that started in Juba 
spread across eastern and northern South Sudan. Nearly 1.4 million people were 
forced from their homes and tens of thousands were killed (OCHA 2014).
A ceasefire agreement was signed in August 2015, but clashes have continued. 
The strife has progressively adopted the characteristics of an inter-communal 
conflict, with government forces under President Salva Kiir Mayardit, allied to 
the Dinka tribe, fighting against the Nuer tribe, which is loosely allied with for-
mer and current Vice-President Riek Machar.4 The conflict is concentrated in 
the Greater upper Nile states of Jonglei, upper Nile, and unity, with the central 
counties of unity State the most severely affected. Food insecurity and malnutri-
tion rates are alarming, and insecurity is hampering the delivery of assistance. 
OCHA (uN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) reports wide-
spread violations of human rights and targeted violence against civilians, and 
6.1  million people were reported to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 
2016 (OCHA 2015). The number of affected people has declined since its peak 
of 7.3 million in 2014 (OCHA 2014); however, more than 69 percent of the total 
population is still suffering as a result of the conflict.
Between the independence in 2011 until December 2013, South Sudan has 
received more than uS$4.3 billion in humanitarian and development assistance 
Figure 5.1  Bilateral ODA by sector for South Sudan, 2013–2014 average.
Source: authors, based on data from OeCD/DAC (www.oecd.org/dac/stats).
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from the international community (Osborne 2014, 2). It was the fourth-largest 
recipient of international humanitarian assistance (uS$664 million) in 2013. In 
2013–2014, 58 percent of bilateral ODA was designated as humanitarian aid, 
leaving nearly 42 percent for development (see Figure 5.1).5 The conflict has 
redirected resources away from development funds to humanitarian relief, fol-
lowing a structure similar to the pre-CPA period. On the other hand, the shift 
in world attention to the Syrian crisis has dramatically decreased the amount 
of humanitarian assistance to South Sudan, falling by uS$210 million in 2014 
 (Development Initiatives 2015).
Humanitarian crisis management in the pre-CPA 
period: commencing with rehabilitation
Operation Lifeline Sudan
Due to major violations of human rights in Sudan from the late 1980s to the early 
1990s, donors withdrew official development assistance to Sudan. The uS sus-
pended development assistance in 1990, as did the eu. Japan ceased providing 
development assistance to Sudan in October 1992. up until the 2005 CPA, aid 
for southern Sudan was limited to humanitarian relief resources, with the few 
possible recovery and development activities carried out under the guise of relief 
activities. The approach to realizing the continuum during this period was using 
humanitarian aid to achieve longer-term, recovery and development goals.
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the largest-ever humanitarian coordination 
mechanism, was coordinated by united Nations agencies and NGOs under the 
lead of uNICeF. OLS was established in 1989 to respond to the most severe 
war-created famines (e.g. 1988 in Bahr el Ghazal). The specific characteris-
tics of OLS were arrangements for humanitarian access negotiated with both 
sides of the conflict—the GoS and the SPLM/A—by creating separate admin-
istrative sectors in the government-controlled ‘North’ and non-government- 
controlled ‘South.’ each NGO had an area of responsibility and worked closely 
with local Sudanese authorities and uN-funded agencies such as the World Food 
 Programme (WFP). OLS started as an emergency relief operation for famine, 
but after 1993 it sought to implement relief-to-development projects, especially in 
the South (Karim et al. 1996; Macrae et al. 1997, 223; Maxwell 2014, 3).
The continuum approach used in the North was oriented toward develop-
ment, the development-oriented continuum, and was driven by the government- 
development agenda. In the case of the South, however, donors, uN agencies, 
and NGOs were the main promoters of the relief-to-recovery approach to the 
continuum, with the SPLM/A showing a positive and cooperative attitude. As 
Macrae et al. (1997) pointed out, there was no clear working definition of the 
continuum at that time. The largest component of OLS was food deliveries; 
however, with uNICeF in the leading role, they also focused on capacity- and 
institution-building as well as promoting food security to increase self-reliance. 
uNICeF capacity-building projects included cash payments to the Sudanese 
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Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) and the Relief Association of 
Southern Sudan (RASS)6 to cover salaries, rents, and office expenses (Macrae et 
al. 1997, 234). Some authorities were critical of the OLS approach to the South, 
maintaining that too much support was given to SPLM/A for human resource 
development, institution building, and to securing resources for sustainability of 
SPLM/A. Operational issues during OLS included legitimacy of the recipients 
and the politicization of aid.
Donor engagement
United States of America
From 1983 to 2003, the uS provided uS$2 billion in humanitarian assistance, 
mainly in the form of food assistance. The majority of uS assistance was chan-
neled to the South with the recognition of the SPLM/A as the main ‘authority’ 
(Harmer 2004, 14). It was administered mainly through the Bureau for Humani-
tarian Response (BHR), the Office of uS Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and Food 
for Peace (FFP). This makes it difficult to identify activities as being specifically 
development or humanitarian relief, with most activities lying somewhere in be-
tween the two.
Hostile relations between the uS and the GoS led to the concentration of 
 uSAID activities in the SPLM/A-controlled southern area.7 under the  Clinton 
administration, the uSAID headquarters in Washington and the Sudan Field 
Office in Nairobi, (established in March 1993 for uS relief assistance in the South) 
created a new strategy together to undertake ‘rehabilitation-oriented activities 
that did not fall under the conventional definition of “emergency assistance”‘ 
(O’Toole Salinas and D’Silva 1999, 7). The distinctive feature of the strategy was 
to start ‘rehabilitation’ in relatively secure opposition-held areas alongside the 
countrywide civil war. Such an approach would traditionally be considered as 
lying within the ‘relief’ aid phase. The other feature of the strategy was its meth-
odology: small grants were provided to NGOs with the aim of reducing costs. For 
the 1994 fiscal year, OFDA estimated uS$28 million would be needed as emer-
gency grant aid for fifteen NGOs (Anderson et al. 1995, 1, 7). Of that amount, 
about 81 percent went to three sectors in the South for building local health capac-
ity (approximately uS$12.6 million), small-scale agriculture programs (uS$8.7 
million), and road rehabilitation projects (uS$1.5 million). The smallest amount 
of funding was allocated to food aid (15%) and water and sanitation projects (3%).
The Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program, which 
began in 1998, is considered a uS model for a ‘developmental’ program in an 
area that is relatively stable but in the middle of conflict. The STAR program 
components were designed to:
•	 strengthen Sudanese grassroots organizations working to solve local re-
habilitation problems, thereby reducing their heavy reliance on relief and 
strengthening self-reliance;
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•	 provide governance training to the nascent civil administration in order to 
improve transparency, accountability, public financial management and re-
spect for human rights; and
•	 provide a forum that can contribute to the development of policies (O’Toole 
Salinas and D’Silva 1999).
The STAR program was introduced after debate in the uS Congress and a 
change of policy in the White House in 1997. This allowed the provision of devel-
opment assistance—uS$7 million over three years—in addition to humanitar-
ian assistance. It was intended to be used for promoting participatory democracy 
and good governance while reducing reliance on relief in the South. The Bureau 
for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) of the uS Department of State, 
the uSAID Regional economic Development Services Office in the Sudan Field 
Office, uSAID Khartoum, and the uS embassy in Nairobi planned and moni-
tored STAR together (OFDA 1998, 49).
STAR consisted, for the most part, of relatively small amounts of funding pro-
vided in related to capacity- and institution-building within the SPLM. At the 
same time, it also promoted a grassroots people-to-people reconciliation process, 
small-scale economic recovery activities, and rehabilitation of roads and agri-
cultural systems. The STAR program was intended to provide a bridge between 
relief and development as well as create a foundation for the eventual transi-
tion from conflict. It is important to note the SPLM was not a passive recipient 
but a participant in the program development and implementation processes in 
capacity-building for civil administration. However, STAR had underlying po-
litical objectives in moving towards state-building, by linking together not only 
relief and development but also capacity-building.
The European Union
From 1992 to 2002, the eu disbursed approximately uS$488.25 in humanitar-
ian assistance to both the North and the South (Harmer 2004, 15). ever since 
the suspension of development cooperation, eCHO had been a major player in 
Sudan and had tried to provide humanitarian relief and rehabilitation.
eCHO managed its activities in the North from Khartoum, withdrawing from 
the South when the SPLM asked NGOs belonging to OLS to sign a Memorandum 
of understanding (Mou) in March 2000. As a humanitarian-mandated agency, 
eCHO took a strong stance against the arbitrary taxes imposed by the SPLM/A 
and suspended eCHO’s humanitarian flights, but continued to provide support 
outside the SPLM/A-controlled area. As a humanitarian agency, eCHO was re-
luctant to accept the SPLM/A as the local ‘authority’ governing the South while at 
the same time, the eu as a political entity was adopting a foreign policy approach of 
‘constructive engagement’ toward normalizing relations with the GoS. This shows 
a clear distinction between eCHO and uSAID, whose support for capacity- and 
institution-building in SPLM/A-controlled areas virtually confirmed uS recogni-
tion of the SPLM/A as the local authority as part of the uS government’s strategy.
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Despite its strict humanitarian mandate, eCHO recognized it needed to 
move beyond relief activities. In the absence of development funding, eCHO 
had to ‘dress up’ developmental activities as ‘relief’ in NGO funding proposals 
 (Lehtinen 2001, 21). In this regard, eCHO strongly advocated for the Director 
General (DG) of DeVCO8 and DG Relex9 to start developmental activities. In 
 November 2000, the eu agreed on the implementation of its ‘Humanitarian 
Plus’ program from the 6th european Development Fund. It aimed to address 
the lack of a legal framework for development cooperation and provided uS$16 
million in grants for programs that extended beyond relief. The Humanitarian 
Plus program provided multi-year funding and focused on re-establishing ‘self- 
reliance’ in sectors related to food security, basic health, water, and sanitation to 
strengthen the delivery of basic services at the local community level. This was 
the first time in Sudan that local NGOs could access eu development- assistance 
funding. Humanitarian Plus was implemented by NGOs rather than by the GoS 
or SPLM/A; however, eu member states were still concerned that such a pro-
gram would send the wrong political signal to the Sudanese government.
DG DeVCO is responsible for the Humanitarian Plus program in close co-
ordination with eCHO. The european Commission (eC) disbursed assistance 
through Humanitarian Plus to both the North and the South as humanitarian 
aid, though eCHO provided assistance only to the North and not to SPLM/A-
controlled areas (Harmer 2004, 14–15). It was managed by a special Programme 
Management unit (PMu) within the Commission, in close cooperation with the 
eu delegation and eCHO in Sudan. This was partly due to the result of an in-
fluential evaluation of eCHO’s work in 1999, which criticized its increasing role 
in more-than-relief areas (Randel, Cordeiro and Mowjee 2004, 56).
Japan
until Sadako Ogata became the president of JICA in 2003, Japan had not de-
veloped any initiatives related to the continuum. JICA is in charge of providing 
bilateral aid in the form of Technical Cooperation, and Loan and Grant Aid, 
for which the main purpose is development. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), on the other hand, manages multilateral aid, including humanitarian 
funding to international organizations and NGOs. In comparison to eu and 
uS, Japan does not have a humanitarian agency for conflict-affected situations.10
Japan has been providing ODA to Sudan since the 1960s. In 1976, Japan pro-
vided loans for the first time; however, the main aid scheme for Sudan was grant 
aid to the North. The JICA Sudan office, which opened in Khartoum in 1989, 
was closed in January 1993 following a Japanese government decision to suspend 
development assistance. Following this, JICA sent a mission to conduct field re-
search and start a dialogue with the SPLM in Nairobi in November 2004. At 
this time, more than 90 percent of aid to Sudan was humanitarian assistance 
via international organizations, such as the WFP and uNICeF. up until 2004, 
Japan disbursed a total of uS$73 million as grant aid including humanitarian 
assistance (MOFA 2005).
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As the aid project titles show, Japanese aid was not intentionally used for re-
habilitation purposes. With the suspension of aid for development programs 
implemented through the GoS, disbursement of humanitarian aid through inter-
national organizations and NGOs was the only way for Japan to continue engag-
ing with the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. There were no rehabilitation-purposed 
programs for achieving relief-to-development continuum activities such as STAR 
and Humanitarian Plus. Japan’s engagement in gray area activities in relation to 
the continuum commenced after Ms. Ogata was appointed to the JICA presi-
dency. This occurred well before ‘seamless assistance’—the Japanese approach to 
the continuum—was formally adopted as JICA’s strategy in 2008.
Comparative analysis
‘Rehabilitation,’ ‘capacity-building’ and ‘long-term objectives’ were used as well 
as the word ‘developmental’ to show the need to extend assistance to the gray 
area between relief and development in the literature and donor reports during 
the period. The phase shift in donors’ strategies from ‘relief’ to ‘developmental’ 
activities started around 1994 along with the expansion of OLS activities in the 
South. It is useful to examine why such a shift took place at this time.
One reason for the expansion of OLS was the 1993 famine, but there were 
other reasons. The most obvious explanation is that donors began to realize that 
‘relief is not enough’ in a humanitarian crisis with no end, and that locals should 
be empowered to become self-reliant (Maxwell et al. 2014, 3). Moreover, pro-
longed and expensive humanitarian assistance led to a requirement by donor 
governments for cost reductions and decreases in aid dependency levels among 
recipient populations. Realization of the need for these reductions can be seen as 
prompting modifications of previous relief-focused policies.
Another reason was the unforeseen changes in diplomatic relations between 
donors and the GoS—especially for the uS—which occurred simultaneously to 
the building of closer relations with the SPLM/A (Akol 2005; Bradbury, Leader 
and Mackintosh 2000). Despite the establishment of OLS, without any visible 
progress from the GoS on the peace process, respect for human rights, or democ-
ratization, donors were unlikely to change their policies.
On the other hand, relationships between donors and the SPLM/A changed 
dynamically following the establishment of RASS as the civilian counterpart in 
the South and agreement on new Ground Rules with the SPLM/A for negotiated 
access. This created a humanitarian space that could also be used for more de-
velopmental activities. Bradbury, Leader and Mackintosh (2000, 24) noted that 
the establishment of the OLS and the signing of the Ground Rules in early 1993 
signaled a process of rehabilitation for the SPLM/A and the area it controlled. 
This clearly shows that development aid is a highly political instrument, and that 
political goals take precedence over needs at the local level. In this regard, the 
rehabilitation program implemented in the OLS period, which was funded by do-
nors as humanitarian assistance, could be regarded as the relief-to-developmental 
continuum approach under a humanitarian umbrella (Macrae et al. 1997).
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There were no special coordination mechanisms during the OLS period to-
wards realizing the relief-to-development continuum. There were six uN agen-
cies, 30 international NGOs, and 11 local NGOs under the auspices of OLS 
Southern Sector. Some constraints on the effective coordination of the complex 
structure of the OLS at different levels led to insufficient strategic coordination 
and poor joint planning. Within the OLS, frequent meetings often appeared lim-
ited to exchanges of information regarding security and ongoing projects rather 
than joint strategic coordination and the planning of activities (Lehlinen 2001, 
15). There was the notion of the need for a strategy for realizing the continuum; 
however, it did not become a specific strategy for OLS.
As Lehtinen (ibid., 12–13, 17) observed, the contrast between the uS and the eu 
shows that the donors’ approaches differed according to their mandate between 
the politically mandated humanitarian OFDA and the humanitarian- mandated 
eCHO. In the case of Japan, JICA was restricted by its development-only man-
date. The rehabilitation program in the South was strongly linked to OFDA’s 
foreign strategy; in this regard, OFDA worked jointly with other governmental 
offices and agencies. On the other hand, eCHO was faithful to its humanitarian 
mandate even though eCHO pressured DeVCO to develop a rehabilitation pro-
gram. Compared with the uS and the eu, Japan had to rely on multilateral en-
gagement during this period, and did not seek to utilize the relief-to- development 
continuum at this time. It is unsurprising that each donor approach toward the 
continuum corresponds to the differences between agencies’ mandates. It also 
depends on whether each donor has a clear political strategy for engaging with 
such fragile states.
In addition, with regard to local issues, the case of Sudan highlights the prob-
lem of how to deal with local ‘illegitimate’ authorities such as the SPLM as 
counterparts. There were many critics of this approach because, ‘whilst not chal-
lenging Sudanese sovereignty directly, OLS conferred international recognition 
on the SPLA’ (Harmer 2004, 12). Although the uS started rehabilitation activ-
ities before others in the southern area, thereby providing an important contri-
bution towards realizing the continuum, the one-sided nature and the backing of 
the SPLM/A as a part of an anti-GoS policy also received some criticism (Deng 
and Morrison 2001).
CPA period to the 2013 crisis: the continuum 
in a linear peacebuilding model
Foundation of the continuum: CPA, JAM, MDTFs
The 2005 CPA symbolized the beginning of a ‘recovery’ for all donors (Harvey 
2009, 146). This is clearly based on a linear peacebuilding model. For the first 
time, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) was recognized as a legitimate re-
cipient, enabling donors to resume development assistance in the South. The pro-
cess of setting a course for recovery (which consisted of state-building in the South) 
and the prospect of improved security helped to broaden the kinds of programs 
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on offer and boosted the motivation of aid workers. However, the special interim 
measures, such as ‘one government, two systems’ (meaning two counterparts), 
two coordinating teams, and two cluster teams for both the GoS and SPLM/A, 
during the 2005 CPA transition period until the referendum on independence, 
created an enormously complex situation. The international environment was 
dominated by the war against terrorism, leading to the continuation of strained 
relations between some western donors and the GoS in Khartoum. On the other 
hand, positive support for the newly recognized authority, the GoSS in Juba, was 
driven by the expectation of building the world’s newest country (Hemmer and 
Grinstead 2015). DAC countries almost doubled the amount of their aid in 2005, 
as a result, after the 2005 CPA, international aid engagement in Sudan (includ-
ing the South) increased dramatically.
Aid coordination mechanisms established in the 2005 CPA period could be 
regarded as an experiment in how and to what extent donors and aid organiza-
tions could work jointly to provide effective assistance. There was a clear need to 
assist the emerging governance structure of the GoSS in maintaining the peace 
process, address the issue of the fragility of the damaged and vulnerable econ-
omy and society, and to save the lives of people at risk. As a result, the structure 
of donor intervention in South Sudan became multi-layered. Political support 
for the peace process was provided by the troika (uS, uK, Norway) and IGAD 
 (Intergovernmental Authority on Development); security and election prepara-
tion assistance was undertaken by united Nations Mission in Sudan (uNMIS); 
and humanitarian relief and recovery was implemented by international organi-
zations, NGOs, and donor agencies.
The 2005 CPA, the Joint Assessment Mission ( JAM) process, and the Multi- 
Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) were important elements in donor engagement. 
The 2005 CPA was an ambitious time-bound political process, leading to a ref-
erendum on the South’s self-determination in 2011 (Fafo Institute 2013, 7). As a 
member of the troika, the uS took a strong initiative in the process. The JAM 
report was developed as a foundation plan for the six-year ‘recovery,’ focusing 
mainly on post-conflict development. Key donors, including the uS, eu and 
 Japan, provided critical technical and financial support to cluster works, such as 
governance, economic policy and infrastructure. The GoS and SPLM/A were 
also comprehensively included the JAM process, with careful consideration given 
to ensuring a balance between local ownership and donor interventions. A multi- 
national pooled fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS) was already embedded in 
the  Protocol on Wealth Sharing (2004) to ensure donors’ financial and technical 
support; this was formally decided at the Oslo Pledging Conference (2005) when 
the 2005 CPA and JAM reports were in place. The purpose of JAM was to provide 
an assessment of rehabilitation and transitional recovery needs focused on the first 
two years of the interim period, and an outline framework for reconstruction and 
recovery over the full six-year interim period (uNDG/World Bank 2006). JAM 
envisioned that it could use these pooled funds—mainly from MDTFs—to ena-
ble aid coordination.11 However, the MDTFs were not the sole funding channel; 
donors directly funded their own programs bilaterally ( JAM 2005). The 2005 
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CPA, JAM, MDTFs, and bilateral funding were the foundation of a continuum 
‘picture’ for drawing up a strategy envisaging humanitarian and security assis-
tance. They also provided a basis for donors’ large flagship development projects, 
financed through separate channels (Davies, Smith and Williamson 2011).
During this process, JAM tried to create links between other planning pro-
cesses such as the uN & Partners Work Plan of 2005 and 2006, the  uNAMIS 
and  uNMIS mission planning process, the Poverty eradication Strategy 
concept note, and the joint GoS/SPLM document ‘urgent Needs in Sudan’ 
(uNDG/World Bank 2006). The document was developed as an alternative to 
the  Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), which normally involves the develop-
ment of a strategic plan for humanitarian action and the fostering of cooperation 
between the host government, donors and aid agencies. These linkages were a 
noteworthy experiment in adopting a comprehensive approach, especially for 
the uN & Partners Work Plan 2006, which included a humanitarian component 
and a recovery and development component based upon the outcomes of JAM, 
and could be regarded as a continuum strategy. In the case of South Sudan, it is 
noteworthy that the planning process was originally based on separate humani-
tarian, security (peacekeeping) and development communities working together, 
as in the Work Plan and Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP) and in the 
uNMIS integrated planning process.
The JAM report requested funds for a coordinated response to development 
and recovery needs. Consequently, uS$4.6 billion was pledged by donors at 
the Oslo Conference in 2005. This provided a financial base for implementing 
the JAM report. The humanitarian needs did not directly respond to JAM but 
were included in the Work Plan for 2005 (uNDG/World Bank. 2006). However, 
about 60 percent of these pledges were actually provided for humanitarian relief. 
The PCNA review pointed out the need for integration of humanitarian relief, 
recovery, and development planning tracks and that more attention should be 
given to ‘early recovery’ activities with careful coordination of projects geared 
towards ‘medium-term reconstruction’ (ibid.). Overall, the challenge of merging 
political, humanitarian and development approaches by combining CPA, JAM 
and MDTFs under a state-building umbrella in order to realize the continuum 
may inevitably lead to the creation of a complex and un-manageable situation.
Donor engagement
United States of America
The uS was an interesting exception among the donors due to its deep involve-
ment in peace negotiations as a member of the troika, the large scale of its aid, 
and the human capacity available in the field. For example, while the 2005 CPA 
and its aid approaches tied donors to cooperating within the 2005 CPA frame-
work, its most important element was to ‘make unity attractive.’ The peace pro-
cess strategically focused on different approaches depending on the area—the 
North, the South, and the Three Areas12—with the latter two exempted from 
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sanctions beginning in 2006. uSAID provided activities for relief and promot-
ing peace in the Three Areas, and supported the South in its moves towards 
anticipated independence with a range of large projects covering humanitarian, 
recovery, and development activities. In this regard, they coordinated activities 
closely with other donors of development projects, but did not necessarily act in 
concert with the 2005 CPA’s aim for unity.
At the Oslo Donors’ conference in April 2005, the uS pledged the largest 
amount of funding: about uS$1.7 billion for the two years 2005 and 2006. The 
uS has been the leading donor to Sudan, providing more than uS$3.5 billion 
between 1983 and 2006. Among all contributions made by the uS government, 
Sudan was the largest recipient of OFDA humanitarian funding up until 2012, 
when the Syrian crisis became the major problem. However, due to legislative 
constraints and remaining suspicions about effectiveness, uSAID’s large re-
sources were only channeled bilaterally and did not support any pooled funds 
(Harvey 2009, 158).
From November 2007, OFDA Sudan (except Darfur) shifted the focus of its 
aid from relief to long-term assistance, with the goal of reducing humanitarian 
funding (OFDA 2007b). According to the OFDA annual report in 2007 and 
2008, OFDA worked with OTI, FFP and uSAID/Sudan to transfer its activi-
ties from relief programs to more development-oriented programs that could be 
handed over to other agencies and local authorities in Southern Sudan (OFDA 
2007a, 2008). This indicates a clear phase-centric logic. This shift may have 
arisen as a result of the recognition that the peace dividends were proving to 
be slow in realization. This resulted from the fragility of GoSS service delivery 
systems and, if unaddressed, it could consequently become a source of conflict. 
In 2009,  uSAID/Sudan started funding the Building Responsibility for Delivery 
of Government Services (BRIDGe) Program, which aimed to support CPA by 
delivering tangible peace dividends through building the capacity of state and 
county governments in the South to plan and deliver essential services as well as 
empower communities. The BRIDGe program serves as an important link in 
uSAID’s strategy to transition efforts from relief to development.
After independence in 2011, uSAID generated the ‘Transition Strategy be-
tween 2011 and 2013,’ which was aimed at increasing stability in South Sudan 
(uSAID 2011). The strategy stated, ‘the experience of the last six years demon-
strates that moving humanitarian to development programs and approaches is 
not a simple or linear process’ (ibid., 4). This strategy recognized the impor-
tance of synergies between the development and humanitarian programs led by 
OFDA and FFP, and other uS government initiatives such as the DOS Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law enforcement Affairs (INL), the Office of 
the uS Special envoy to Sudan (uSSeS), and the stabilization team mobilized 
by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
 Stabilization (S/CRS).
In South Sudan, OFDA provides its funding mainly through international 
NGO partners, preferring to put funds into NGOs rather than the uN. NGOs 
are considered more flexible, cost effective, capable of showing a stronger presence 
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on the ground, and better able to reach remote and isolated populations (Harvey 
2009, 151). Interviews by Harvey, showed that coordination between the three 
offices within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance 
(DCHA) worked well based on strong personal relationships and long experience 
in the South and the Three Areas. Harvey also found that internal coordination 
with uSAID development assistance was generally seen as strong (ibid., 152).
The European Union
The eu recommenced development assistance to Sudan in 2005. At the Oslo 
 Donors’ conference, the eu pledged about uS$734 million for the three years 
from 2005–2007. The total amount of eu assistance to Sudan between 2005 and 
2011 was more than uS$827 million, with more than half provided to the South in 
the areas of agriculture, food security, education, stabilization, and human rights. 
The eu was required to work only through the Government of National unity 
(GoNu), which was created following the 2005 CPA as an interim government 
between the GoS and the SPLM/A, and not directly with the GoS unless the GoS 
ratified the eu’s Cotonou Partnership Agreement with the African,  Caribbean 
and Pacific (APC) states, which included requirements for good governance based 
on human rights and democracy. However, the eu provided extensive funding for 
CPA implementation, which was channeled to pooled funds such as MDTF-SS, 
the Common Humanitarian Fund and the Basic Service Fund.
The european Commission Juba sub-office has played an important role in 
information sharing with eCHO and other Commission DGs to implement 
particular projects with awareness of the need to link relief and longer-term 
objectives. The Recovery and Rehabilitation Program—co-funded by uNDP—
provided funding to 48 national and international NGOs to build water points, 
health care units, schools, and sanitation systems. eCHO started allocations to 
implementation partners (IPs) for humanitarian projects in the South in 2005, 
including early recovery programs for internally displaced persons (IDPs) who 
had fled their homes but not crossed an international border. In order to real-
ize the continuum, funding for the recovery phase (the european Commission’s 
 Recovery and Rehabilitation Program, the Humanitarian Plus Program, the 
Food Security Thematic Program, and the Water Facility) could take over from 
the eCHO funding.
The eu published a Single Country Strategy Paper aligned with South  Sudan’s 
2011–2013 Development Plan in January 2012. The strategy stated that a coor-
dinated transition from a humanitarian approach to a government-owned devel-
opment based on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), the 
relief-to-development continuum concept for the eu, was the core (eu 2012, 3, 
28). In addition to the LRRD, the eu Comprehensive Approach— encompassing 
political and diplomatic issues, security, rule of law, stabilization, development, 
human rights, and humanitarian and trade aspects in the eu’s policy—was a 
guiding principle. The eu developed the strategy as a pilot case for the eu Joint 
Programming approach, which aims to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
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of eu aid by reducing fragmentation among eu donor aid programs and pro-
jects through joint preparation of country strategies with eu bodies, eu coun-
tries, recipient governments, and non-eu donors. As a result, the eu decided to 
focus on rule of law, health, education, and infrastructure for WASH, as well as 
food security. LRRD was embedded as a core principle for implementation with 
these sectors.
Japan
Japan pledged uS$100 million at the 2005 Oslo Conference for the first phase of 
JAM for both North and South, including the Three Areas. Japan channeled aid 
bilaterally not to MDTFs, but via JICA and through uN agencies.13 The total 
amount of technical cooperation provided to South Sudan by JICA from 2005 to 
2011 was about uS$58.97 million ( JICA 2013, 68).
The Japanese government recommenced development aid to Sudan in April 
2005. JICA started discussions with SPLM officials in Nairobi in 2004, and for-
mal engagement recommenced in May 2005 following an international coopera-
tion seminar in Japan to which administration officers from the North and South 
were invited. The final report of the emergency study on planning and support for 
‘Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and Surrounding  Areas’ 
suggested 25 projects in 8 areas, mainly infrastructure, such as road networks, 
water supply facilities, education facilities, and health centers ( JICA, Katahira & 
engineers International and Japan engineering Consultants 2007). Along 
with these infrastructure projects—JICA’s traditional area of expertise—JICA 
started a vocational training capacity-building project in the Juba  Multi-Service 
 Training Center. One of the features of JICA’s continuum approach in the 2005 
CPA period was ensuring ‘visible and tangible results’ by combining fast onset 
(vocational training) and slow onset projects (infrastructure), with a central focus 
on infrastructure projects, so South Sudanese people could become aware of a 
tangible peace dividend ( JICA 2013, 69).
Comparative analysis
until the 2013 Crisis, to a large extent, donors repeatedly invested aid in South 
Sudan’s development and state-building with great enthusiasm (Harvey 2009), 
‘blind optimism’ (Maxwell et al. 2014) or ‘the mantra that only development 
could bring peace’ (Hemmer and Grinstead 2015). especially in terms of de-
velopment assistance, donors funded infrastructure, basic services, and social 
protection through the GoSS and provided capacity- and institution-building 
projects for government officials. As international engagement ultimately shapes 
state-building, shifting never-ending humanitarian relief to recovery came to be 
an important issue; however, considerable effort was put into state-‘frame’ build-
ing and development as the main drivers of recovery. This foreseeable ‘state’ is 
considered essential in preventing relapse into conflict and precipitating another 
humanitarian crisis.
Figure 5.2  Total assistance to Sudan (2001–2011) and South Sudan (2011–2014) by DAC countries and eu institutions across phases of transitions.
Source: authors, based on data from OeCD QWIDS.
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Besides the mainstreaming of state-building, the fact that focus of aid 
changed constantly over a short period of time was a characteristic of this phase. 
 Humanitarian assistance made up the largest part of the total amount of do-
nor commitment up until 2010; however, the focus gradually shifted to devel-
opment assistance after independence in 2011, especially in the terms of social 
infrastructure (Figure 5.2). However, the suspension of oil production in January 
2012 and ensuing financial crisis caused another shift as the focus of donor assis-
tance returned to humanitarian issues. With the resumption of oil production in 
 September 2012, donor focus reverted to development. Donors responded well 
to the changing nature of complex emergencies like South Sudan; however, the 
changing nature of the conflict itself made it difficult to implement consistent aid 
programs.
Although the 2005 CPA aid mechanism explained in the section above was 
prepared by JAM and backed by MDTFs, many criticized the strategic gap in 
the early recovery phase. There was little evidence of a strategy that encom-
passed political, security, development, and humanitarian tools across bilateral 
and multilateral actors (Chandran, Jones and Smith 2008; Harvey 2009). As 
time has passed, JAM has lost its importance as an operational strategy. If it is 
assumed that one voice is ideal, a myriad of complex bilateral and pooled fund 
mechanisms with too many leaders was an obstacle to greater strategic coher-
ence. However, looking at each donor’s approach, there were relatively useful 
strategies for linking relief and development in coordination and funding mecha-
nisms. The uS and Japan did not use pooled funds but provided ‘early recovery’ 
programs for the continuum bilaterally, while the eu tried to realize the contin-
uum through pooled funds and coordination among eu players.
Donor engagement in the post-2013 crisis: 
the state-building to community approach?
After the relapse into conflict
Many of those interviewed for the study in January 2016 noted that it was very 
important that the humanitarian and development communities agree on ad-
dressing the continuum in South Sudan. In spite of more than 20 years of support 
provided to the government for capacity-building and long-term development, 
they have been disappointed by the unbreakable vicious cycle of delayed peace 
processes, recurring violence, and worsening humanitarian crises (Hemmer and 
Grinstead 2015).
Bilateral donors other than Japan have adopted the stance of not recog-
nizing the South Sudan government as a credible development partner, and 
full-scale development aid mediated by the central government is currently 
in abeyance. The uS, along with the uK and Norway, has continuously sup-
ported peace negotiations. However, on March 28, 2015, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 2206, condemning the flagrant violations of the Cessation 
of  Hostilities  Agreements in 2014 signed between the GoSS and the SPLA-IO 
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(SPLA-in-Opposition) and decided on targeted sanctions against individuals and 
entities who engaged in violent acts. The uS had been working on the resolution 
out of frustration with the lack of progress in the 14-month-long peace process. 
As a result, they had no choice but to continue with mainly humanitarian aid. 
While donors in Juba are sharing information, as of January 2016, they are not 
yet in a position to coordinate development aid.
Donor engagement
United States of America
Regarding coordination within donor countries, the uS being the largest aid 
donor, has adopted a comprehensive approach to ‘crisis response.’ The cooper-
ation made between uSAID staff that deal with diplomats within the embassy, 
OFDA staff within uSAID that specialize in humanitarian aid, various special-
ists in public order, humanitarian aid, and conflict analyst and DART (Disaster 
 Assistance Response Team), has been activated since the 2013 crisis. DART pro-
vides the spearhead for crisis management, coordinating directly with OFDA 
Washington. By authorizing independent decision-making for relief, DART 
strengthens the American government’s crisis response capability. According to 
a DART staff member, the system does function more flexibly and effectively in 
times of crisis. As such, they endeavor to make parallel relief and recovery work 
feasible, hoping to turn in results that constitute a single comprehensive and co-
herent uSAID approach.
The European Union
Within the eu, it appears difficult to adapt the model for the relief-to- development 
continuum for natural disasters and food security to a complex emergency like 
South Sudan. The traditional recognition of organizational differences between 
development approaches and eCHO’s strategy, rules, funding, mindsets and phi-
losophy persists. According to some interviews, aid workers in the field recognize 
there are organizational gaps—in principles, program cycles, and organizational 
culture—between the humanitarian and development communities. Acting on 
an eu headquarters initiative, eCHO and the eu delegation of South Sudan 
carried out a Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework ( JHDF) to pro-
mote strategic talks between the humanitarian wing (eCHO) and the develop-
ment/political wing of the eu delegation. The JHDF tried to create a framework 
for information sharing and common assessment and identify possibilities to 
complement programs in a cooperative manner. However, this approach was 
found to be too systematic. One interviewee said that, especially in a complex 
emergency like South Sudan, phases are non-linear and issues differ from place 
to place; thus, the attempt to systematize the collaborative work between hu-
manitarian and development aid is ideally good but, in practice, would not work 
easily in the field. Moreover, as the example of the JHDF shows, the gap between 
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the headquarters and field offices is far from small. For the field officers, attempts 
to systematize collaborative work between independent actors in foreign policy, 
development, and humanitarian areas are ideally good but not easily applied in 
practice. Since the suspension of development aid, eCHO has resumed its role as 
the main eu actor, the same role it undertook in the OLS era.
Japan
Japan has a small number of officers in the embassy—with no special analysts 
for conflict, humanitarian relief, or development—while the JICA office is sited 
elsewhere in Juba. There are coordination meetings and ODA task force meet-
ings between JICA and the embassy, but these are for information-sharing rather 
than working collaboratively to integrate relief and development work across the 
continuum. The approach is divided into humanitarian aid, dealt with by the 
embassy through allocation of the supplementary budget to international organ-
izations, and development programs implemented by JICA. A pilot project of 
concerned parties in communal conflict analysis—started as a part of JICA’s 
agricultural master plan—has the potential to become a project aimed at conflict 
prevention.
In contrast to the stance of the Western donors, the Japanese government has 
taken a long-term perspective, emphasizing patient association with the South 
Sudanese government. Japan has adopted a different, independent response 
compared to the 1990s when it acted in concert with Western donors and sus-
pended its support. Without a specialized government agency for humanitar-
ian relief in cases of armed conflict Japan is attempting to include a perspective 
on implementing the continuum when the Japanese embassy in Juba processes 
aid proposals by international organizations. It does this by trying to take into 
account both short-term relief and medium-to-long-term recovery and preven-
tion perspectives when the Japanese embassy in Juba processes aid proposals 
by international organizations. On the other hand, development assistance has 
been implemented through the continuing support of JICA, which particularly 
emphasizes ‘economic development’ by providing high-quality infrastructure 
and detailed agriculture master plans. As a result, Japan could be regarded as 
supporting the continuum through the demarcation between MOFA’s grant aid 
for international organizations and JICA’s humanitarian relief and development 
support.
Comparative analysis
Donor plans for closing the gap between relief and recovery are moving toward 
a focus on community-centered livelihood improvement and conflict preven-
tion. This is the first time that conflict prevention has become the main focus 
since the CPA, with donors adopting similar ideas to those employed during 
the OLS period. As a decision on assistance through the central government is 
still pending, program targets have turned to the improvement of ‘resilience’ at 
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the community level. unlike what has been done since the 2005 CPA period, 
this is not a state-building approach through the central government, but what 
is now referred to as ‘resilience’ support, intended to boost the inherent coping 
abilities of people living in regional communities. It implies an understanding 
that future shocks will occur. In particular, uSAID, International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), WFP, and JICA are taking an approach that combines 
food security and livelihood improvement support with conflict prevention and 
resolution. ‘Conflict’ here does not refer to the disputes between the SPLA and 
SPLA-IO, but to community-level conflicts (resource- dependent communal con-
flicts such as cattle raiding). Actions aimed at increasing self- reliance through 
improvements in food-security show similarities to the OLS period but, in their 
more recent incarnation, they are designed to prevent communal conflict and 
combine livelihood and peacebuilding at the community- level. It could be said 
that these efforts have been developed in response to the criticisms of previous 
aid programs, which paid insufficient attention to the connections between relief, 
recovery, and conflict prevention, rather than just relief.
Such community-based approaches show donor awareness of the dangers of 
aid dependency through large and continuous aid investment and service deliv-
ery by NGOs. As a result, while the humanitarian needs are not acute, condi-
tional approaches such as ‘food for assets’ or ‘food for education’ have also been 
adopted. Moreover, community-based approaches are expected to encourage an 
improvement of local governance (bottom-up governance reform) through com-
munity support. These approaches have broadened the relief-to- development 
continuum into donor funding, such as the WFP’s Food for Assets and the IOM’s 
Abyei Rehabilitation Initiative funded by uSAID (uSAID and IOM 2014, 
2015) and the Peace and Stabilization Quick Impact Fund financed by the eu. 
 Currently, a new call for papers is being issued, and the eCHO Humanitarian 
Implementation Plan (HIP) Sudan and South Sudan, as well as the uK, the 
uS, Germany, Switzerland, and Canada, are contributing to the South Sudan 
 Conflict Sensitivity Programme.14 This fund is receiving attention for its ‘not 
business as usual’ awareness and due to the need for a special approach different 
from that taken until now in South Sudan (Hemmer and Grinstead 2015). There 
are plans to share conflict analysis data and a conflict resolution framework, and 
to start a Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility and Conflict Sensitivity Forum. 
In other words, relief, recovery, and development, along with conflict prevention, 
are the trend of movement along the continuum in South Sudan.
According to some interviewees, there is also hesitation to form resilience 
programs and program cycles. Resilience programs should target medium- to 
long-term objectives, but humanitarian agencies should—ideally—not stay long. 
In addition, there are differences between donors in how key concepts, such as 
humanitarian relief and resilience, are understood and applied. For example, in 
terms of the meaning of ‘localization,’ humanitarian agencies tend to think of 
this as being based in local ‘communities’ or ‘people’; one the other hand, the 
development sector often takes ‘local’ to mean ‘state authorities.’ There are other 
examples of considerable variances in basic perceptions.
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In order to narrow the differences in mandates and policies between donor 
countries, understanding and cooperation at the ministerial level is essential. For 
example, in Japan, in order to acquire a supplementary budget, it is necessary to lay 
the groundwork with the Africa Bureau and the economic  Cooperation  Bureau 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to persuade the Ministry of  Finance. In 
the united States, there is the uSAID/OFDA Rapid Response Fund that works 
as a fund to close the gap between relief and recovery. As it is able to direct quick 
funding to IPs, the fund has been praised as especially useful by IPs. The max-
imum amount allowable under the fund is uS$300 million with a very rapid 
three-week screening process. The DART mechanism enables it to adapt to many 
programs at once, and the standard length of a project is three months—with 
further extensions possible after review. Close cooperation between  Washington 
and DART, bypassing the regional office in Nairobi, is an arrangement that gives 
decision-making power to the local DART and increased flexibility to the Rapid 
Response Fund approval process. Furthermore, cooperation with and implemen-
tation of FFP relief within DART has increased responsiveness and flexibility 
during crisis responses. The eu diplomatic mission has an officer to manage the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) but this is not a position that 
coordinates the eu’s development and humanitarian sectors.
Conclusion
This chapter conducted an analysis of the uS, the eu and Japan’s approaches to 
realizing the continuum in South Sudan from the early 1990s until after the 2013 
Crisis. As already mentioned, approaches to the continuum were referred to as 
‘rehabilitation’ in the early 1990s, ‘rehabilitation,’ ‘transitional or early recovery,’ 
and ‘reconstruction’ in the 2005 CPA period under a state-building process, then 
‘resilience’ and ‘conflict prevention’ in the post-2013 crisis period. Thus, it is clear 
that bilateral donors have implemented some ‘more-than-relief programs’ over 
these past 20 years and how they were implemented.
To conclude, I would like to highlight two aspects of my findings: firstly, ways 
that donors introduced activities into gray area activities in South Sudan; and 
secondly, the motivations for bilateral donors to start such activities, or in another 
words, what the differentiating factors were in each donor’s approach to the con-
tinuum. I will conclude by characterizing each donor’s approach and describing 
the implications of the study.
The uS was the first donor to start the rehabilitation program for the con-
tinuum in the Southern area, during a time that it was experiencing conflict. 
The distinctive feature of the strategy in 1993 was to undertake ‘rehabilitation- 
oriented activities’ in relatively secure opposition-held areas in the South, with 
the goal of building the capacity of the SPLM. Adopting a different approach 
to the uS, the eu started a rehabilitation program in 2000 for both the North 
and South. This was organized under the 6th european Development fund, 
 Humanitarian Plus. A key aim of the program was to fill the gap in the legal 
framework for development cooperation towards Sudan. When Japan began to 
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focus on the relief-to-development continuum approach —around the time of the 
2005 CPA—it was somewhat behind the other two donors. Compared to the uS 
and eu relief-to-development ‘rehabilitation’ programs, which consisted of many 
small grant projects for capacity-building related with livelihood, a feature of 
Japanese approach was the utilization of a development-to-recovery continuum 
focusing on vocational capacity-building along with an infrastructure program.
The second aspect concerned donor motivations and differentiation of each 
donor’s approach to the continuum. Despite understanding the needs on the 
ground, domestic political dynamics in each donor country influenced decisions 
on how and when to establish a continuum program. For uSAID, the com-
mencement of the rehabilitation program was reflected in changing the strategy 
towards the Horn of Africa. Of course, hostile relations between the uS govern-
ment and the Khartoum government led to uSAID activities being concentrated 
in SPLM/A-controlled areas. For the eu, in addition to eCHO’s pressure on 
DeVCO and DG Relex, the assessment of the Council of europe in 1999 could 
be regarded as one of the causes of the decision to use the development fund 
to set up the ‘more-than-relief’ program. In the case of Japan, it was difficult 
to implement recovery or development activities during the 1990s following the 
suspension of ODA, the lack of a humanitarian implementation agency, and the 
region’s high sensitivity to operational safety concerns. As well as addition of ‘re-
construction’ in its mandate, JICA has changed its internal procedures to deliver 
quick impact projects in the early recovery phase. As a result, the independence 
of the South in 2005 provided an opportunity for JICA to realize the continuum.
Comparing approaches to realizing the continuum by the uS, the eu and 
 Japan, it could be concluded that the uS’s approach was dependent on its politi-
cal interests, the eu’s approach reflected the humanitarian principles of eCHO, 
and in contrast to both, Japanese approach showed empathy related to their 
own past experiences of development in the post-conflict phases. This explains 
each bilateral agency’s mandate but does help to determine when bilateral do-
nors have realized the continuum and how it should be implemented. While the 
purpose of the continuum is to ensure that people’s needs can be responded to 
dynamically, donor motivations for realizing the relief-to-development contin-
uum are primarily driven by domestic political dynamics and policy changes. 
When state-building becomes the central item on the agenda of international 
actors and governments, the goal of addressing suffering among people is likely 
to be neglected, as donors prioritize the development end of the continuum over 
humanitarian activities.
It is obvious from the above examination that we should consider the political 
sensitivities involved in humanitarian crisis management, especially in the case 
of fragile states such as South Sudan. This is particularly so in areas not con-
trolled by the government or when the government is not regarded as a credible 
actor. The different attitudes of donors to Sudan and southern/South Sudan are, 
of course, reflected in their aid approaches. unfortunately, from the 1990s up 
until the present, the growing recognition of the importance of conducting more-
than-relief programs has been insufficient to prompt donors to introduce such 
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programs. Bilateral donors cannot retain a focus on achieving their own political 
goals while providing purely people-centric assistance. Donors should work to-
wards ensuring that aid best meets the needs of the people while protecting the 
dignity of those who suffer the most.
Update (2018)
As mentioned in the introduction, the analytical target of this chapter covers the 
period of the aid situation in Southern/South Sudan before the signing of CPA in 
2005 to the beginning of 2016. This chapter excluded the analysis of the situation 
after the violent clash between the government forces and the SPLA-IO forces 
during the 5th year anniversary of their independence. According to the South 
Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2018 by OCHA (united Nations Of-
fice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), more than 2 million people 
have fled South Sudan as refugees and about 1.9 million people are internally 
displaced. Needless to say, the humanitarian needs for both inside and outside 
of the country have continued to intensify and expanded. However, it should be 
noted that South Sudan has various needs including that of peacebuilding and 
further development. unfortunately, development aid by western donors is still 
suspended and humanitarian aid to support South Sudan continued to decline. 
At that beginning of 2018, South Sudan remains to be one of the most chal-
lenging environments for humanitarian and development actors. Therefore, the 
significance of realizing the continuum should take into account the assistance 
for those who fled from South Sudan as refugees and those who opted to stay.
Notes
 1 At the end of the 1990s, Macrae et al. (1997, 224) defined that ‘relief’ operations are 
primarily concerned with the physical survival of individuals lives, ‘developmental’ 
activities are usually planned with respect to the sustainability and appropriateness 
of social and economic systems, and ‘rehabilitation’ assistance is assumed to have a 
developmental concern for promoting livelihoods and reducing future vulnerability, 
as well as maintaining a concern for the preservation of life.
 2 The author wishes to thank all interviewees she met in Juba in February 2016.
 3 Please note that the term ‘Sudan’ refers to the present-day Republic of the Sudan, 
and ‘South Sudan’ to the Republic of South Sudan established in 2011, whereas 
terms such as ‘northern Sudan’ or ‘southern Sudan’ refer to the relevant geograph-
ical regions.
 4 Riek Machar was Vice-President of the Republic of South Sudan from 2005 to July 
2013 and is considered to have remained in the position until replacement by Taban 
Deng Gai after the July 2016 violence in Juba. As of April 2017, he was in exile.
 5 The data are from the table ‘Bilateral ODA by Sector for South Sudan, 2013–14 aver-
age’ on the OeCD/DAC webpage ‘Aid at a Glance: Chart for South Sudan’ (https:// 
public.tableau.com/views/OeCDDACAidataglancebyrecipient_new/Recipients?: 
embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no).
 6 The Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) was established to act 
as the humanitarian arm of the SPLM; the Relief Association of Southern Sudan 
(RASS) was established in 1994 as part of the SPLM civil administration.
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 7 The Clinton administration added Sudan to the list of states supporting terrorism in 
August 1993 and, in August 1998, a uS missile hit Khartoum in retaliation for the 
terrorist bombing of the uS embassy in Nairobi.
 8 The Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Develop-
ment (DeVCO) is responsible for designing european international cooperation and 
development policy and delivering aid throughout the world (see http://ec. europa.eu/
europeaid/general_en).
 9 The Directorate-General for the external Relations (DG Relex), which was responsible 
for the external policy, was merged into the european external Action Service in 2010.
 10 As shown in Chapter 1, JICA has a system for dispatching disaster relief teams during 
natural disaster situations.
 11 There are other pooled funds: the Common Humanitarian Fund, the Capacity 
Building Trust Fund, the Strategic Partnership Arrangement, the emergency Re-
sponse Fund, the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and the 
Basic Services Fund.
 12 The Three Areas consist of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, located along 
Sudan’s volatile North–South border.
 13 JICA implemented the vocational training project funded by MDTFs.
 14 This is being led by DFID, with a two-year pilot starting in early 2016 and the possi-
bility of an extension to three years.
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Introduction
The civil war in Syria has become protracted, and many actors, both internal 
and external, have waged armed confrontations to further their own interests 
and agendas. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. The report 
of the united Nations Secretary-General of September 2016 to the Security 
Council describes the humanitarian situation: ‘month by month, as hospitals, 
schools and markets are destroyed and doctors, teachers and shopkeepers are 
killed, the Syrian Arab Republic increasingly becomes a shell of its former self’ 
(uNSC 2016, 16). A report of the Independent International Commission of In-
quiry on the Syrian Arab Republic1 issued in August 2016 states that ‘there has 
been a marked upsurge in the fighting, with indiscriminate and disproportionate 
attacks on civilian-inhabited areas, particularly through pounding aerial bom-
bardments’ (uNHRC 2016).
The international community has tried to respond to the deep on-going cri-
sis, with various humanitarian actors—including united Nations (uN) agen-
cies, major donors, international and local non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)—engaging in large-scale assistance operations. However, as no political 
solution is in sight, the response by the international community has been far 
from adequate. The war-torn and fragmented reality in Syria hinders and com-
plicates aid operations, and humanitarian actors face a wide range of challenges.
One salient challenge is that humanitarian actors need to conduct two dif-
ferent types of aid operations in parallel—emergency humanitarian relief along 
with mid- and long-term assistance for recovery and future development. Since 
the early 1990s, the concept of a continuum has led to wide discussions on the 
utility of providing humanitarian relief in sequential phases. A. Gómez and 
 Chigumi Kawaguchi, however, argue that in responding to a huge scale human-
itarian crisis, a multi-layered approach is required rather than a linearly sequen-
tial approach, because the two phases of relief and development overlap each 
other and cannot be clearly separated (Gómez and Kawaguchi 2016, 30–31). In 
a large-scale crisis such as in Syria, indeed, affected people need both emergency 
relief and mid- and long-term assistance simultaneously in parallel rather than 
in a linear sequence.
6 the Syrian Civil War
Politicization of the crisis and 




In order to bridge phases of emergency relief with mid- and long-term as-
sistance, humanitarian actors began incorporating the concept of resilience 
into humanitarian relief about ten years ago. The Organization for economic 
Co- operation and Development (OeCD) defines resilience as the opposite of 
fragility and as ‘the ability to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness, or 
legitimacy’ (OeCD 2008, 12). Thus, resilience is not a phase-oriented approach; 
rather it implies that ‘all activities occur in parallel’ and ‘a commitment to re-
silience pursues contiguous participation during the entire crisis’ (Gómez and 
Kawaguchi 2016, 10).
Indeed, in responding to the Syrian crisis, the uN called for the strengthening 
of resilience from the early stage. In its revised version of the 2013 Syria Human-
itarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP), the uN emphasized the necessity of 
livelihood interventions ‘in order to retain and strengthen community resilience’ 
(uN 2013, 30). Since then, the uN has called on humanitarian actors to achieve 
two goals simultaneously: extending ‘a lifeline to the most vulnerable people’ and 
enhancing ‘protection and strengthen individual- and community-level resilience’ 
(uN 2015, 8).
As the crisis has deepened and become increasingly prolonged, however, the 
funding gap has remained huge, and demands for emergency assistance have 
continued to increase because of the unbroken crisis. Therefore, it is quite chal-
lenging for humanitarian actors to decide how to divide limited resources be-
tween the two types of responses.
Another difficult challenge relates to politicization. In humanitarian conflicts, 
almost all actors—both internal and external—politicize everything, even hu-
manitarian access, for their own tactical and strategic interests and advantages. 
In the Syrian case, the regime and other armed actors deliberately restrict aid 
access for political and tactical gain. Consequently, apolitical organizations, such 
as uN humanitarian agencies and international NGOs, are obliged to operate 
in a highly politicized environment. Major donors also provide assistance within 
political contexts, particularly with the goals of facilitating a political transition 
and state-building. These political objectives may obscure the primary goal of 
humanitarian relief operations.
In this chapter, I first provide an overview of the Syrian civil war and the 
humanitarian crisis. In the following sections, I explore responses to the crisis 
inside Syria by uN agencies, major donors (mainly the united States (uS), eu-
ropean union (eu) and united Kingdom (uK)), and their bilateral agencies. I 
focus particularly on restrictions on humanitarian access, cross-border assistance 
and remote management, and issues relating to emergency relief assistance and 
resilience building. Finally, I discuss three issues:
1  dilemmas between adherence to the humanitarian principles and continua-
tion of aid delivery;
2  obstacles caused by the remote management approach; and
3  political objectives set by major donors and their impacts on humanitarian 
relief.
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In doing so, I try to explore tensions and dilemmas caused by conflicting re-
lationships between humanitarian relief and politicization. The mass influx of 
Syrian refugees has had enormous impacts on host countries and communities. 
However, because the refugee crisis has already been widely discussed, I will not 
explore refugee issues in this chapter.
My study is based on literature research in related fields, plus field research in 
Lebanon and Jordan in September 2015 and in Turkey in March 2016. During 
my field research, I conducted 43 semi-structured interviews with officials from 
uN agencies, government departments, and bilateral agencies, staff of interna-
tional NGOs, and academics. Corresponding to the time of my field research, 
this chapter mainly covers the situation until 2016.
the civil war in Syria and humanitarian crisis
Prolonged armed conflict and fragmentation
The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in Tunisia at the end of 2010 triggered popular so-
cial movements in many Arab states, which demanded social justice, economic 
and political reforms, and democratization. Syria was not an exception. Since 
March 2011, protest movements against the regime under Bashar al-Assad 
spread rapidly across the country. Violent suppression by the regime led to the 
widespread-armed conflict between government forces and opposition groups. 
In April 2011, the uN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning 
‘the use of lethal violence against peaceful protesters’ by the Syrian authorities 
and requested the Office of the united Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to dispatch a mission to investigate alleged violations of international hu-
man rights law (uNHRC 2011).
The armed confrontation inside Syria, however, continually escalated to the 
extent that, in June 2012, the uN under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations, Herve Ladsous described the situation in Syria as a ‘civil war.’ It was 
the first time that a senior uN official used a term ‘civil war’ to characterize the 
situation in Syria (Reuters 2012).
There have been some diplomatic attempts to bring about cease-fires or ces-
sations of hostilities among major external actors. In line with negotiations be-
tween the uS and Russia, the uN Security Council adopted Resolution 2254 in 
December 2015, expressing support for a political transition program based on 
the agreement of the International Syrian Support Group (ISSG).2 Nevertheless, 
attempts to implement cease-fires and a political transition have failed to bring 
about the intended results. Rather, the crisis in Syria has prolonged and increas-
ingly deteriorated mainly for the following reasons.
First, government forces have never been strong enough to overcome oppo-
sition forces despite the support provided by Iran and Hezbollah. Since Russia 
started its military intervention, taking the side of the regime in September 2015, 
the regime has been on the offensive. even so, the regime faces serious weak-
nesses, including lack of legitimacy and insufficient human resources.
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Second, anti-regime groups have never been united; rather they pursue their 
own interests. Anti-regime groups organized the Syrian National Council (SNC) 
in October 2011 as an umbrella organization. Defectors from the national 
army also formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In November 2012 in Doha, 
Syrian opposition factions formed another umbrella organization, the National 
 Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also known as the 
Syrian  Coalition. In a meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People in 
 December 2012, the uS, most european countries, Japan, and other regional 
states acknowledged the Syrian Coalition as ‘the legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people and the umbrella organization under which Syrian opposition 
groups are gathering’ (Group of Friends of the Syrian People 2012, para.13). The 
Syrian Coalition established the Syrian Interim Government in March 2013.
However, opposition groups and forces have remained deeply divided along 
various lines, such as tribes, localities, ethnicities, sects, and different interpre-
tations of Islam. Therefore, almost all opposition groups have retained a strong 
local orientation and do not share common ideologies, objectives, or even strat-
egies. Support by external actors has further divided anti-regime forces, with 
some regional actors—including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey—providing 
different rebel groups with funds and, in all likelihood, weapons for their own 
agendas.
Third, the uN Security Council is not functioning well because of the deep 
disagreement between the uS and Russia over a possible political settlement to 
the crisis. For instance, in April 2012, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 
2042 and 2043. Based on the resolution, the united Nations Supervision  Mission 
in Syria (uNSMIS), an unarmed monitoring team, was deployed in Syria. 
However, the mission could not make any substantive contribution because of 
its restrictive mandate and the insecure situation on the ground, and it ceased 
activities after four months.
Fourth, the emergence and presence of two transnational jihadist groups, the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL)3 and the Nusra Front ( Jabhat al-Nusra),4 
have further complicated the fragmented situation, worsening the humanitarian 
crisis. Since September 2014, the uS and its allied forces have been conducting air 
raids on ISIL positions. In addition, both the Syrian government and opposition 
forces have attacked ISIL. Despite being defensive, however, ISIL has continued 
to hold large swathes of territory and has committed atrocities against civilians.
As a result, the country has broken into many pieces, each of which is con-
trolled by different groups, including the regime, Kurds, ISIL, the Nusra Front, 
and other rebel groups.
Deep humanitarian crisis
The prolonged and highly intensified violence and fighting have resulted in a 
very serious humanitarian crisis. According to an estimation of united Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) over the last five 
years, more than 250,000 people have been killed and more than 1.2 million 
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injured (OCHA 2016a, 30). Another estimation, however, puts the number of 
casualties at 470,000 (PBS 2016).5
Furthermore, as of December 2016, OCHA estimates that 13.5 million, in-
cluding 5.8 million children, are in need of humanitarian assistance, with 4.9 
million of these people living in hard-to-reach and besieged areas. OCHA es-
timates that the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has reached 6.3 
million (OCHA 2016e, 7). In addition, some 450,000 Palestinian refugees regis-
tered with united Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near east (uNRWA) have suffered severely during the prolonged crisis.
The humanitarian tragedy has deepened further because the various armed 
groups have deliberately targeted civilians for tactical and political purposes. A re-
port issued by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syria 
Arab Republic listed a number of different types of human rights violations and 
possible war crimes, such as long-term sieges, assaults on medical care, hostage- 
taking, torture, and sexual violence (uNHRC 2016). These violations have been 
committed by different armed groups, including the government, ISIL, and oth-
ers. Of these, however, the Assad regime has allegedly committed the most viola-
tions of international human rights law. Ban Ki-moon, the uN  Secretary-General, 
strongly condemned the Syrian government, saying that ‘many groups have killed 
innocent civilians—none more so than the government of Syria, which continues 
to barrel bomb neighborhoods and systematically torture thousands of detainees,’ 
in the uN General Assembly in September 2016 (AP 2016).
It has been reported that the regime forces have deliberately attacked civilian 
targets, including schools and health facilities, in rebel-held areas in order to 
prevent emergence of alternative governing bodies in territories that the regime 
has lost to rebels (Khaddour 2015). Between April 2011 and November 2016, 
according to Physicians for Human Rights, 454 attacks on medical facilities were 
recorded, and more than 796 health care personnel were killed. Of these, regime 
forces were responsible for 307 attacks on facilities (68%), with 675 personnel 
killed (85%) (Physicians for Human Rights undated).
The regime has also been responsible for imposing sieges on hundreds of thou-
sands of civilians. In his statement to the uN Security Council in May 2016, 
Stephen O’Brien, the uN undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs 
and emergency Relief Coordinator, announced the breakdown of people un-
der siege: 452,700, or 76.4 percent, were besieged by regime forces. In addition, 
110,000 were besieged by ISIL and 20,000 by non-state armed groups and the 
Nusra Front (OCHA 2016b, 2). The Syria Institute, however, estimated that as 
of July 2016, the number of civilians under siege was more than one million in at 
least 40 besieged areas (Syrian Institute and PAX 2016, 8). Due to these different 
estimations, which I will discuss later, OCHA has been criticized on the grounds 
that it has deliberately underestimated the number of people under siege due to 
pressure from the Assad regime (Sparrow 2016).6
The refugee crisis in neighboring and european countries has also caused se-
rious problems, both for refugees themselves, and for host countries and commu-
nities (see Table 6.1). The magnitude of the mass refugee influx into neighboring 
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countries has exceeded the capacity of host countries and communities to man-
age the refugee crisis.
While the refugee crisis is beyond the scope of this paper, I do need to point 
out one negative impact that the refugee crisis may create in a post-conflict pro-
cess. While many refugees will most likely help by contributing financially or by 
other means to a reconstruction process, the outflow of millions of people means 
that Syria will be deprived of significant human resources for a very long time to 
come. There is a general tendency towards increasing numbers of refugees living 
in exile for many years, with the average length of exile around 17 years (Betts 
and Collier 2015, 92). The Syrian refugees are unlikely to be an exception to this 
trend, and it is therefore estimated that a majority of refugees will remain in host 
or third countries. In addition, many children of refugees and IDPs receive nei-
ther formal nor informal education. The growing number of the lost generation 
of unschooled children is likely to be a serious problem for a long time.
Response by the international community inside Syria
UN operations and constraints caused by politicization
Assistance operations inside Syria conducted by various humanitarian actors can 
be categorized into three types based on targeted areas:
1  regime-held areas from Damascus;
2  cross-line assistance to opposition-held areas from Damascus (i.e. across 
lines between conflicting parties); and
3  territories held by either the regime or opposition groups from neighboring 
countries as cross-border assistance.
A large portion of cross-border assistance is carried out from two major hubs: 
Gaziantep, Turkey, and Amman, Jordan. In addition, a small portion of cross- 
border assistance is also conducted from Lebanon and Iraq.
From the outset of the violence in Syria, uN humanitarian agencies, the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM) and international NGOs began hu-
manitarian relief operations in order to provide affected people with emergency 
Table 6.1 Number of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries (thousands).
  2012.1 2013.1 2014.1 2015.1 2016.1 2017.1
Turkey* 9.5 174 560 1,553 2,504 2,855 
Lebanon 6.3 131 811 1,148 1,069 1,011 
Jordan 2.9 120 582 623 635 655 
Total** 18.7 520 2,332 3,718 4,595 4,855 
Source: author, based on data from uNHCR (http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.
php?id=107).
Note: * Numbers of registered refugees with the Turkish government.
** Numbers include refugees in Iraq, egypt, and other part of North Africa.
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relief. In December 2012, they launched the 2013 Syria Humanitarian Assis-
tance Response Plan (SHARP), which was later revised in order to address 
further large-scale humanitarian needs inside Syria. From the Syrian side, the 
Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) has played an important role in humanitar-
ian assistance by providing volunteers for aid deliveries. SARC also approves 
and oversees all operations and acts as an implementing partner for international 
humanitarian organizations in government-controlled areas (Howe 2016, 13).
uN agencies have faced a wide range of difficulties and obstacles caused not 
only by intense armed confrontations and constant changes in the situation but 
also by politicization of the humanitarian crisis. As discussed in the previous 
section, the humanitarian crisis in Syria has been highly politicized by warring 
forces and external actors. The Assad regime, in particular, has been criticized 
on the grounds that it has ‘weaponized’ humanitarian needs by withholding ac-
cess and preventing aid from reaching those in need in order to ‘punish and 
weaken opposition groups’ (Berti 2016).
In territories under its control, the regime has tended to give consent to, and 
even provide, cooperation for humanitarian operations in order to mobilize pop-
ular support. As a deliberate strategy, however, the regime restricts aid deliveries 
to territories controlled by opposition forces, causing a serious dilemma for uN 
agencies: between respecting Syria’s sovereignty or attempting to continue their 
full operations outside of government-held areas.
The uN system has an established principle of respecting the sovereignty 
of any affected country where uN agencies provide humanitarian assistance. 
uN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991, which governs humanitarian 
emergency assistance by the uN, explicitly states the importance of respecting 
the sovereignty of the affected country as one of the guiding principles, as follows:
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully 
respected in accordance with the Charter of the united Nations. In this context, 
humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected 
country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.
(uN 1991, Annex I, para. 3)
In fact, SHARP was prepared ‘in collaboration with the Government of Syria,’ 
with the agreement further stating that ‘humanitarian partners renew their com-
mitment to deliver humanitarian aid with full respect to the sovereignty of the 
Syrian Arab Republic’ (uN 2013, 8). Therefore, uN agencies should conduct 
operations with the consent and cooperation of the Assad regime not only for safe 
operations but also for respecting Syria’s sovereignty.
In order to reach the people in need, the uN and other humanitarian agencies 
have repeatedly demanded that the Assad regime provide its consent and guaran-
tee humanitarian access, and to lift obstructions to relief access. For instance, the 
third report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria 
of August 2012 asked the Syrian government to ‘grant the international commu-
nity immediate access to the affected areas to provide humanitarian assistance’ 
(uNHRC 2012, para. 153). In October 2013, the uN Security  Council issued 
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a Presidential Statement urging Syrian authorities to ‘take immediate steps to 
facilitate the expansion of humanitarian relief operations, and lift bureaucratic 
impediments and other obstacles.’ The statement further urges the Syrian author-
ities to promptly facilitate ‘safe and unhindered humanitarian access to people in 
need, through the most effective ways, including across conflict lines and, where 
appropriate, across borders from neighboring countries in accordance with the 
uN guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance’ (uNSC 2013, 3).
However, the Assad regime has maintained strict restrictions on uN agencies’ 
operations and the situation has continued to deteriorate.
UNSC Resolution 2165 of 2014
In response to this situation, the uN Security Council adopted Resolution 2165 
in July 2014. The resolution authorizes uN humanitarian agencies and their 
partners to use routes across conflict lines and two border crossings in addition to 
those already in use ‘in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance, including 
medical and surgical supplies, reaches people in need throughout Syria’ (uNSC 
2014, para 2). The uN Security Council has renewed Paragraph 2, making use 
of follow-up resolutions.
With the passage of the resolution, uN humanitarian agencies launched the 
‘Whole-of-Syria’ approach in September 2014. The main objective of the Whole-
of-Syria was to integrate separate operations into a single framework, in order 
to ‘maximize efficiency, reduce duplication, and ensure greater accountability, 
effectiveness and reach of humanitarian programming’ (OCHA undated). Based 
on uN Security Council Resolution 2165 and the follow-up resolutions, uN hu-
manitarian agencies have expanded their cross-line assistance from Damascus 
and cross-border assistance since July 2014.
According to OCHA, seven uN agencies dispatched 505 convoys of 13,091 trucks 
for cross-border assistance from July 14, 2014, to February 2017 (OCHA 2017). 
As Table 6.2 shows, millions of people have benefited from the uN Security 
Council Resolutions since the adoption of Resolution 2165.
Table 6.2  Number of beneficiaries by cross-border operations of the uN and its partners, 
July 2014 to February 2017 (thousands).
Sector Beneficiaries Items
Health 12,231 emergency health kits, surgical kits, reproductive health 
kits, midwifery kits, medical consumables
Non-food 
items
3,540 Dignity kits, blankets, jerry cans, kitchen sets, sleeping 
mats, mattresses, winterization kits, tarpaulins
Food 3,261 Food baskets
Wash 2,826 Basic water kits for families, water purification tablets, hygiene 
kits for families and babies, sanitary napkins, diapers
education 322 Recreational kits
Nutrition 28 Supplementary spreads
Source: author, based on OCHA (2017).
The Syrian Civil War 109
even so, however, uN cross-line and cross-border operations have been con-
strained not only by active conflict and insecurity but also by politicization by the 
regime. In order to respect the sovereignty of Syria, as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the uNSC resolutions oblige uN agencies to notify the Syrian authorities in 
order to receive the latter’s approval for aid deliveries. In many cases, however, the 
Syrian authorities creates ‘bureaucratic blockages’ (uNSC 2016, para. 39), such as 
rejecting approvals, demanding amendments, delaying procedural  processes, and 
requesting additional aid deliveries to areas that the regime controls.
For instance, in August 2016, the uN requested access for inter-agency con-
voys to 32 locations for 991,050 people, comprising 523,550 people in hard-to-
reach areas and 467,500 people in besieged areas. According to the report by 
the uN Secretary-General to the Security Council, Syrian authorities approved 
access to only 505,750 of those 991,050 targeted people in 23 of the 32 locations. 
The Syrian authorities also requested that 41 other locations outside the plan 
be reached in August. As a result, the report concludes, ‘all in all, the united 
Nations was not granted access to more than 50 percent of the requested benefi-
ciaries’ (uNSC 2016, para. 26).
Cross-border assistance and remote management
In addition to uN agencies, international and local NGOs, major donors and 
their bilateral agencies have provided humanitarian assistance inside Syria 
mainly through cross-border activities for civilians in areas held by opposition 
groups. Because NGOs do not necessarily have to respect the sovereignty of 
Syria, they commenced their own cross-border efforts from Turkey and Jordan 
immediately after armed confrontations erupted in 2011 in Syria. Since then, 
they have expanded their operations.
According to OCHA, as of February 2016, 50 International NGOs and more 
than 100 Syrian NGOs provided aid to Syria from Turkey (OCHA 2016c, 3). 
In fact, 80 percent of cross-border operations from Turkey were conducted by 
NGOs (author’s interview with an OCHA official in Gaziantep, March 10, 
2016). For instance, the Turkish Red Crescent began its cross-border operations 
in 2011 to provide humanitarian supplies, such as food, medicines, and tents, 
through local Syrian NGOs (author’s interview with an official of Turkish Red 
Crescent in Ankara, March 9, 2016). Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has oper-
ated medical facilities and has supported clinics inside Syria since August 2011, 
mainly through Syrian medical networks and field hospitals (MSF 2015, 2).
Bilateral agencies have also conducted cross-border assistance. The united 
States Agency for International Development (uSAID) has assisted  Syrian part-
ner organizations in different sectors, such as agriculture, food security, economic 
recovery, health, information management, protection, and the Water, Sanita-
tion and Hygiene Program (WASH) (uSAID 2015a, 7). The uK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID) and eu’s european Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations (eCHO) have also provided a number of actors 
with funds for cross-border operations.
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The Group of Friends of the Syrian People established the multi-donor Syria 
Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF), which funds projects inside Syria. The SRTF 
states that its purpose is to reduce the suffering of the Syrian people and assist the 
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (the Syrian 
Coalition; Syria Recovery Trust Fund undated). As mentioned above, the Group 
of Friends of the Syrian People has recognized the Syrian Coalition as the legiti-
mate representative of the Syrian people since 2012.
While cross-border operations make a vital contribution to assisting millions 
of civilians in need inside Syria, humanitarian organizations have faced increas-
ing difficulties and risks to secure their operations because the situation in Syria 
has further deteriorated and fragmented into small territories controlled by dif-
ferent armed groups.
Against the backdrop of these difficulties and risks, most cross-border oper-
ations are implemented through remote management. Remote management 
has developed in places where international organizations cannot operate due 
to limited humanitarian access or lack of government permission in a conflict- 
affected country. Thus, international organizations, which are usually based in 
neighboring countries, manage operations and local staff and/or partners imple-
ment projects. Because of the physical distance between management sides and 
implementation sites, remote management leads to a number of serious problems, 
particularly relating to monitoring, reporting, and accountability. International 
staff may also lose touch with the reality of implementation sites over time.
In addition, constant changes on the ground further complicate remote man-
agement. Humanitarian operations through remote management are usually 
implemented in opposition-held areas. However, confrontation lines are not nec-
essarily fixed but rather shift from time to time. Thus, a targeted area of oper-
ations may be captured and controlled by the regime forces or their affiliates. 
In such cases, operations may need to be suspended (author’s interview with an 
official of a bilateral agency in Ankara, March 7, 2016).
Furthermore, such shifts in confrontation lines are likely to cause additional 
risks for local staff and partners because the regime forces or their affiliates may 
‘punish’ local staff and partners due to the latter’s collaboration with interna-
tional organizations without permits from the government. As a result, there is 
an inevitable need for secrecy to protect local staff and partners in certain aspects 
of cross-border operations.
Remote management also involves the ethical issue of transferring security 
risks from international actors to local staff and partners, because remote man-
agement only improves the safety of the international organization, and local 
staff continue to operate under serious risks (Howe, Stites and Chudacoff 2015, 
16; Milosevich and Jalali-Shirazi 2016, 13).
Thus, such serious difficulties and challenges involved in remote management 
hinder the provision of humanitarian relief in the Syrian crisis. Remote manage-
ment also raises important questions about relationships between international 
organizations and local partners, capacity-building and local ownership. I will 
discuss these issues further below.
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Emergency relief and resilience-building
Major donors have contributed funds to humanitarian relief both inside Syria 
and in neighboring countries. In 2015, the eu provided 200 million euros, about 
half of which went to those in need inside Syria, both through cross-line assis-
tance from Damascus and cross-border assistance from neighboring countries 
(european Commission 2015b, 3).
As Table 6.3 shows, DFID provided 249.1 million pounds through various uN 
agencies and international and local NGOs for humanitarian relief inside Syria 
from 2011 to March 2014. Among those funds, £139.8 million (56%) was allo-
cated to uN agencies. From the fiscal year 2013 to the fiscal year 2016, the uS 
Department of State and uSAID provided about uS$2.3 billion for humanitar-
ian assistance inside Syria (Table 6.4). In contrast to DFID, the uS Department 
of State and uSAID contributed more funds to NGOs than uN agencies.
In responding to the Syrian crisis, many donors, including the eu and uK 
DFID, regard resilience building as an important goal, in addition to emergency 
relief assistance. According to the european Commission, resilience means ‘the 
ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to pre-
pare for, to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks 
without compromising long-term development prospects’ (Council of the euro-
pean union 2013, 1). Based on this concept, the eu regional strategy for Syria 
and Iraq stresses the essentiality of linking humanitarian efforts to long-term 
assistance as a ‘means to promote resilience, recovery and post-conflict reintegra-
tion and development’ (european Commission 2015a, 11).
In its operational plan for Syria, DFID has identified four ‘high level’ objectives—
one of these is to build ‘resilience at the individual, community and institutional level 
to enable people to cope in the short term and to provide the foundation for a future 
political transition’ (uK DFID 2014, 4).
Table 6.3 uK DFID funding inside Syria by  
organizations, 2011–2014 (uK£ millions).














Source: author, based on Development Tracker (2015).
Note: *Others include undisclosed humanitarian agencies.
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uN agencies have also emphasized the importance of building resilience in 
Syria. The uN’s humanitarian relief plan to the Syrian crisis regards building 
resilience as one of its objectives, calling for humanitarian actors to ‘incorporate 
resilience within humanitarian programming’ (uN 2015, 10).
To achieve these objectives, DFID has allocated a certain portion of funds 
to projects relating to building resilience inside Syria, such as rehabilitation of 
water supply networks, psychosocial activities for both children and adults, and 
providing remedial classes to children who are falling behind (uK DFID 2015, 
14, 23, 25). The uS Department of State and uSAID have also funded pro-
jects relating to resilience building inside Syria, including education, information 
management, and WASH (uSAID 2016a, 8, 9).
However, the reality on the ground inside Syria still requires the continuation 
of large-scale emergency relief operations. In fact, the eu repeatedly acknowl-
edges in its documents that almost half of its humanitarian assistance should 
be allocated to ‘immediate life-saving emergency humanitarian operations in-
side Syria,’ such as providing food, safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene, 
child protection activities and emergency items (european Commission 2016, 3; 
 european Commission 2017, 3).
The uS Department of State also recognizes that its humanitarian assistance 
inside Syria will continue to provide ‘critical, life-saving support,’ such as emer-
gency food assistance, medical care, cash assistance, funding for shelters and 
relief supply (uS Department of State 2016). Like the eu, the uS allocates al-
most half of its assistance for emergency relief activities. For instance, in the 
fiscal year 2016, the uS government provided uS$586 million for humanitarian 
operations inside Syria under the programs of Foreign Disaster Assistance and 
Table 6.4 uS humanitarian assistance inside Syria, FY 2013–2016.
2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
NGO partners 270,821 330,600 402,623 421,384 1,425,428
WFP 149,284 185,346 173,209 79,812 587,651
uNHCR 58,170 58,170
uNICeF 24,000 24,500 24,350 35,454 108,304
WHO 14,000 13,000 14,646 17,500 59,146
IOM 10,500 17,940 28,440
uNFPA 2,796 4,500 6,000 6,700 19,996
FAO 1,000 1,000 4,866 2,000 8,866
PIO partners 2,000 2,000 4,000
IFRC 2,000 2,000
uNDSS 500 500 1,000




2,627 2,456 1,760 2,597 9,440
Total 583,298 566,912 642,954 586,387 2,379,551
Source: author, based on uSAID (2014, 2015b, 2016a, 2017).
Note: The table does not include funds that cannot be distinguished from those destined for Syria 
or for neighboring countries.
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Food for Peace. Out of this amount, uS$301 million or 51 percent was allocated 
to emergency relief activities, such as emergency food assistance and air deliv-
ery of humanitarian assistance (uSAID 2016b, 8). The actual portion of emer-
gency relief activities may be higher, because some funds from the remaining 
uS$285 million may also have been allocated to emergency relief, although it is 
impossible to ascertain.
With no political solution in sight and the situation further deteriorating, ma-
jor donors and uN agencies will need to continue emergency relief operations on 
a large scale for years to come. However, available financial and humanitarian 
resources are limited; in fact, the funding gap has become increasingly  serious. 
As of the end of June 2016, only 33.4 percent of financial requirements for 
 Humanitarian Response Plan inside Syria in 2016 were met (OCHA 2016d, 3). 
Therefore, decisions on how to divide available resources between emergency 
relief assistance and resilience-building operations will remain difficult for inter-
national assistance agencies.
Remote management approaches also hamper mid- and long-term operations 
for resilience-building assistance. Due to problems discussed in the previous sec-
tion, such as monitoring, reporting, and security risks for local partners, many 
donors and international NGOs tend to implement simple projects rather than 
complicated and time-consuming ones. In addition, constant changes caused by 
movement of conflict lines often force international humanitarian actors to sus-
pend or abandon projects before completion (author’s interview with an official 
of GIz in Ankara, March 7, 2016).
Humanitarian relief and politics
Humanitarian principles and relief activities
As discussed above, uN agencies are facing a dilemma concerning humanitarian 
principles, particularly in regard to neutrality and impartiality in their opera-
tions inside Syria. While uN agencies are expected to respect the sovereignty of 
the state where they engage in humanitarian activities, they are also expected 
to abide by humanitarian principles. However, uN agencies operating inside 
Syria—including OCHA, World Health Organization (WHO), united Nations 
Children’s Fund (uNICeF), and World Food Programme (WFP)—have been 
heavily criticized that they do not abide by these humanitarian principles be-
cause they have been strongly concerned by the prospect of reduced cooperation 
from the Assad regime (Lynch 2014).
Based on their analyses of food distribution by uN agencies inside Syria, José 
Martínez and Brent eng have criticized uN agencies for their food distribution 
from the angle of neutrality. According to them, food assistance has been dispro-
portionately concentrated in areas held by the regime, a finding that has serious 
political implications because food assistance provided by uN agencies has actu-
ally supported the regime’s survival (Martínez and eng 2016, 155).
Annie Sparrow also argues that, by providing billions of dollars of assistance, 
‘the uN has freed Syrian government resources to be used for Syrian politicians, 
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troops, security forces and allies.’ Accordingly, Sparrow has urged OCHA to 
revisit the underlying principles and stop ‘supporting the atrocities of the Syrian 
government’ (Sparrow 2016).
While these criticisms sound persuasive on the surface, the application of hu-
manitarian principles, particularly neutrality and impartiality, is not straight-
forward in a war-torn setting such as Syria, where the government deliberately 
manipulates humanitarian access for its own strategy and interests. In addition, 
millions of civilians face serious shortages of food, drinking water, medicine, and 
other necessities. Facing such a humanitarian crisis, it is also obligatory for uN 
agencies to continue humanitarian operations in order to reach as many affected 
people as possible, regardless of where they reside. Furthermore, assisting only 
certain segments of people may have other political and security implications, 
and may undermine overall humanitarian operations.
An official of OCHA emphasized the difficulties of balancing quantities of 
assistance between operations based in Damascus and cross-border operations 
from either Turkey or Jordan because of unstable and unpredictable circum-
stances. This official also admitted that uN agencies were sometimes forced to 
‘reconcile’ their activities and announcements—including statistics such as the 
number of people in besieged areas—with political reality in order to continue 
provision of humanitarian assistance (author’s interview with an OCHA official 
in Turkey, March 2016).
Nevertheless, criticisms of the uN have continued. In September 2016, 73 
NGOs that engage in humanitarian relief in the Syrian crisis suspended coopera-
tion with the uN. The signatories of the letter sent to OCHA said that the Syrian 
government had a ‘significant and substantial influence on the performance of 
uN agencies,’ and criticized that the people had suffered more because of the 
‘deliberate manipulation by the Syrian government and the complacency of the 
uN’ (Gladstone 2016).
This dilemma between adhering to humanitarian principles and continuing 
humanitarian operations under the uN guiding principle is not limited to Syria. 
It is rather common with humanitarian operations in any country where the 
central government loses its willingness to safeguard its own people suffering 
from a humanitarian crisis. The ICRC faces the same dilemma. To reduce this, 
Claudia McGoldrick states that the ICRC should take a needs-based approach, 
maintain proximity to the beneficiaries, and ensure engagement with all stake-
holders.  McGoldrick further argues that, by doing so, the ICRC can gain ‘the 
widest possible acceptance and respect, and, through this, the widest possible 
humanitarian access’ (McGoldrick 2011, 974, 984).
Regarding how to meet the two requirements, i.e. adhering to both humanitar-
ian principles and continuing humanitarian assistance in war zones,  Katherine 
Haver and William Carter suggest a more practical approach. In order to ‘find 
acceptable compromises,’ they emphasize the need for ‘a more nuanced under-
standing of principles, including a hierarchy of principles’ with humanity at the 
top. According to them, humanity is ‘the most important principle because it 
expresses the fundamental goal of all humanitarian action’ (Haver and Carter 
2016, 37–38).
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Humanitarian relief and local actors
As discussed above, most cross-border operations for Syria have been conducted 
through remote management arrangements between international organizations 
based in neighboring countries and local actors inside Syria. In this respect, I will 
explore relationships between international organizations and local partners and 
issues of capacity-building.
Local actors differ widely in terms of types, backgrounds, agendas, activities, 
financial resources, and other aspects. In government-controlled areas,  local 
NGOs, which are registered with the Syrian government, are the only ones 
allowed to operate. These were usually established prior to the crisis, and are 
strongly controlled by the government. Thus, most of them are not regarded 
as NGOs rooted in civil society because civil society itself did not exist either 
in Syria prior to the crisis nor in government-controlled areas up to the present 
date (author’s interview with staff of a Syrian NGO based in Gaziantep, March 
10, 2016). It has been reported that in government-controlled areas, so-called 
popular committees have been formed for the assessment of local needs, the co-
ordination of aid, and its distribution. These committees, however, are under the 
regime’s tight control (Meininghaus 2016, 1467).7
In opposition-held areas, different types of local actors have emerged since 
the eruption of the armed conflict, including local councils, local NGOs, 
community- based organizations, women and youth initiatives (Swisspeace, Con-
flict Dynamics International and FarikBeirut.net 2016, 7–12). The emergence 
of local councils was a reactive response in order to fill the power vacuum and 
lack of social services that resulted from the closure or withdrawal of government 
administrative institutions. They try to meet demands of the local population 
by maintaining security and social order, providing basic needs, such as food, 
drinking water, medical care, and electricity. Both local councils and NGOs 
function as channels for humanitarian aid flows (Meininghaus 2016, 1467). In 
other words, they are indispensable partners for international actors to imple-
ment various types of projects, both emergency relief as well as mid- and long-
term assistance.
Most local actors, however, suffer from certain disadvantages caused by their 
insufficient capacity and relatively short experience because they are still new-
comers and operate in extremely difficult and insecure environments. According 
to Rana Khalaf, local councils are not yet well established, and are ‘at different 
stages of development, depending on their security situation, access to routes to 
border areas, length of time since their establishment and existence of other com-
peting structures or spoilers’ (Khalaf 2015, 46). In addition, local actors are still 
weak in terms of legitimacy, efficiency, and capacity (Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue 2014, 9–11, 25–26).
Nonetheless, they have strong advantages because they are firmly rooted in their 
own local societies. Therefore, they are able to obtain first-hand information about 
their communities, and are well aware of the requirements of affected populations. 
They have also accumulated knowledge on how to conduct their operations in war-
torn circumstances. Thus, in order to engage in both emergency relief and mid- and 
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long-term recovery and future development, it is essential for international organi-
zations to establish reliable and robust relationships with local partners.
In this context, one essential task for international organizations is to under-
take capacity-building for their local partners in relevant tasks, such as needs as-
sessment, project formation and management, and reporting. Capacity-building 
is particularly important in remote management, because local staff members 
need to make many day-to-day decisions regarding project activities (zyck 
2012, 10). Of course, it is not an easy task to build capacity of local partners lo-
cated in remote areas with limited or no access. Nevertheless, a certain number 
of international organizations conduct capacity-building programs in different 
ways, including face-to-face training if possible, training a certain number lo-
cal staff members as trainers for other local members, and through the internet 
 (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2014, 27).
To implement capacity-building programs, international organizations should 
be careful not to give the impression that they one-sidedly push capacity-building 
programs on their local partners because, as Howe, Stites and Chudacoff (2015, 
33) warn, capacity-building approaches are ‘top-down in nature.’ Due to this 
nature, local partners tend to have a feeling that the internationals dictate areas 
of capacity improvements and provide mandatory trainings for these skills.
In any case, relationships between international organizations and local part-
ners are particularly delicate in remote management due to limited commu-
nications, sometimes leading to mutual mistrust. Referring to Syrian medical 
NGOs, zedoun Alzoubi points out that international donors and NGOs fail to 
understand the particular situation in which Syrian partners operate. Therefore, 
according to Alzoubi, many Syrian NGOs have criticized some international 
NGOs ‘for deciding on the projects they want to fund rather than tailoring the 
projects to the needs of the people inside Syria’ (Alzoubi 2015, 5).
As discussed above, local actors also differ in many aspects, and some of them 
have connections with armed groups. Therefore, it is hard to define ‘local’ in 
a war-torn situation like Syria. even so, it is a fact that local actors themselves 
should lead self-help initiatives at the grass-root level and navigate the recon-
struction process once it starts. In this context, remote management has a posi-
tive aspect as well. It helps to increase local ownership because it may bring about 
greater engagement by local staff in decision-making processes and skill-transfers 
from international to local staff (Danish Refugee Council 2015, 3).
Humanitarian relief and political objectives 
set by major donors
Since the end of the cold war, the international community has responded to 
humanitarian crises and armed conflicts as part of security policy, particularly 
in the context of ‘failed,’ ‘fragile’ or ‘collapsed’ states because such states have 
been perceived as threats to global peace and stability. As Charles Call argues, 
a prescription for these states prioritizes reinforcement of order and stability and 
places emphasis on ‘creating states that are foremost strong security providers,’ 
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although each state needs different and specified approaches (Call 2008, 6). In 
addition, Daniela Nascimento argues that humanitarian policy has focused on 
‘violence reduction and conflict prevention instead of humanitarian assistance 
per se,’ and humanitarian action is ‘increasingly conditioned on geopolitical and 
geostrategic interests of the main international actors’ (Nascimento 2015, 5, 15).
There is no doubt that many international actors have responded to the Syr-
ian crisis in the broader security context, not only because of its huge magni-
tude but also because of its significant and far-reaching political and security 
implications. In fact, the uK, the eu, and the uS stress the linkage between 
their provision of humanitarian relief and their long-term political and security 
objectives, particularly in regard to achieving a political transition and coun-
tering extremism.
As discussed above, in its Operational Plan 2011–2016 Syria, DFID sets four 
‘high level’ objectives in the short and medium term. One of these is building 
resilience to ‘provide the foundation for a future political transition.’ Another 
objective is to ‘strengthen the moderate opposition’s capacity to provide govern-
ance and services—and thereby an alternative to extremist groups and Assad’ 
(uK DFID 2014, 4).
In order to achieve these objectives, the Operational Plan states that DFID 
will ‘help to improve governance and service delivery in opposition-held ar-
eas, working closely with the moderate opposition,’ and will ‘build local level 
resilience and provide an alternative to the regime and extremists’ (uK DFID 
2014, 4). These two political objectives, namely to ‘build resilience to provide 
the foundation for a future political transition’ and to ‘strengthen the moderate 
opposition’s capacity,’ repeatedly appear in DFID’s documents on the crisis in 
Syria as ‘key objectives.’8
In its 2014 document regarding its response to Syria and Iraq, the eu also 
stresses the importance of ‘supporting the resilience of individuals, communities 
and institutions in coping with the effects of the crisis.’ For this purpose, the eu 
refers to achieving a ‘Syrian-led transition,’ emphasizing that it will continue 
to ‘support the moderate opposition,’ including the Syrian Coalition (european 
Commission 2015a, 13–14).
In the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) 2015, 
the uS Department of State clearly affirms that the Department of State and 
 uSAID ‘have innovated with cross-border engagement and assistance to support 
the Syrian opposition’ (uS Department of State and uSAID 2015, 60). uSAID 
also states on its website that ‘moderate opposition’ groups will play ‘a vital role 
in stabilization efforts when a transition of power occurs in Syria,’ and it will 
assist in increasing ‘the ability of moderate opposition organizations to serve the 
Syrian people’ (uSAID undated).
Thus, the three major donors clearly connect their humanitarian relief with 
political goals that they want to achieve. They particularly emphasize the impor-
tance of supporting ‘moderate opposition.’ However, the term ‘moderate’ is not 
self-explanatory in the context of the Syrian crisis. Furthermore, as discussed al-
ready, resources for responding to the crisis are limited, and remote management 
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creates a very delicate and challenging situation for both implementing emer-
gency relief assistance and mid- and long-term resilience-building operations.
The following example from DFID’s underscores the tensions within this 
discussion. DFID allocated £9.5 million from the uK Conflict, Stability and 
 Security Fund (CSSF) to ‘support local capacity and build stability’ (uK DFID 
2016, 1). While the DFID document does not provide any details of how this fund 
will be spent, the uK parliament record shows that it was used to support the 
Southern Front. According to the Parliamentary record, this front was ‘a coali-
tion of moderate armed opposition groups,’ and the uK government planned to 
provide members of the front with ‘training and non-lethal equipment’ in order to 
‘improve their casualty evacuation capabilities and their capacity to control and 
defend a defined section of the Syrian–Jordanian border’ (House of  Commons 
2015). As this case shows, support for ‘moderate opposition’ can include security 
objectives.
While the concept of resilience is helpful in bridging the gap between emer-
gency relief assistance and development aid, it has not been strictly defined. 
Therefore, one can expand the concept to include numerous factors, from 
enhancing capacity at an individual and community level to reconstructing 
 security and state-building at a national level. However, reconstructing secu-
rity and state-building are political interventions. As such, they are depend-
ent on a number of factors, and these may not necessarily be compatible with 
a humanitarian intervention. As Michael Mazarr argues, outsiders simply 
cannot accomplish forcible state-building because state-building missions 
‘tend to be long, difficult, and expensive, with success demanding an open-
ended commitment to a messy, violent, and confusing endeavor’ (Mazarr 
2014, 115–116).
As Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other cases show, to incorporate state- 
building efforts, such as ‘supporting moderate opposition’ and accelerating 
‘political transition,’ into humanitarian intervention may blur the fundamental 
goals of humanitarian relief and hinder humanitarian operations, particularly in 
remote management settings.
In this respect, it is worth considering a critical comment on the concept of 
resilience raised by Jonathan Whittall and other MSF officials: the word ‘resil-
ience’ is a ‘new buzzword of a floundering aid system, pushed by donors increas-
ingly looking for cost effectiveness and a way to marry all components of aid to 
a process of state-building. They further argue that linking resilience building 
to state-building may sideline ‘the most vulnerable, which is exactly those peo-
ple and those populations that are not resilient enough to cope by themselves’ 
(Whittall, Philips and Hofman 2014).
I am not suggesting here that it is a good idea to exclude the notion of 
state-building entirely from the scope of crisis responses and resilience building, 
because such an approach to state-building is essential for affected people. How-
ever, state-building is a very long-term process, and the present reality inside 
Syria offers little room for prioritizing such a political endeavor.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the three major issues involved in humanitar-
ian relief by the international community to the Syrian humanitarian crisis. All 
three issues relate to the question of politicization.
The first issue is the dilemma that uN humanitarian agencies have been facing 
in their relief operations inside Syria, either through cross-line or cross-border 
assistance. The dilemma exists between consistently adhering to humanitarian 
principles or abiding by the uN guiding principle of respecting sovereignty of the 
affected country. In order to continue relief operations inside Syria, uN agencies 
should obtain consent and corporation from the government authorities. In fact, 
most besieged areas can only be reached through government-held areas (Lund 
2016b). Despite strong criticism, they are obliged to both continue humanitarian 
efforts and abide by the uN guiding principles.
Controlling humanitarian access is a common political or tactical action in 
a conflict setting. Although denying humanitarian access may constitute viola-
tions of international human rights law, warring actors try to control the flow of 
goods, including humanitarian supplies, to further their political and tactical 
advantages. Therefore, as far as uN humanitarian agencies are concerned, this 
dilemma is likely to continue unless the central government completely collapses 
or the international community forces a central government to allow humanitar-
ian access based on a strong uN Security Council Resolution, which requires a 
broader consensus among major international actors.
The second issue concerns remote management. For the last two decades or 
more, intra-state armed conflicts have increased and intensified. under such cir-
cumstances, there is little or no guarantee of security protection for humanitar-
ian actors. Furthermore, many armed actors, including government authorities, 
politicize movements of staff of external humanitarian organizations in territo-
ries under their control. Remote management should not be a last resort due to its 
many disadvantages (european Commission 2013, 3). In many cases, however, 
international humanitarian actors are forced to resort to remote management, 
and this tendency is increasing. Therefore, further studies on remote manage-
ment should be undertaken from many perspectives, such as operational hin-
drances, ethical issues, capacity-building and local ownership.
The third issue is related to relationships between humanitarian relief and polit-
ical objectives set by major donors. Major donors tend to perceive intra-state con-
flicts from the perspective of their own security concerns, and prioritize recovery 
of security and a state-building process in an affected country. As the Syrian case 
shows, however, numerous political and warring actors continue to pursue their 
own political interests and agendas. In addition, fragmentation and localization 
at different levels has obscured political objectives at the national level. Remote 
management also hinders humanitarian relief operations.
Therefore, the inclusion of political objectives in humanitarian relief should be 
undertaken with care and restraint. Otherwise, humanitarian assistance, which 
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is a primary objective of crisis response, will be further complicated, particularly 
due to limited resources, unfriendly circumstances, and remote management.
As discussed in the introduction, in order to realize the continuum in respond-
ing to a huge-scale humanitarian crisis, such as the Syrian case, a multi-layered 
approach is required rather than a linearly sequential approach, because the two 
phases of relief and development overlap with each other and cannot be clearly 
separated. In fact, inside Syria, many actors try to implement both emergency 
relief operations and mid- and long-term activities for building resilience, despite 
many obstacles.
The three issues raised above, however, cause additional difficulties for in-
ternational organizations in realizing this continuum. Strong criticism against 
uN agencies in respect to humanitarian principles may undermine necessary 
coordination between uN agencies and international NGOs. Controlling hu-
manitarian access by armed forces not only denies delivery of emergency relief 
but also hinders mid- and long-term activities. According to OCHA’s report, it 
is difficult for international organizations to bring staff reliably to project sites 
either for rotation or for training, which undermines programming and efforts to 
strengthen local capacities (OCHA 2016e, 24). emphasizing political objectives 
may also make local partners hesitate to cooperate with international organiza-
tions in implementing mid- or long-term projects because local partners under-
standably avoid risks of being ‘punished’ by the regime forces or their affiliates 
once a project site falls into hands of the latter.
A large-scale humanitarian crisis, such as the Syrian case, also raises doubts 
about realizing crisis prevention measures. With ongoing intense fighting, the 
needs for extensive humanitarian relief operations, and no political solution in-
sight, there has been little room for crisis prevention activities inside Syria so far.
Humanitarian action cannot happen in a political vacuum (McGoldrick 2011, 
974) and inevitably accompanies politicization. Hence, humanitarian actors 
should cope with problems and issues relating to and caused by politicization. 
Lessons presented by the Syrian crisis are common to any large-scale humani-
tarian crises caused by armed conflicts.
The circumstances surrounding the Syrian civil war has significantly changed 
since the end of 2016. The Assad regime has turned offensive and regained its 
control over wide areas. Partial ceasefire and de-escalation measures have been 
introduced in some regions. ISIL has lost its major footholds through battles in 
2017. Nevertheless, hostilities still continue in various places. As a result, the 
large-scale humanitarian crisis is unlikely to end in the foreseeable future, and 
obstacles to humanitarian assistance remain a fundamental problem. The re-
port of the united Nations Secretary-General of December 2017 to the Security 
Council warns ‘lack of safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access is a 
critical element compounding the fragility of civilian populations’ (uNSC 2017, 
14). The international community and humanitarian actors should continue 
their response to the Syrian humanitarian crisis and at the same time should 
draw lessons from their experiences in Syria as many as possible.
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Notes
 1 The Commission was established in August 2011 by the uN Human Rights Council 
with a mandate to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law 
since March 2011 in Syria. See www.ohchr.org/eN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/
Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx.
 2 The International Syrian Support Group (ISSG) was established in the fall of 2015 
to find the way to a political settlement of the Syrian civil war. It is co-chaired by the 
uS and Russia, and consists of 17 nations in addition to the uN, the eu and the Arab 
league. In November 2015, ISSG issued a statement, which calls for an 18-month 
timeline for a political settlement.
 3 ISIL is also called as the Islamic State (IS), the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS), 
and its Arabic abbreviation, ‘Daesh.’
 4 The Nusra Front changed its name to the Front for the Conquest of Syria ( Jabhat 
Fateh al-Sham) in July 2016, and it changed its name again to the Organization for 
Liberation of the Levant (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) after it merged with other groups in 
January 2017.
 5 In April 2016, Staffan de Mistra, Special envoy of the uN Secretary-General for 
Syria, said that his estimation of the death toll was 400,000 (Al Jazeera 2016).
 6 Later, OCHA announced a revised number of people under siege as 974,080 as of 
early November 2016 (data from www.unocha.org/syria).
 7 According to Aron Lund, popular committees were organized by pro-Assad forces, 
and became part of the state-sponsored umbrella organizations to support the regime 
(Lund 2016a).
 8 For instance, see uK DFID’s ‘Syria Crisis Response’ summaries for August 20, 
2015, October 29, 2015, and March 10, 2016 (www.gov.uk/world/organisations/
dfid-syria-crisis-response).
References
Al Jazeera. 2016. Syria Death Toll: uN envoy estimates 400,000 Killed. Al Jazeera, April 23.
Alzoubi, zedoun. 2015. Syrian Voices on the Syrian Conflict: Syrian Medical NGOs in the Crisis: 
Realities, Perspectives and Challenges. October. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
AP. 2016. Ban Ki-moon Addresses uN General Assembly, Slams Syria Government. AP, 
September 20.
Berti, Benedetta. 2016. Syria’s Weaponized Humanitarian Space. Cairo Review of Global 
Affairs, July 14. www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/syrias-weaponized-humanitarian- 
space.
Betts, Alexander, and Paul Collier. 2015. Help Refugees Help Themselves: Let Displaced 
Syrians Join the Labor Market. Foreign Affairs 94(6), 84–92.
Call, Charles T. 2008. The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State.’ Third World Quarterly 29(8), 
1491–1507.
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 2014. Local Administration Structures in Opposition-held 
Areas in Syria. April. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
Council of the european union. 2013. Council Conclusions on EU Approach to Resilience. 
May 28. Council of the european union.
Danish Refugee Council. 2015. Remote Management in Humanitarian Operations: 
Lessons Learned from Libya and Beyond. Evaluation Learning Brief 8 (September).
Development Tracker. 2015. UK DFID, Annual Review (2): To Provide Humanitarian Assistance 
to Those Affected by the Syrian Conflict in Syria and the Neighbouring Countries. GB-1–203216, 
122 R. Tateyama
December. Development Tracker. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203216/
documents (accessed March 25, 2016).
european Commission. 2013. Instruction Note for ECHO Staff Remote Management. Brussels: 
european Commission.
———. 2015a. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an 
EU Regional Strateg y for Syria and Iraq as Well as the Da’esh Threat. February 6. Brussels: 
european Commission.
———. 2015b. Syria Crisis: ECHO Factsheet. August. Brussels: european Commission.
———. 2016. Syria Crisis: ECHO Factsheet. September. Brussels: european Commission.
———. 2017. Syria Crisis: ECHO Factsheet. January. Brussels: european Commission.
Gladstone, R. 2016. 73 Syrian Aid Groups Suspend Cooperation with uN. The New York 
Times, September 8. www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/world/middleeast/syria- aid-
united-nations.html.
Gómez, Oscar A., and Chigumi Kawaguchi. 2016. The Continuum of Humanitarian Crises 
Management: Multiple Approaches and the Challenge of Convergence. JICA-RI Working Paper, 
No.136, December. Tokyo: JICA Research Institute.
Group of Friends of the Syrian People. 2012. The Fourth Ministerial Meeting of The 
Group of Friends of the Syrian People Marrakech: Chairman’s Conclusions. December 12. 
www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/syria/friends_kaigo/2012_12/pdfs/2012_12_01.
pdf#search=‘Freinds+of+Syria+2012’.
Haver, Katherine and William Carter. 2016. What It Takes: Principled Pragmatism to Ena-
ble Access and Quality Humanitarian Aid in Insecure Environments. November. Global Public 
Policy Institute.
House of Commons. 2015. Syria: Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. Hansard 602, 
November 17. https://hansard.digiminster.com/Commons/2015-11-17/debates/15111748 
000008/SyriaConflictStabilityAndSecurityFund.
Howe, Kimberly. 2016. No End in Sight: A Case Study of Humanitarian Action and the Syria Con-
flict. London: Kings College. Feinstein International Center, and the Humanitarian 
Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute, January.
Howe, Kimberly, elizabeth Stites and Danya Chudacoff. 2015. Breaking the Hourglass: 
Partnerships in Remote Management Settings—The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan. Feinstein 
International Center.
Khaddour, Kheder. 2015. The Assad Regime’s Hold on the Syrian State. Carnegie Middle east 
Center, July 8.
Khalaf, Rana. 2015. Governance Without Government in Syria: Civil Society and State 
Building During Conflict. Syria Studies 7(3), 37–71.
Lund, Aron. 2016a. Assad’s Broken Base: The Case of Idlib. The Century Foundation, 
July 14, https://tcf.org/content/report/assads-broken-base-case-idlib/.
———. 2016b. The UN Enters Syria’s Moral Labyrinth. September 9. Carnegie Middle east 
Center.
Lynch, Colum. 2014. uN’s Fear of Angering Assad Leaves Gap in Syria Aid effort. Foreign 
Policy, December 30.
McGoldrick, Claudia. 2011. The Future of Humanitarian Action: An ICRC Perspective. 
International Review of the Red Cross 93(884), 965–991.
Martínez, José Ciro, and Brent eng. 2016. The unintended Consequences of emergency 
Food Aid: Neutrality, Sovereignty and Politics in the Syrian Civil War, 2012–15. Interna-
tional Affairs 92(1), 153–173.
Mazarr, Michael J. 2014. The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm: Requiem for a 
Decade of Distraction. Foreign Affairs 93(1), 113–121.
The Syrian Civil War 123
Meininghaus, esther. 2016. Humanitarianism in Intra-state Conflict: Aid Inequality and 
Local Governance in Government- and Opposition-Controlled Areas in the Syrian 
War. Third World Quarterly 37(8), 1454–1482.
Milosevich, Darren, and Padideh Jalali-Shirazi. 2016. Humanitarian Aid in Conflict 
environments: A Case Study of Cross-Border Aid to Syria. Institute for Middle east 
Studies, George Washington university.
MSF. 2015. Syria Crisis Factsheet. January. Médecins Sans Frontières.
Nascimento, Daniela. 2015. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Humanitarian Challenges 
and Dilemmas in Crisis Settings. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance 18, February 18. 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2126.
OCHA. 2016a. Global Humanitarian Overview 2016. OCHA.
———. 2016b. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, 
Stephen O’Brien: Statement to the Security Council on Syria. New York, 27 May. OCHA.
———. 2016c. Humanitarian Bulletin Syria Operations from Turkey 15, February. OCHA.
———. 2016d. Summary of Humanitarian Response Plan Monitoring Report. January–June. 
Whole of Syria ISCCG for Strategic Steering Group, OCHA.
———. 2016e. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017: Syrian Arab Republic. December. Strategic 
Steering Group, OCHA.
———. 2017. Syrian Arab Republic: United Nations Cross-border Operations under UNSC Resolutions 
2165/2191/2258./2332. March 9. OCHA Regional Office for the Syria Crisis.
———. undated. Humanitarian Response Overview: Whole-of-Syria. OCHA.
OeCD.2008. Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to 
Resilience. Paris: OeCD.
PBS. 2016. A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria’s War—470,000. February 11. PBS.
Physicians for Human Rights. undated. Anatomy of a Crisis: A Map of Attacks on 
Health Care in Syria. https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_syria_map/web/index.html.
Reuters. 2012. Syria in Civil War, uN Official Says. Reuters, June 12.
Sparrow, Annie 2016. Aiding Disaster: How the united Nations’ OCHA Helped Assad 
and Hurt Syrians in Need. Foreign Affairs, February 1.
Swisspeace, Conflict Dynamics International and FarikBeirut.net. 2016. Inside Syria: 
What Local Actors Are Doing For Peace. January. Swisspeace, Conflict Dynamics Interna-
tional and FarikBeirut.net.
Syria Recovery Trust Fund. undated. Overview. www.srtfund.org/articles/1_overview.
Syrian Institute and PAX 2016. Siege Watch: Third Quarterly Report on Besieged Areas in Syria. 
May–July. http://siegewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PAX_RePORT_
Syria_Siege_3_FINAL_digi_singlepage.pdf.
uK DFID. 2014. Operational Plan 2011–2016 Syria. updated December 2014. http://reliefweb.
int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Syria.pdf. London: Department for International 
Development.
———. 2015. Annual Review 2014/2015 Summary Sheet. Development Tracker, December. 
https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203216/documents.
———. 2016. Syria Crisis Response Summary. March 10. London: Department for Interna-
tional Development.
uN. 1991. Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United 
Nations. A/ReS/46/182, December 19. united Nations.
———. 2013. Revised Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan January–December 2013. 
united Nations.
———. 2015. 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan: Syrian Arab Republic. December. united 
Nations.
124 R. Tateyama
uNHRC. 2011. The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in the Context of 
Recent Events. A/HRC/ReS/S-16/1, April 29. uNHRC.
———. 2012. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic. A/HRC/21/50, August 16. uNHRC.
———. 2016. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic. A/HRC/33/55, August 11. uNHRC.
uNSC. 2013. Statement by the President of the Security Council. S/PRST/2013/15, October 2. 
uNSC.
———. 2014. Resolution 2165 (2014). S/ReS/2165 (2014), July 14. uNSC.
———. 2016. Implementation on Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 
(2014) and 2258 (2015): Report of the Secretary-General. S/2016/796, September 16. uNSC.
———. 2017. Implementation on Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 
(2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016): Report of the Secretary-General. S/2017/1057, Decem-
ber 15. uNSC.
uSAID. 2014. Syria—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, No.6 of FY 2014. January 15. Washington, 
DC: uSAID.
———. 2015a. Syria—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, No.6 of FY2015. June 25. Washington, 
DC: uSAID.
———. 2015b. Syria—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, No.7 of FY 2015. August 4. Washington, 
DC: uSAID.
———. 2016a. Syria—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, No. 2 of FY2016. February 4. Washington, 
DC: uSAID.
———. 2016b. Syria—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, No. 5 of FY2016. September 30. 
Washington, DC: uSAID.
———. 2017. Syria—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet, No.2 of FY2017. March 1. Washington, 
DC: uSAID.
———. undated. Syria. www.usaid.gov/political-transition-initiatives/syria.
uS Department of State. 2016. New uS Assistance to Respond to Syria Crisis. February 4. 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252113.htm.
uS Department of State and uSAID. 2015. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 
2015: Enduring Leadership in a Dynamic World. Washington, DC: uS Department of State 
and uSAID.
Whittall, Jonathan, Mit Philips and Michiel Hofman. 2014. Opinion and Debate: Building 
Resilience by Deconstructing Humanitarian Aid. February 7. Médecins Sans Frontières. 
www.msf.org.uk/article/opinion-and-debate-building-resilience-deconstructing-hum 
anitarian-aid.
zyck, Steven A. 2012. Remote Control Project Management in Insecure Environments. Series on 





A cycle or a spiral? Visualizing disaster management
In almost all textbooks and training tools for disaster management, the image 
of a disaster management cycle—shown in Figure 7.1—is used to illustrate how 
actions related to disasters are organized (e.g., Carter 1991; Wisner and Adams 
2002; Akashi et al. 2013). Immediately after a disaster strikes, the response starts, 
followed by rehabilitation and reconstruction—often referred to as ‘recovery’ in 
recent international frameworks. Prevention, mitigation and disaster prepared-
ness should ensue, after which disaster may strike once more.
This simplified depiction of the cycle presents the continuum as a sequential 
process of activities that is easy to teach and assimilate, which explains why it 
is still frequently used. Nevertheless, the linear cycle is far from an accurate 
representation of disaster management. The cyclic representation can give the 
incorrect impression that the same or similar disasters may occur, even after 
making maximum efforts towards prevention, mitigation and disaster pre-
paredness. It can therefore be seen as pessimistic about what can actually be 
achieved by activities for confronting hazards. It also obscures the fact that 
actions described at each stage largely overlap, or work can be undertaken that 
contributes to multiple phases simultaneously. When disasters occur, disaster 
management actors and inter alia humanitarian organizations become involved 
not only in the immediate response and long-term recovery phases but also 
in developing community resilience against future disasters. In this sense, the 
interphase between relief and recovery is easier to grasp: activities for recov-
ery generally include ‘the social sectors (housing, land and settlements, educa-
tion, health, and nutrition), production sectors (employment and livelihoods, 
agriculture, commerce and trade, and industry), [and] infrastructure sectors 
(community infrastructure, water, sanitation and hygiene, transport and tele-
communications, and energy and electricity)’ (GFDRR 2015, 17). All of these 
sectors are also attended to during the relief phase, and it is easy to foresee how 
actions can be undertaken in parallel—for example, by providing temporary 
and permanent housing solutions as they become available, as well as in se-
quence, by shifting from relief to recovery mode, or being integrated as part of 
comprehensive livelihood support.
7 the continuum in the 
management of disasters
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The case for the prevention phase overlapping with recovery is similar, as the 
latter can provide an opportunity to build back better (BBB) by introducing meas-
ures against similar future events as the recovery phase progresses. Prevention, 
understood as integrating mitigation, risk reduction and preparedness, is also 
connected to relief, as it encompasses ‘strengthen[ing] disaster preparedness for 
response, taking action in anticipation of events, integrating disaster risk reduc-
tion in response preparedness, and ensuring that capacities are in place for effec-
tive response and recovery at all levels’ (uN 2015). Activities include structural 
and non-structural measures such as construction codes, disaster-conscious con-
struction planning, risk assessments, risk governance, mitigation (e.g. through 
land use controls), early warning systems, community disaster risk reduction 
(DRR), and other mitigation/preparedness measures ( JICA 2015).
Besides this, developmental considerations also play a key role in contributing 
to the mitigation and preparation of a community to effectively confront a dis-
aster. Prevention activities are different from other parts of the cycle in as much 
as they are not transitory, but need to become part of everyday life. In this sense, 
this project suggests a progressive model that changes over time (see  Figure 7.1).1 
Disaster management diagrams should not be visualized as a circle but should 
Figure 7.1  The disaster management cycle.
Source: authors.
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reflect the possibility of enhancing community capacity towards future disasters 
instead. This has formed the basis by which understandings of the continuum 
have evolved through the influence of international organizations involved in 
managing disasters. In order to grasp this evolution, two strands of experience 
are described in this chapter: first, the humanitarian perspective as fleshed out 
by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) and, second, a developmental perspective from global agreements ensu-
ing from the International Decade for Disaster Reduction (IDDR) in the nineties.
Principles and rules of disaster relief and their 
evolution within the Red Cross
The Red Cross was born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination 
to those wounded on the battlefield. The organization endeavored, in its inter-
national and national capacities, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wher-
ever it may be found (ICRC 1996, 2). The Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies 
(hereafter referred to as ‘National Societies’) are auxiliary bodies tasked with 
providing humanitarian services for their governments under national laws or 
by Presidential decree. They are subject to the laws of their respective countries; 
yet, they must always maintain their autonomy. National Societies are thus not 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), although they are considered to be the 
largest relief agency. That said, the principles and rules that they apply to disaster 
relief have been evolving as experience around the world has accumulated.
The 1953 North Sea floods were the worst disaster in europe in modern times. 
During relief operations, National Societies gathering in Geneva raised nine-
teen questions about their role, including the following: Should international Red 
Cross disaster relief actions be limited to meeting the immediate emergency or 
should they carry over into rehabilitation? If a decision is taken against actions 
for rehabilitation, how should any surplus funds be disposed of? After a series 
of discussions, a set of principles for the work of the Red Cross was adopted in 
Oslo in 1954. These stated simply that, while the primary aim of the Red Cross 
was to meet emergencies, additional funds might be used for rehabilitation of the 
neediest individuals.
These ‘Oslo Principles’ were reviewed by the Relief Advisory Committee in 
Istanbul in 1960. Henry W. Dunning, the Deputy Secretary General in charge of 
relief operations at the League of Red Cross Societies (now IFRC), reported that 
when all immediate needs had been met, the status of surpluses remained one of 
the biggest issues. Following discussions, it was established that the surplus could 
be utilized for rehabilitation, but that this work should only be undertaken by the 
private sector. In other words, rehabilitation should not include any project that is 
normally a governmental responsibility. However, exceptions were made for hos-
pitals, clinics, kindergartens, schools or community centers, provided that prior 
agreement was reached between the donor and recipient National Societies. elab-
orating a rehabilitation program in consultation with a specific National Societies 
was included as one of the duties of the League delegates to be dispatched to the 
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affected National Society. This plan was to be submitted through the League to 
the National Societies in a position to contribute to such a program.
The new Principles and Rules for Red Cross/Red Crescent Disaster Relief 
were adopted in Resolution XXIV at the 21st International Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Conference (IRCC) in Istanbul, 1969. The IRCC gathered not only 
the representatives of the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement but 
also the representatives of the state’s parties to the Geneva Conventions. The res-
olution affirms that prevention of disasters, assistance to victims and reconstruc-
tion are first and foremost the responsibility of public authorities. The General 
Provisions state that, ‘in principle Red Cross help is of an auxiliary and comple-
mentary nature and operates basically in the emergency phase. However, if cir-
cumstances required and provided that the Red Cross is assured of the necessary 
resources and means, it may undertake longer-term assistance programmes.’
Since their adoption in Istanbul, the principles and rules have been modified 
and/or supplemented based on lessons learned through undertaking interna-
tional relief operations. For instance, after famine relief operations in Africa in the 
mid-eighties, the report ‘Prevention Better than Cure,’ on human and environ-
mental disasters in the Third World, was prepared for the Swedish Red Cross by 
Hagman, Beer and Swedish Red Cross (1984). Based on that report, the National 
Societies in Sweden, West Germany and Japan formed a consortium for a five-year 
integrated community development program in drought-affected areas in north-
ern ethiopia. There is also evidence from efforts of the IFRC to consolidate its 
accumulated experiences and broker global action, as in the work of McAllister 
(1993) and the ongoing series of World Disasters Reports commencing in 1993.
In the summer of 1994, the Code of Conduct for the International Red 
Cross Movement and NGOs in disaster relief, was also developed and agreed 
upon by eight of the world’s largest disaster response agencies—Caritas Interna-
tional, Catholic Relief Services, IFRC, International Save the Children Alliance, 
 Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, World Council of Churches and  International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Code of Conduct is a voluntary one, to 
which NGOs are signatories.2 The Code lays down ten points of principle, with 
the first four relating to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality and independence. The following four are particularly relevant for the 
continuum:
•	 We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
•	 Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the manage-
ment of relief aid.
•	 Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as 
meeting basic needs.
•	 In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recog-
nize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.
(IFRC 2017)
A subsequent groundbreaking event was the adoption of the ‘Agenda for 
 Humanitarian Action’ during the 28th IRCC in 2003. The agenda focuses on 
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the main theme and overall goal of the IRCC, namely Protecting Human Dignity, 
and sets out action-oriented goals and measures that member states and the 
components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement can 
undertake to protect human dignity (ICRC 2003). Among the four humanitar-
ian concerns addressed in the agenda, the inclusion of the reduction of ‘the risk 
and impact of disasters and improve preparedness and response mechanisms’ is 
evidence of further internalization of the full continuum into the organization’s 
activities (ibid., 11).
As one of the deadliest disasters in recorded history, the 2004 Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami resulted in further changes. The plight of the affected 
people and countries prompted a worldwide humanitarian response, which re-
sulted in more than uS$14 billion of donations in humanitarian aid. Given the 
abundance of resources, the International Red Cross representatives met in a 
Forum held in Hong Kong in March 2005, and committed to delivering re-
habilitation and recovery programs based on the needs of the communities af-
fected; carrying out recovery programs in the affected countries in line with the 
regional strategy, ranging from re-establishing and diversifying livelihoods to 
reconstructing health institutions, housing and social infrastructure; strengthen-
ing national and transnational disaster response capacity and supporting DRR 
programs through building community resilience to prepare for and respond to 
disasters; and developing the disaster management skills of volunteers and staff 
in the National Societies in a sustainable manner that increases local to global 
emergency response capacities. The meeting was followed up by a Tsunami 
 Forum in Kuala Lumpur in 2007, where 15 wide-ranging recommendations 
were made and directed toward the IFRC’s Governing Board. Great emphasis 
was placed on the problems of coordinating large-scale operations covering re-
lief, recovery and prevention activities by different National Societies in the same 
affected areas.
Mention should also be made that in 2011, the 31st IRCC adopted a resolution en-
couraging states, with support from their National Societies, IFRC, united Nations 
Development Programme (uNDP), and other relevant partners to review existing 
legislative frameworks in light of the key gap areas related to DRR identified in an 
IFRC report to the conference. The resolution called for states to assess whether their 
laws made DRR a priority (including through resource allocation and accountabil-
ity); involved communities, civil society and the private sector; and facilitated the 
implementation of land-use planning and building codes (IFRC and uNDP 2015).
After the overview of progress and lessons learned from implementing ma-
jor operations over the last few years—such as the Haiti earthquake, Pakistani 
floods and the Japan triple disaster—recent discussions have focused on commit-
ment to the allocation of a firm percentage to activities for preparedness within 
major disaster appeals. The 24th Session of the Governing Board of the IFRC in 
2011 adopted the approach that every appeal for international disaster response 
should include, as far as possible, a provision of at least 10 percent for longer-term 
disaster preparedness and risk reduction work. However, this important decision 
was not included in the 2013 revisions and remains an issue.
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The Principles and Rules Preamble drafted in 2013 describe how they encom-
pass preparedness for response, disaster relief and early recovery activities. They 
complement commitments to DRR and seek to encourage National Societies to 
link relief, recovery and development. Accordingly, Principle 9 mentions that 
IFRC supports the transition from relief to recovery for disaster-affected  people, 
and Principle 10 describes how the societies provide international assistance that 
builds upon local capacities and complements local response mechanisms, con-
tributing to preparedness for possible future disasters and strengthening long-
term resilience. There are even specific instructions for connecting relief and 
recovery.
In sum, it is clear how the challenge posed by the continuum has crept into 
the IFRC Principles and Rules since they were first adopted in 1954. Availability 
of resources and pressure to respond to the changing needs on the ground have 
been the major driving forces. Much emphasis is placed on the central role of 
local communities and authorities, who are the main responders. This also plays 
a role in the evolution of the second strand of efforts through the united Nations 
(uN) that we describe in the next section.
From Yokohama to Sendai: Strategies for the 
continuum and disaster risk reduction frameworks
The process of mainstreaming comprehensive action against disasters through 
the uN started with the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR) in the nineties.3 This was mostly a scientifically propelled initiative 
that tried to raise awareness of the possibilities of prevention, in opposition to the 
shock-driven response facilitated by the CNN effect. These seminal experiences 
profoundly influenced the way that agreements concerning disaster reduction 
were framed. From the outset, the DRR movement was inspired by the premise 
that ‘prevention is better than cure,’ and it therefore focused on ways to avoid 
disasters before they occur, primarily by mainstreaming DRR as part of devel-
opment. In consequence, the frameworks adopted for action had (and still have) 
little to say about relief. Indeed, until the last version was agreed on in 2015, there 
were few references to recovery. The outcomes of the first World Conference on 
Disaster Risk Reduction, held in Yokohama in 1994, acknowledged the impor-
tance of the continuum but quickly emphasized that ‘notwithstanding the full 
continuum, disaster prevention is better’ (IDNDR 1994, 10).
The next World Conference took place in 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. In the 
list of outcomes of this meeting (uN 2005), preparedness was included as one of 
five priorities, and recovery was acknowledged as a ‘window of opportunity,’ but 
the emphasis remained on prevention, now on its present formulation as ‘risk 
reduction.’
As noted above, the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 was a turning point be-
cause it was the first time in history that there was enough money for coop-
eration to look beyond relief on such a massive scale. In 2011, the first World 
Reconstruction Conference was held, and the BBB mantra became a major 
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trend inside DRR. This was reflected in multiple side events related to recovery 
during the Third World Conference in Sendai in 2015, giving way to one of four 
new priorities being framed as: ‘enhancing disaster preparedness for effective 
response, and to Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruc-
tion’ (uN 2015). In principle, the continuum is fully recognized through the 
outcomes, but the framing suggests two things: the emergence of a strong recov-
ery focus group inside the DRR community, and the continuation of the tradi-
tional sidelining of relief, which did not manage to maintain its own standalone 
priority. In fact, the concept of crisis management has been carefully avoided, 
partly to underscore the importance and urgency of disaster risk management 
(uNISDR 2015).
There is thus competition between the main phases in disaster management, 
but until recently the connection between those phases has not figured promi-
nently in major documents. Since recovery became a field of active engagement, 
related work by Fengler, Ihsan, and Kaiser (2008) and the Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR 2015) recognizes the need to start 
working as soon as possible after a disaster, while relief work is still ongoing, and 
ideally building upon humanitarian aid. From existing experience, there are two 
sectors that have repeatedly been shown to be the most critical in connecting 
relief with recovery: housing and livelihoods (Christoplos 2006; GFDRR 2015). 
Both areas are not only critical but extremely complex, to the point that they 
are a big issue not only in developing countries but also in robust societies such 
as  Japan (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014). There are multiple examples of work 
being undertaken and guidelines being developed in these two sectors, such as 
those prepared by the International Recovery Platform and several uN agencies 
(see IRP undated). However, since any solution is very contextual, generalization 
is difficult.
It is also important to note that prevention in DRR is framed as occurring 
prior to disasters, so the ways that prevention and preparedness enter the picture 
of crisis management has not been addressed (Brusset et al. 2009). Once again, 
the rise of BBB has provided a way of resolving this issue by linking prevention to 
recovery, but the approach does not necessarily cover the full range of prevention 
and, especially, preparedness activities. As in the case of the Red Cross; the in-
terface, if any, between recovery and prevention phases/actors is yet to be made 
clear with a better model of the continuum. We suggest that such a model should 
acknowledge the overlap of phases and establish how middle and long-term ac-
tivities for prevention are engendered from day one of any crisis.
One way or another, the last two world conferences resulted in frameworks for 
action that describe the tasks and priorities for advancing DRR in each coun-
try, and include the full cycle of crisis management. They followed an inclu-
sive and elaborated process for the crafting of the documents, including formal 
inter- governmental negotiations, with the results subsequently adopted by uN 
member states and endorsed by the uN General Assembly. Their outcomes have 
thus become a global referent on this specific type of crisis and, through its inter- 
governmental process, highlight the importance of local ownership.
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Actors and financing for the continuum after disasters
Both historical strands introduced above converge on two major features of the 
continuum: a similar set of phases and the centrality of local communities and 
governments. While we have emphasized the fuller picture of crisis management 
and ways in which doing ‘more than relief’ has been reflected in disaster man-
agement history, the configuration of actors and the underlying flow of resources 
also deserve mention.
While the world conferences on DRR gather many diverse stakeholders at the 
global level, the process remains an inter-governmental one. Local ownership 
is stressed because it is the affected people and their governments who must un-
dergo the full process. Therefore, the way external actors—mainly donors, inter-
national organizations and NGOs—come into the picture is through assessment 
tools and the plans derived from those assessments. This is most clear from exist-
ing recovery frameworks, for instance, the european union (eu), World Bank, 
and the uN post-disaster needs assessments (PDNA) (eC 2015, 109). National 
officers are supported to different degrees by international partners to produce 
the assessments and then develop recovery plans that donors will support, de-
pending on their capabilities. This process aims to avoid the risk of international 
agencies, and their development partners, appropriating control of the process 
(GFDRR 2015, 37).
At this point, similar mechanisms for dovetailing relief into DRR do not exist. 
The uN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in con-
junction with national governments, coordinates emergency needs assessment 
based on national requests, which inform the flash appeals to the international 
community. However, all agencies involved in humanitarian action undertake 
their own needs assessments.4 For example, the united States Agency for Inter-
national Development’s (uSAID’s) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 
has DARTs (Disaster Assistance Response Teams), while the european Civil Pro-
tection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (eCHO) and the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency ( JICA) also deploy their own assessment teams. The extent 
to which multiple needs assessments for relief can or cannot be coordinated is 
an issue heavily influenced by the flow of funds—that is, they are supply-side 
oriented. Changes to the cluster system, suggests that moving operations back 
to local institutions may be possible in the future when ‘government capacity is 
adequate and not constrained’ (IASC 2015). Since relief is followed by different 
forms of informal recovery that can interfere with BBB plans, efforts at early 
coordination have been encouraged.
There is, however, an important caveat to the relatively positive picture of the 
response to natural disasters. International attention to the DRR process has so far 
been very unequal. During the two decades since 1991, Japan has contributed as 
much as 68 percent of all financial donations for DRR (Kellett and Caravani 2013) 
and is the only country that addresses disasters from both its humanitarian and 
development branches in a very clear manner. For the remaining donors, activities 
related to disasters are mainly seen as part of the humanitarian aid portfolio.
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The lack of financial contributions towards DRR has resulted in an ongoing 
debate. This can be seen in relation to other types of crises: in the 2010 figures, 
DRR amounted only to about 10 percent of what is spent on peacekeeping. Lack 
of funding has also been criticized as a share of the Overseas Development Assis-
tance (ODA), less than 1 percent, and as a share of humanitarian aid, 6.4 percent 
in 2014 (Development Initiatives 2015; Kellett and Caravani 2013). Mainstream-
ing DRR into development is seen as a way to address the scarcity of resources, 
although tracking such efforts remains difficult. The low share of resources for 
humanitarian assistance—just about one tenth of all ODA—also suggests limita-
tions in addressing multiple parallel phases of the continuum through this budget 
line, in which relief needs override prevention needs—one of the issues addressed 
by the Red Cross, as explained above. Funds for DRR, as distinct from BBB, are 
not necessarily included in recovery plans if they are not explicitly there from the 
start. Funding through humanitarian portfolios makes it unclear how the goal of 
preventing crises from recurring can become part of the continuum in the long 
term. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the biggest contribution of 
funds actually comes from citizens, within a country and from abroad (GFDRR 
2015, 42–43).
The lack of a multilayered understanding of phases contributes to tensions 
between relief and recovery actions. On the one hand, from the national gov-
ernment perspective, the ideal is to finish relief as soon as possible to provide its 
people with some sense of normalcy, or at least progress. This requires careful 
assessment of the situation, since populations under stress and the organizations 
supporting them could perceive this as a political decision. On the other hand, 
there is the perception that the humanitarian world ‘often stretches out the re-
lief phase (immediate or delayed) until the funds earmarked for relief have been 
exhausted’ (de Ville de Goyet 2008, 32). In other words, financial sources may 
also be a source of conflict between implementing partners and local authorities, 
generating unfriendliness and reinforcing prejudices between actors. The issue 
is not, however, merely about funding because, as de Ville de Goyet (ibid.) rec-
ognizes, organizations receiving humanitarian resources do move into recovery 
projects as needs change on the ground. The work of the Red Cross is a conspicu-
ous example, and Yoshikawa (2013), as well as the interviews conducted as part of 
this review, support this observation. Larger organizations without mandate con-
straints can internally balance different sources of funding within their evolving 
programs. Irrespective of this, it seems to be the case that humanitarian money is 
easier to obtain than development money (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994), 
creating a perverse incentive to apply for available funds. A strict humanitarian 
mandate tries to prevent this, but this actually discourages the goal of the con-
tinuum by, for instance, banning the words ‘permanent’ or ‘reconstruction’ from 
flash appeals (de Ville de Goyet 2008, 33), despite the fact that phases overlap 
and any division between them may be difficult to distinguish.
It is also important to observe that time-constrained allocations are not only 
an issue of relief. Support for the recovery process—as an extraordinary type of 
assistance—can also be limited by donors or local authorities to a certain time 
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period that may or may not reflect the actual capacity of the implementing actors 
to absorb resources on the ground. The rush to spend money does, therefore, fa-
cilitate co-optation and waste. Moreover, there is also a trade-off between speed, 
quality, and control that can only be managed on a case-by-case basis (Akashi 
et al. 2013).
Addressing the continuum in practice
Getting a better grasp of how these changes in global frameworks and practice of 
crisis management are manifested in the field requires examination of particular 
cases. The following three chapters of this volume provide close-up accounts of 
major events at different points in the history of DRR efforts, illustrating how 
challenges and approaches have evolved, as well as the complexities inherent 
in each context. First, the case of Honduras after Hurricane Mitch (Chapter 8) 
offers a peek into how the system worked at the outset of the DRR movement. 
Gómez considers how prevention is engendered during the relief phase and then 
proceeds, partly thanks to—and partly in spite of—recovery and efforts to re-
start development. His chapter shows how, in the absence of common agreement 
on BBB, long-term visions of societies stepping back from disasters can return to 
business as usual because of, among other things, politically motivated time pres-
sure and conflicting visions of how DRR works. He also highlights the impact of 
the general lack of specialized knowledge in DRR cooperation, a point that other 
chapters show has been consolidated through experience.
Next, Ishiwatari follows the epoch-making events of the Indian Ocean 
 tsunami, using the Java earthquake that occurred two years later as a test of how 
much learning has taken place in Indonesia (Chapter 9). This allows an overview 
of the full process of disaster management, and in particular, the contributions to 
long-term development. Ishiwatari presents an overall positive picture, in which 
the commitment of the government and the generosity of donors allowed multiple 
initiatives that, partly through trial and error, resulted in the development of last-
ing institutions. He highlights advances in housing, showcasing reconstruction in 
Yogyakarta that ensured resilient solutions against future earthquakes. He also 
describes how the livelihood sector received positive support through cash pro-
grams. Indonesia was able to strengthen its DRR by developing institutions and 
legislation through learning from the disasters. Donors coordinated different as-
sistance schemes to link recovery with long-term development.  Another positive 
experience can be seen in the work of multi-donor pool funds, although the prob-
lem of donor visibility remains a major hurdle. However, weak links were found in 
some areas between recovery and development, particularly in the sustainability 
of the prevention strategies promoted through the recovery, and the decreasing 
attention to DRR after the recovery is no longer seen as a matter of concern.
Part III of this volume concludes with Jibiki and Ono describing the case of an-
other major disaster in a middle-income country frequently affected by adversity 
(Chapter 9). The authors present a case from the Philippines following  Typhoon 
Yolanda, in which local ownership resulted in low coordination of needs among 
The continuum and disasters 137
donors. These organizations initially used their own existing programs to sup-
port the crisis management and then plug into national planning for the recovery. 
While tensions in relation to a linear, sequential conception of the relief phase re-
main, the authors emphasize the enormity of the challenge posed for the housing 
sector and the reluctance of international cooperation to engage with this. They 
find that the time frame for cooperation is very different from that required by 
the recovery process, suggesting the need to develop strategies for longer-term 
support, including attending to pre-existing vulnerabilities.
Despite multiple challenges, the case studies suggest steady progress in consol-
idating disaster management as a whole in the aftermath of disasters. A vision 
of crisis management shared by stakeholders on both affected and cooperat-
ing societies emerges as time passes, giving way to increased attention to the 
intricacies of devising DRR institutions and of specific sectors. International 
cooperation also moves to the background, positively as recognition of the local 
ownership of the process, but also revealing the difficulty of supporting more 
than relief through crisis management as international attention fades away. 
Three cases are certainly not enough to generalize, but still they offer hints on 
the challenge of realizing the continuum, about which the final chapter synthe-
sizes the major findings specific for disasters, as well as those common to armed 
conflict case studies.
Notes
 1 See Figure 7.1; see Federal emergency Management Agency 2011; Red Cross undated.
 2 As of July 20, 2018. See: http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/who-we-are/the-movement/
code-of-conduct/signatories-to-the-code-of-conduct/
 3 Before this, the uN Disaster Relief Coordinator worked as a focal point for relief since 
its creation 1972. Regarding its performance, see Crisp (2007).
 4 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) introduced the Multi-Cluster/Sector 
Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) in 2012 to address the lack of joint needs assess-
ments in sudden onset emergencies. This effort is still work in progress. Lately, work 
on ‘more joint and impartial needs assessments’ as a follow up to the Grand Bargain 
agreed during the World Humanitarian Summit is ongoing.
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Introduction
Most of the discussions about realizing the continuum of crisis management focus 
on how relief and recovery phases connect and overlap. As shown in Chapter 2, 
approaches to the continuum are generally framed in terms of the humanitarian- 
development divide, occasionally including some form of early recovery in the 
middle, but seldom including prevention as a specific phase of crisis manage-
ment. Prevention is certainly a preoccupation, crosscutting different areas of in-
tervention, but it is not clearly connected to the flow of actions underlying the 
continuum. This likely follows from the strong emphasis on pursuing prevention 
before crises, not after. Such emphasis can be seen in the general depiction of the 
humanitarian Cluster System designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Commit-
tee, the framing of the peace agenda as explained by Hoshino and  Kawaguchi 
earlier in this volume, and even in disaster risk reduction (DRR) frameworks for 
action, usually depicted as having a cyclical nature as described in the introduc-
tion to this section of the book. In consequence, there has been limited attention 
given to documenting the ways that prevention is or can be connected to relief 
and recovery efforts.
In this chapter I use the case of Honduras after Hurricane Mitch to shed light 
on how prevention evolves as a phase of the crisis management process, pointing 
out different factors that can facilitate or hinder its progress. From the outset, 
it should be stressed that for this research, prevention is considered to include 
activities for mitigation, risk reduction and preparedness, which sometimes are 
presented as independent of each other. In order to examine the characteristics of 
the prevention phase as part of the continuum, I provide a historic account of re-
lief and recovery phases conducted by national actors, as well as the united States 
(uS), the european union (eu) and Japan, focusing on the way they influenced 
and overlapped with activities related to prevention. This description allows un-
derstanding of how the prevention phase took shape from the very beginning 
of the emergency and evolved in parallel to other phases. Next, I concentrate 
on prevention-specific activities—specifically, the consolidation of a disaster risk 
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management (DRM) system and the conciliation of different strands of work rel-
evant to DRM—to identify the main challenges in advancing this phase beyond 
relief and recovery. Finally, I add comments on two major consequences of Hur-
ricane Mitch that had a great impact on the crisis management process but were 
beyond its reach: firstly, Honduran participation in the ongoing global debt relief 
program at that time; and secondly, increased migration to the uS.
The research explores Christoplos’s (2006) observation that the job of con-
necting different phases and the return to normality is the core task of national 
actors’ responses to disasters. The ideal role of international donors is to sup-
port locals in realizing the continuum of relief, recovery and prevention, not 
in making their individual projects connected with each other. Therefore, I 
present a broader account of the complex process of crisis management and 
the longer-term changes to the Honduran society triggered by the hurricane, 
through which I identify the specific contributions of external actors, particu-
larly in relation to major donors and the promotion of a robust prevention 
phase.
I partly organize my presentation around the idea of ‘transformation,’ which 
warrants explanation. After Hurricane Mitch, transformation was a guiding 
concept pushed by the international community in order to make sure that some-
thing beyond simple reconstruction was achieved after the disaster. Transforma-
tion came to mean many different things for different actors, including disaster 
prevention but also civil society empowerment, decentralization, democratiza-
tion, and transparency, among other things. Thus, transformation helped dif-
ferent actors to communicate and put forward their own plans under general 
coordination principles, despite each of them having their own particular agen-
das. This characteristic makes the pursuit of transformation an appealing option 
for understanding the overlap and transition between different management 
phases. Bearing in mind that in 1998, concepts such as recovery, disaster risk 
reduction and build back better (BBB) had yet to become standards for fram-
ing the disaster management cycle, transformation captured the idea of turning 
disasters into opportunities. This framing can still be heard today, especially in 
relation to BBB. Moreover, it is worth noting that I am using ‘reconstruction’ 
and ‘recovery’ interchangeably, with the former a concept used in national and 
international policies, while the latter is a term used for the model proposed in 
this book.
This research is based on a series of 37 semi-structured interviews, several of 
them with two or more people, held in Tegucigalpa in July 2015 and June 2016 
with government officials, donors, multilateral agencies, non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), and universities. It is complemented by a handful of other 
consultations undertaken in Washington DC and in Tokyo. Primary and sec-
ondary data in Spanish,  english and  Japanese was thoroughly reviewed, benefit-
ting particularly from the comprehensive online collection held by the Medical 
Library of the National  Autonomous  university of Honduras, as well as copies of 
old reports available at local  Honduran institutions.
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Background
Hurricane Mitch wreaked havoc over the whole of Honduras, Nicaragua, and to 
some extent other neighboring countries between October 22 and November 9, 
1998. Despite its strong winds, it was the unrelenting rains that led to floods and 
landslides. These left 5,657 persons confirmed dead, 8,052 missing, and hundreds 
of thousands displaced in Honduras alone (eCLAC 1999). Losses amounted to 
uS$3,800 million, or 70 percent of the gross domestic product of the country. The 
most affected area was the productive sector, especially agriculture, while infra-
structure damage equaled seven times the annual construction sector output (ibid.). 
About 70 percent of roads were destroyed; bridges were also particularly affected, as 
well as the electricity supply. The loss of access to potable water for a long period of 
time was critical. The disaster required building around 33,220 housing units and 
rehabilitating 49,500 houses (uNDP 1999). The magnitude of the tragedy over-
whelmed local capacities and pushed the national government to appeal for help, a 
call that the international community heeded and followed up on for several years.
While phases of crisis management largely overlap, there are several key events 
and agreements during the process that can help in understanding the connec-
tions and transitions—a summary of these has been provided in Figure 8.1. 
Figure 8.1  Timeline of policy events relevant to the disaster management.
Source: author.
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The process started with a declaration from Central American leaders one week 
after the disaster, seeking international support. This was followed by two meet-
ings with donors and international agencies in Washington and Stockholm, in 
December 1998 and May 1999 respectively, where the main plans for the recon-
struction and transformation process were agreed upon.
After these meetings, the framework of the process ceased to be regional and 
became mostly national—thus, local politics started to play an essential role. 
Mitch took place in the year that Honduran President Carlos Roberto Flores 
commenced his four-year term. Nominally, the process of reconstruction would 
last throughout his term, and despite patchy progress on the ground, expire in 
late 2001. This would allow the newly elected President Ricardo Maduro to com-
mence his term with new policies in 2002. Given that creating a system for DRM 
is considered a hallmark in the evolution of the prevention phase, I follow the 
process until 2009 when the law that created it was officially approved, although 
in 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2009 there were several emergencies that once again 
triggered relief and reconstruction activities (Suárez and Sánchez 2012). The ap-
proval of the DRM system law coincided with a political crisis that year when 
Manuel zelaya, president since 2006, was ousted as he attempted to rewrite the 
constitution in order to remain in power. This event affected the relations with 
donors and the flow of cooperation; it therefore offers a good point at which to 
end the analysis.
Hurricane Mitch prompted active participation by the international commu-
nity, which invested time, personnel and resources to help the beleaguered coun-
tries. After the two meetings mentioned above, a follow-up coordination group 
was created by five leading supporting countries, which gradually expanded to 
include 16 members: the group started as the G5, and ultimately became the 
G16, including all major donors and institutions such as the uN  Development 
Programme (uNDP), the World Bank and the International  Monetary Fund 
(IMF). This process is considered a very successful experience in donor coordi-
nation that heavily influenced the evolution of the management process after the 
disaster (Yanguas 2013).
Figure 8.2 presents the Organisation for economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OeCD) data on major bilateral donors’ aid to Honduras from 
1997 to 2011. Visible leadership was provided by the uS, followed by Japan. 
The eu, Germany, Spain and Sweden also played prominent roles. Numbers 
should be treated carefully though: d’Ans (2008, 152–158) reports that a ded-
icated French research team was unable to determine the actual balance of 
the commitments and disbursements following the Stockholm meeting. With 
regard to Figure 8.2, some of the peaks around the mid-2000s reflect the result 
of debt relief—as is the case with Japan’s peak in 2005, and to some extent 
Spain’s1—and so do not represent actual inflow of resources. Based on the 
trends of the figure, as well as available information, I focus mainly on the 
experience of the uS, the eu and Japan in order to understand donors’ roles 
in the process.2
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Relief: setting the scene for recovery 
and transformation
Torrential rains started affecting Central America on October 18, 1998 before 
a tropical depression in the Caribbean became Hurricane Mitch a week later on 
October 22 (d’Ans 2008). The worst period of the disaster started on October 27, 
sweeping the Caribbean coast of Honduras from east to west and north to south 
through the main corridor of the country that ends at the Pacific Ocean. Dif-
ferent degrees of emergency were decreed, starting with coastal regions of the 
north, until by October 30, the whole country was covered. A national period of 
mourning was declared the next day, and Tegucigalpa was placed under curfew. 
National and international aid started flowing in from this point onward.
On November 9, the presidents of four Central American countries— 
Honduras, Nicaragua, el Salvador and Costa Rica—and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Guatemala held a hurried summit at the airport of el Salvador to make 
joint decisions about how to face the situation (Torres 2004). The declaration 
resulting from this meeting included the following appeals:
•	 Support for the elaboration of a Central American Rehabilitation and Re-
construction Plan through an international advisory group;
•	 new resources to implement such plan;
•	 free access to the markets of the uS and the eu for products from the af-
fected countries in order to reactivate the economy;
Figure 8.2  Bilateral aid to Honduras, 1997–2011.
Source: author, based on data generated from OeCD QWIDS.
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•	 moratoria for the foreign debt of the most affected countries; and
•	 amnesty for undocumented migrants.
One of the most salient aspects of the declaration is that no appeal for relief or hu-
manitarian aid was made. At the first stages of the response to the emergency, the 
national office in charge of the response in Honduras, the Permanent Commission 
for Contingencies (COPeCO), played a role in providing information but it soon 
found itself overwhelmed (ensor and ensor 2008). The president then took over 
the operation and moved quickly into rehabilitation and reconstruction. The 1999 
World Disasters Report (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies 1999, 42–54) suggests that most life-saving activities were undertaken 
by people themselves (see also d’Ans 2008). This included the provision of food, 
which did not become scarce because staple crops were not seriously affected by 
the disaster. The government decided to outsource the reception, management and 
distribution of relief assistance mainly to the Catholic Church, supported by some 
evangelical churches (ensor and ensor 2008, 40). COPeCO was replaced by an ad-
hoc National Commission for emergencies, followed by the Reconstruction Cabinet 
(Honduras Health Secretary and Pan-American Health Organization 1999).
The lack of a dedicated appeal for relief does not imply that there was no aid, 
which in fact poured in like the rains. With the hurricane due to pass through  Mexico 
before abruptly deviating towards Honduras, there were pre-positioned goods and 
Mexican teams that hurried to support local operations. The nine uN agencies 
present in Honduras worked in teams during the emergency and started early to 
plan for recovery and rehabilitation, an effort that was praised by the uN General 
Assembly (2000).3 The proximity of the uS to Honduras at different levels resulted 
in an unprecedented high level of attention to Mitch (Halperin and Michel 2000). 
Starting with civil and military relief operations, multiple offices of the government, 
civil society organizations and private citizens supported the response.  Relief oper-
ations alone totaled more than uS$300 million (uSAID 2000), including civilian 
and military assets. More than a thousand troops were deployed from a uS base 
in the country (Halperin and Michel 2000). The uS president, the first lady and 
several government delegations visited the affected areas. As for the eu, the major 
humanitarian initiative funded by the european Civil Protection and Humanitar-
ian Aid Operations (eCHO) was a regional response and rehabilitation projects 
between 1998 and 2000, which provided 39.79 million euros.
Support from Japan after Mitch was also unprecedented: it was the first time 
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were deployed after a natural disaster outside of 
the country. The 185 members in the mission began by installing a provisional 
hospital at the center of Tegucigalpa and providing support for public health ac-
tivities; Japanese assistance was recognized as being among the quickest to arrive 
(eCLAC 1999, 29). The mission included a team of 14 Japan International Coop-
eration Agency ( JICA) staff who undertook a survey—mainly in Honduras and 
Nicaragua—and developed a ‘grand design’ for reconstruction that was presented 
at the Washington DC meeting. Similar plans that may have been developed by 
other donors are not referred in the available accounts of the emergency response 
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process, although all of them are likely to have coordinated under the umbrella of 
the national plan and the donor coordination group, as explained below.
It is important to note that this flood of resources benefitted civil society organ-
izations, which became valuable implementing partners, and attracted a signifi-
cant number of international NGOs. d’Ans (2008, 167–168) quotes a journalist’s 
report in 2001 that found 1,500 NGOs had been authorized to work in the coun-
try, although official records only reported 150; later that year it was disclosed 
that at least 5,186 NGOs had been given legal status. Several interviewees who 
were working or had worked for NGOs began their roles in Honduras follow-
ing Mitch. There are cases of organizations such as Oxfam, which started after 
Mitch with relief activities, but were not undertaking any activities related to 
DRR at the time of this survey. Some of these employees also moved from NGOs 
to international organizations or the government, as emerging disaster-related 
activities and institutions grew out of the tragedy. Civil society and NGOs were 
then able to play an important role in seeding prevention activities by implement-
ing projects designed by them or others. d’Ans (2008) states that they shared a 
budget of uS$70 million dollars annually, thereby nurturing human resources 
that would help in managing the DRM system in later years.
Support for a greater role of NGOs and civil society during the relief phase 
was the result of pressure from the international community. The rationale for 
this was that an inclusive process would improve the planning and execution of 
reconstruction. The initial leaders’ declaration merely mentions recovery-related 
actions, which was the main concern brought to the table in Washington. Fuentes 
(2009) describes an internal tension in Honduras between the government and 
civil society, with the former trying to develop a plan quickly through a closed, 
ad-hoc Reconstruction Cabinet, while civil society groups set out a more inclu-
sive approach. National governments were asked by donors and international 
organizations in Washington DC to consult with civil society. This was the first 
time that ‘transformation’ was suggested as a leading concept for the implemen-
tation of recovery plans. The inclusion of bottom-up consultations was the first 
substantive undertaking that can be attributed to the ‘transformation’ framing, 
thus broadening the agenda of recovery actions under consideration.
Prevention through recovery: Building back better?
The Honduran government prepared the first draft of its Master Plan for Na-
tional Reconstruction and Transformation (PMRTN) for the meeting in Stock-
holm in May 1999. The government projected the end date for the reconstruction 
in 2001 and included a vision for long-term sustainable development. There were 
four thematic priorities:
1  fight poverty and human development;
2  reactivate the economy through productive employment;
3  sustainable protection of natural resources; and
4  strengthening of democratic participation (Yanguas 2013).
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Priority 2 corresponded to reconstruction goals, while Priority 1 comprised the 
country’s development plan. Priorities 3 and 4 were much more closely associated 
with the goal of transformation. As a concept, transformation was further expli-
cated in Stockholm, where six principles and goals were agreed:
•	 reduce the social and ecological vulnerability of the region as the overriding 
objective;
•	 reconstruct and transform Central America on the basis of an integrated 
approach of transparency and good governance;
•	 reinforce the process of decentralizing governmental functions and powers 
with the active participation of the civil society;
•	 promote respect for human rights as a permanent objective, giving special 
attention to promoting equality between women and men and to the rights 
of children, ethnic groups, and other minorities;
•	 coordinate donor efforts guided by priorities set by the recipient countries; 
and
•	 intensify efforts to reduce the external debt burden of countries in the region.
The first four principles were included in the PMRTN, as is evident in the com-
mitments published by the Honduran government with the addition of a specific 
mention of infrastructure. Figure 8.3 shows that around 40 percent of the budget 
was committed to reconstruction, 30 percent to poverty reduction. The remain-
der was used for transformation through promotion of DRR and several other 
agendas that can be loosely connected to governance and inclusive development. 
I will discuss the latter in the following two sections but, firstly, given the size of 
Figure 8.3  Commitments to the reconstruction process (uS$ millions, percentage).
Source: author, based on data from Gobierno de la República de Honduras (2003).
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reconstruction share, it is necessary to inquire as to what extent prevention was 
promoted through reconstruction.
As mentioned in the introduction, the BBB mantra had still not achieved 
global recognition when Mitch hit Central America; however, it could be argued 
that it was already a shared practice. In spirit, the Stockholm principles appeal to 
more than merely ‘building back as before’ and, indeed, uS assistance had pre-
viously mentioned BBB (uSAID 2000), while Japanese assistance was inspired 
by similar ideas. Therefore, in this section, I explore some of the connections and 
disconnections between recovery and prevention.
From this research, at least two major factors influencing the sustainability of 
recovery can be identified, namely: the trade-off between speed and quality, and 
the lack of local and practical knowledge or capacities. One additional indirect 
factor specific to donors also deserves attention; namely, their previous experi-
ence in the country. These three are obviously interrelated, since lack of knowl-
edge can be the result of not including local actors, perhaps because there was 
insufficient time or previous experience. However, for the sake of this analysis, 
I will treat them separately.
It is important to keep in mind that the recovery process was mainly supply- 
driven (i.e., the government adopted an ‘all aid is welcome’ policy) and, to some 
undetermined extent, the implementation was characterized by low national in-
volvement (Telford et al. 2004). The Honduran government requested a total of 
uS$4,000 million at the Stockholm meeting, an amount that was received with 
skepticism because of doubts about the country’s absorption capacity.  However, 
the government still received commitments for uS$2,939 million. About half 
of this consisted of grants and the other half loans, of which 60 percent had 
been disbursed by November 2002 (Gobierno de la República de Honduras 
2003).  Another uS$319.1 million was added from local resources, comprising 
10   percent of the overall total. Yet, after mining the public expenditure data, 
 Valenzuela (2009) only finds reports of uS$63 million provided for reconstruc-
tion between 1998 and 2001, which attests to the difficulty of determining the 
actual flow of resources and validates the supply-driven qualification.
The trade-off between speed and quality seems to be the most prominent 
limiting factor. While eCLAC (1999) had already suggested that, in the ideal 
case, reconstruction would take seven years, the official plan was devised for 
only three. The final report of the reconstruction in 2003 shows that 40 percent 
of funds were still to be disbursed, suggesting that much work remained to be 
done. Yanguas (2013) suggests that transformation had replaced reconstruction 
by the year 2000, at least at the planning level, in as much as the preparation of 
the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was already under way. 
I discuss this factor further below, but it is relevant to observe here that presi-
dential change of office was due to take place in January 2002. The hurricane 
obliged President Flores to devote his entire mandate in responding to the emer-
gency, so the PRSP was an opportunity to leave a plan that extended beyond the 
recovery. This highlights some of the domestic political pressures underlying the 
planning process.
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The impact of this rush to reconstruct was mainly that a budget for mainte-
nance was omitted from the investments. An ex-post evaluation made by the 
Honduran Fund for Social Investment4 (Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social 
2005, VII), with a sample of 32 from 2175 emergency projects, found that re-
construction designs included provisions against future disasters, but lacked ca-
pacities and plans to operate and maintain the work. The very same problem 
has been reported in regard to uS cooperation. Funding from the uS govern-
ment was channeled through the Central American and Caribbean emergency 
 Disaster Recovery Fund. The fund, created in May 1999, contained a total of 
uS$621 million dollars, with uS$291 million to be used in Honduras alone. 
This generous support was initially supposed to be totally used before September 
2000, but disbursement of funds did not start until January of the same year. 
The uS Agency for International Development (uSAID) managed to reach an 
informal agreement with the uS Congress to extend the deadline to December 
31, 2001 (uS General Accounting Office 2002). Despite this extension, even two 
years and seven months were too short, and several projects had to be rushed, 
sacrificing technical, social quality and, in consequence, sustainability. In par-
ticular, Lichtenstein (2001) stressed that all the efforts put towards infrastructure 
development without corresponding resources and capacities for maintenance 
were due to be lost. Only 80 percent of the resources set aside for Honduras had 
been utilized by the extended deadline.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that Japanese aid was rushed or qual-
ity sacrificed for speed. By February 1999, a new survey team was deployed, 
gathering requests for help in five areas:
1  bridges and roads;
2  water, sewerage and health;
3  schools and education;
4  housing; and
5  agriculture and fisheries.
The first two sectors received special attention: seven bridges were rebuilt or re-
inforced around the country and the Tegucigalpa water system was rehabilitated. 
The Tegucigalpa water system project was completed in 2003, the new bridges 
were built between 1999 and 2009 (MOFA and JICA undated), and all of them 
have stood against subsequent disasters. It should be noted, nonetheless, that 
these few well-known but very expensive projects comprised most of the Japanese 
contribution; thus they were not expected to have many of the complications 
faced by uSAID, which worked with 12 other uS departments and agencies.5
The second problem, lack of knowledge or capacities to build back better, was 
also mentioned in several documents (e.g., d’Ans 2008; Telford et al. 2004; uS 
General Accounting Office 2002). One of such capacities was the absorbing ca-
pacity of Honduran institutions, since national actors were not in a position to 
use all the money requested for the recovery. In the case of donors, evaluations 
of uS assistance recognize that it was the first time uSAID had confronted such 
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a reconstruction process, and for many of the 12 uS partners mentioned above, 
it was the first time to take part in international cooperation projects. NGOs are 
considered to have lacked the expertise required for the recovery projects, with 
donors suggesting that the lack of local capacities was one reason for relying on 
foreign contractors (Telford et al. 2004).6 The housing sector received particular 
attention, since provisional shelters built by local engineers and supported by the 
Red Cross remained functioning for more than four years, while large resettle-
ment programs were less than successful. Still, Suárez and Sánchez (2012) show 
how housing was one of the most resilient sectors to disasters following Mitch, 
while losses to the water supply, infrastructure and education sectors were con-
siderable. A possible explanation is that while the quality and delays in the hous-
ing component resulted in multiple criticisms, exposure to new disasters was at 
least addressed through  relocation—housing does not suffer from maintenance 
problems.
Finally, regarding donors’ knowledge and experience in the country, it is 
worth noting the contrast between the performance of the eu, uS and Ja-
pan. When Mitch hit, the eu was in the process of regionalizing operations, 
and for Central America, this meant moving the locus of management from 
its Brussels headquarters to Managua, Nicaragua. However, there was no 
eu delegation in  Tegucigalpa until 2005 (ADe-DRN 2012), so projects had 
to be controlled remotely. This underlies the most important weakness of 
the eu recovery plan: it was designed without the participation of national 
counterparts (european Court of Auditors 2008). In practice, the major in-
terventions of the reconstruction plan did not start until f ive or six years after 
Mitch, and subsequent evaluations suggest it was more a development pro-
gram than a reconstruction one (Barnini et al. 2009). Besides relief, eCHO 
undertook rehabilitation programs, making resources available for health, 
temporary shelter, economic reconstruction and water and sanitation for the 
f irst two years. Schrikkema (2001) presents an evaluation of the rehabilita-
tion sector, but because it is regional and prepared right after the end of the 
projects, no specif ic details about Honduran experience and its sustainability 
can be found.
On the other hand, donors with a long-standing presence in Honduras, such 
as the uS and Japan, used their established partnerships with local institutions to 
make the most of their contributions. The donor coordination group could have 
played the role of equalizer for other donors, providing opportunities to those 
with less experience in the country to local stakeholders, especially as it included 
not only diplomatic consultations but also technical and sectoral ones (Yanguas 
2013). The performance of the eu suggests that solid coordination is not enough.
the disaster-prevention phase
The above sections examined many of the overlaps and connections between 
prevention and the other phases of crisis management. This section focuses on 
the prevention phase itself. The master plan for the recovery suggested that the 
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prevention phase was made of two major groups of efforts: the first was com-
posed of plans for natural resource management—basically river basins manage-
ment, forestry and land planning—and the other consisted of consolidation of 
the DRM system, revolving around (but not exclusively about) the future role of 
 COPeCO. These two components were assigned 8.4 percent of all reconstruc-
tion  commitments—5.4 percent for natural resources and 3 percent for DRM—
as shown in Figure 8.3. The share of the budget seems very low, although in 
theory other components should have incorporated a DRR component.
The way in which the prevention phase continues after reconstruction efforts 
finish can be seen in how the country’s PRSP—which replaced the PMRTN in 
2002—maintained natural resource management and the DRM system as part 
of the government agenda, at least on paper. Prevention was considered to be 
the ‘sustainability of the strategy,’ although diluted with other transformation 
agendas. Government and donors agreed to use the enactment of legislation 
and the formulation of disaster management plans as indicators of progress 
(Gobierno de la República de Honduras 2001, 2004, 2005). As a result laws on 
territorial planning, water resources, forests and DRM were promulgated be-
tween 2004 and 2009, and great efforts were undertaken to prepare municipal 
plans—although, as Suarez and Sanchez (2012) stress, the real challenge was 
and still is implementation.
There were two major issues that shaped the prevention phase, namely: the 
need to rethink existing institutions working on disasters based on the Mitch ex-
perience; and, underlying this, the issue of conciliating different strands of work 
relevant to DRM. These two partially overlap with the two groups of efforts 
described above. I will examine each of these in turn.
The creation and development of the DRM system in Honduras was en-
trusted to COPeCO, the office normally in charge of emergency response and 
preparedness, as well as providing support during recovery (Talavera-Williams 
and  Canales Aguilar 2008). As noted above, COPeCO was overwhelmed by 
 Hurricane Mitch and, therefore, both relief and recovery had to be managed 
by other ad-hoc offices. Consequently, COPeCO was reformed in 1999 and the 
first official National Commissioner was appointed that year.7 From that point 
onward, a process of institutional strengthening followed, beginning with new 
offices, along with equipment and capacities at the central level, and gradu-
ally reaching the country’s regions. All donors provided some contributions to 
this process of capacity-building, aimed mostly at preparedness. Levels of sup-
port reached the point that some dependence on aid—at least during the first 
 decade—was mentioned in the interviews.8
COPeCO was traditionally an emergency response office and, therefore, 
a good share of the resources that poured in right after Mitch were used to 
strengthen their response as well as early warning capacities (Arita Orellana 
2003). For instance, the uS invested uS$16.2 million dollars to ‘improve the 
region’s hydro- logical and meteorological forecasting, early warning, and pre-
paredness capabilities, as well as improving the resilience of coastal communities 
at risk from the impacts of tropical storms and hurricanes’ (Showstack 2001). 
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This was mainly aimed at improving remote sensing and other measurements. 
Donors also mentioned programs for community-level preparedness, such as the 
Central American Mitigation Initiative,9 the Disaster Preparedness eCHO Pro-
gramme and Japanese-funded BOSAI ( JICA 2012), and other forms of capaci-
ty-building and equipment provision.
Capitalizing on its expertise, COPeCO devoted four years of efforts (from 2002 
to 2006) to developing the National System of Civic Protection in order to create 
a robust response structure capable of dealing with any type of disaster, while 
centralizing functions and authority (Talavera-Williams and Canales  Aguilar 
2008, 15). However, the international vision of DRM was rapidly changing, and 
pressure was growing to prioritize prevention and risk management over response 
(e.g., uNDP and CePReDeNAC 2004), thereby turning the DRM  system on its 
head. At a meeting in Guatemala in 1999, the Central American  Coordination 
Center for Natural Disaster Prevention (CePReDeNAC) promoted the adoption 
of a Strategic Framework for Vulnerability and Disaster Reduction in  Central 
America, focusing on vulnerability and the integrated management of water re-
sources and forests. This was precisely the other group of efforts for prevention 
suggested in Honduras but not the original plan of COPeCO, which represented 
the country at CePReDeNAC. Consequently, the civil protection proposal was 
not welcomed by organizations involved in the meeting, including NGOs and 
uN agencies. The proposed legislation was subsequently dropped in 2006 and 
replaced with a National System for Risk Management. This law was finally ap-
proved in 2009 in the middle of the national political crisis.
COPeCO’s reluctance to engage in the development of a comprehensive sys-
tem can be explained in terms of its existing and lacking capabilities. On the one 
hand, it had a tradition of response-oriented work and received a great amount 
of international support to continue playing that role; this capacity remains at 
the heart of COPeCO’s operations even today. On the other hand, in order to 
coordinate the DRM, it was necessary to be able to influence a large group of na-
tional institutions, particularly ministries, many times bigger and more powerful 
than COPeCO. Those actors were necessary in moving forward large-scale, sys-
tematic work on mitigation and prevention, and it was evident that COPeCO’s 
position was weak. One alternative would have been to promote line ministries’ 
ownership of DRR. Indeed, the challenge of using the crisis to commit and com-
bine a wider set of government actors to disaster prevention is the second issue 
underlying this phase in Honduras.
The issue of committing and combining different strands of work relevant to 
DRR was problematic in Honduras from the very beginning. The two groups 
of prevention efforts conceived during the recovery, natural resources and the 
DRM system, were put together on a single coordination table in the donor coor-
dination mechanism, which Yanguas (2013, 39) suggests failed to work properly 
because of the combination of topics. Yanguas also raises the issue of the scarcity 
of international cooperation staff dedicated to DRM as one of the reasons for 
this table not working adequately, which suggests the lack of capacity was also 
present from the supply side. The absence of the infrastructure sector in leading 
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prevention was also a negative factor. The secondary priority of prevention in the 
middle of recovery, when combined with lack of experience, thus contributed to 
the lack of systematic approach.
Water and forestry sectors worked in parallel, each of them characterized by 
different institutional settings with overlapping responsibilities—and thus also 
conflicts. They received a greater share of the prevention budget but for this sur-
vey, I could not identify major disaster prevention-oriented capabilities developed 
during those years, perhaps with the exception of risk evaluation for infrastruc-
ture, mentioned as part of ‘recovery.’ The failure to influence local institutions 
was a prominent deficiency in eu support, which included an emphasis on wa-
ter between 2002 and 2007, and forestry between 2007 and 2011. It assigned 
each of these sectors a total of around 60 percent of its recovery program, and 
45   percent of the resources of its 2002–2006 strategy. However, an evaluation 
of this work found that the Honduran government continued to have ‘no real 
committed policy in this sector and no policy dialogue was conducted on the 
causes of resource mismanagement or in support to a national agenda on natural 
resources management’ (ADe-DRN 2012, 25). Interviews with staff at several of 
the involved institutions suggest that cooperation served as a means for each min-
istry to recover and continue with their roles prior to Mitch. Donors gave priority 
to the more affected areas at the beginning of operations; however, these were 
also areas that had better levels of human development (uNDP 1999). Therefore 
support was quickly moved back to poorer areas in order to promote poverty 
reduction and the Millennium Development Goals.
It is worth observing that, while a prevention phase that included more than 
preparedness can be observed in Honduras as a whole, the same is not true for 
donors. Particularly conspicuous is the decision of the uS to forego a specific 
component for DRM after the recovery was over, opting instead to integrate 
it back into the entire program (uSAID 2003). This decision made it difficult 
to trace back efforts towards DRM and, as the evidence suggests, it was not 
a successful strategy. A country goal on ‘Providing Humanitarian Assistance’ 
was included again in the 2009–2013 country assistance strategy, dealing with 
forestry and preparedness (uSAID 2009). DRM through european develop-
ment cooperation was present on paper, but an evaluation found no actions 
had been planned—apart from funds for strengthening COPeCO (ADe-DRN 
2012, 51).10
The case of Japan is a little different because prevention is something that is 
ingrained in JICA’s vision. The JICA project formulation survey that visited af-
fected countries roughly one year after the calamity already aimed to move ‘from 
reconstruction to prevention’ ( JICA 2000). Between 2001 and 2002, a study con-
cerning flood control and landslide prevention in Tegucigalpa city was prepared 
( JICA 2002), which served as a reference point for subsequent DRM activities. 
The 2000 formulation survey gave way to a regional project on DRM between 
2007 and 2009, combining activities at the international, national and local lev-
els in six countries at the time, with a budget of around uS$4.5 million ( JICA 
2012). Major mitigation projects proposed in the 2002 study commenced in 2011. 
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Although somehow beyond the time frame of this chapter, it is worth noting that, 
since 2012, support has been given to local universities in order to create their 
own maps and tertiary-level expert knowledge on landslides. This is expected to 
ensure that the technical expertise necessary for prevention is engendered locally 
( JICA and IDCJ 2016).
In parallel, national and international humanitarian organizations in 
 Honduras started their own ‘humanitarian network’ in 2010 to support  COPeCO 
in its preparedness work through the application of international standards and 
the humanitarian cluster system. This initiative was initially not seen positively 
by local authorities, who even now frown at the way that humanitarian resources 
bypass government institutions; however, collaboration has improved through 
the years.
In sum, the prevention phase after Mitch was a slow process through which a 
DRM system started to be formed in Honduras. The goal of promoting a general 
ownership of DRR was attempted—somewhat fruitlessly—although advances in 
preparedness and early warning were achieved. The conflicting visions between 
the expertise of local institutions and international discussions about DRM sys-
tems contributed to the poor performance, as well as lack of expertise and vision 
of the donors when connecting recovery and prevention. A puzzling character-
istic of the emphasis on water and forestry for prevention is that this survey did 
not find any technical documents justifying the investment in these sectors as 
effective measures to deal with disasters in Honduras, except for the technical 
study conducted by JICA in Tegucigalpa. Not all floods and landslides can be 
prevented by river basin management and planting trees. This dimension, con-
cerning the impact of the investments, requires much greater attention but was 
beyond the scope of this research.
Beyond the continuum
Before closing, it is important to mention some additional phenomena that were 
deeply connected to the disaster, but that do not fit into our proposed model of 
the crisis management continuum—overlapping phases of relief, recovery and 
prevention. These are the cancellation of Honduran foreign debt and a steep rise 
in migration to the uS. The two show how the continuum is itself part of a wider 
range of processes under way in each society that do not evolve in isolation but 
heavily influence each other.
Perhaps the most important of these phenomena at the political level was how 
the Honduran government used the disaster as a means for inclusion in the Heav-
ily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. The issue of foreign debt mora-
toria and possible debt cancellation was central to the aftermath of Mitch, as it 
was clear in the first joint declaration in 1998. The government of Honduras 
had been negotiating with the uS, the Banks and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) since 1991 but in 1998, before the disaster, its debt was declared 
sustainable, and thus it was ineligible for debt relief under the HIPC (uNDP 
1998, 71–73).
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Mitch reversed this situation, not only because of the foreseeable worsening of 
the fiscal situation but also because the successful donor-coordination strategy, 
which included the IMF, gave impetus to calls for renewed negotiations. In July 
2000 the World Bank and the IMF decided that Honduras could be included 
in the HIPC and so, less than two years after the catastrophe, preparations to 
realize the benefits of the program had already started. Proof of the relevance of 
this process for donors can be seen, for instance, in the reports of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan about assistance to Honduras (MOFA 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002), which paid much greater attention to debt relief and its monitoring, with 
only passing mention of the reconstruction efforts.
A major requirement for this was the preparation of the country’s PRSP 
(Gobierno de la República de Honduras 2001), which replaced the recovery plan 
in 2001. The PRSP merged the Stockholm principles with IMF requirements, 
thus diluting the focus on prevention, as discussed in the previous section. The 
formulation required a large-scale consultation process between civil society, the 
government and the then G-12 donor coordination group. Since the PRSP was to 
be adopted at the end of the Flores presidency, donors understood from the outset 
that handing off the plan to the next government would not be easy and tried to 
involve all the presidential candidates in the process. Nonetheless, the new pres-
idency did not deliver as expected, a point which is reflected in the statements of 
the donor coordination group (Yanguas 2013) and a report of the World Bank 
experience after Mitch (Telford et al. 2004). Regardless, the new government 
focused on culminating the HIPC process, which finally happened in 2005.
In relation to the prevention phase, it is important to note how the PRSP 
displaced crisis management from the agenda. While it is true that the compo-
nents of prevention from the reconstruction plan were maintained, they were 
combined with other elements of the ‘transformation’ agenda into a single item 
titled ‘Guaranteeing the Strategy’s Sustainability.’ The budget allocation was 
8.5 percent, similar to the previous one. While the total budget of the PRSP was 
around 80 percent of the recovery commitment, it was now distributed among 
many more interventions, including transparency, democratization, rule of law 
and public security (Gobierno de la República de Honduras 2004). Furthermore, 
the experience shows how the recovery agenda gradually became a development 
plan—already inserted from the start as poverty reduction—while sectors linked 
to DRR were displaced and combined with other agendas, diluting its impor-
tance both in visibility and in monetary terms.
Second, another phenomenon that became significant in the long run was the 
petition for amnesty for illegal migrants, mainly in the uS—which was also in-
cluded in the very first declaration of the Central American governments. The 
uS has a legal provision to offer temporary protected status (TPS) or relief from 
removal for foreign nationals coming from places suffering from humanitarian 
crises (Seghetti, ester and Wasem 2015). On December 30, 1998, undocumented 
Hondurans and Nicaraguans were granted TPS, a status that has been extended 
since then until January 2018.11 In fact, Hurricane Mitch is seen as a watershed 
in the migration of Hondurans to the uS. The expatriate community has kept 
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growing to the point of becoming close to 10 percent of the population and, con-
sequently, remittances have become one of the largest sources of income, total-
ing 20 percent of GDP by 2007 (Inter-American Development Bank 2008). The 
amount of remittances is three times larger than foreign direct investment, and 
over five times international cooperation funds received in 2008, as reported by 
the OeCD. This money is expected to play a crucial role in self-help and recov-
ery after disasters, considerably greater than international cooperation, yet it has 
received limited attention until recently.
Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to examine the prevention phase of crisis manage-
ment after Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and its overlaps and connections with 
relief and recovery in order to understand the challenges underlying the contin-
uum. The review showed that the core of the prevention phase consisted of crystal-
izing and making operational the country’s DRM system—a particularly intricate 
challenge (Ishiwatari 2015). This challenge included two overlapping issues, one 
related to the evolution of COPeCO, the existing institution mostly in charge of 
response to disasters, and the other to intertwining the different strands of work 
relevant to DRM—mainly, water resources, forestry, and infrastructure—in a 
way that resulted in wider scale ownership of the government.
Given the existing capabilities, advances in preparedness proved successful in 
the long run, but wider structural change was not possible for the first ten years 
after the disaster, although it is an ongoing process. Since there was no shared 
vision about the role of COPeCO after Mitch, it took eight years to agree on 
how to reconcile existing capabilities for response with the all-embracing coor-
dination needs of the DRM system.12 COPeCO, as the visible coordinator of all 
DRM activities, has helped to push forward the agenda, but one cost of this is 
that no line ministries have developed ownership of it, losing the opportunity to 
promote the mindset change required for DRM at other levels. Therefore, during 
the period investigated, most of the sectoral work seems to have moved from an 
emergency mode during recovery to business as usual, while donors pour re-
sources into sectors and COPeCO without concrete links to building the DRM 
system. Only Japanese support seems to have had a more structural impact on 
the consolidation of the DRM system by linking expertise to long-term vision, 
and undertaking projects more than a decade after being proposed.
I also showed that the prevention phase has roots in relief and recovery activ-
ities. The latter is particularly important as the seeds of prevention have been 
planted as part of reconstruction plans, while the task of making the recov-
ery more resilient still constitutes a huge challenge. In this sense, the trade-off 
 between quality and speed resulted in an accelerated reconstruction process that 
is likely to be wasted in subsequent disasters. This was particularly salient locally 
and for uS support, which was under political pressure to finish recovery activ-
ities quickly, despite awareness of scarce absorption capacity and unaccounted- 
for maintenance needs. Yet the Japanese and eu experiences show that it was 
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possible to support sectors related to prevention despite official declarations of 
phase change. Again, longer term planning for recovery—which, in the case of 
the eu, happened by accident—seems to explain different performances by do-
nors. For local actors, however, the (political) need to return to normality seemed 
inescapable.
The difference between eu and Japan suggests that lack of expertise in DRM 
was also a limiting factor, which was not exclusive to donors but to all the ac-
tors, including implementing partners. These entered the scene during the relief 
phase and then attempted activities for recovery and even prevention, learning 
from their experiences and, thus, making mistakes in the process.13 Particularly 
problematic is how promoting civil society participation in planning for recov-
ery contributed to displacing prevention from the agenda, since other ‘trans-
formation’ agendas also diluted prevention as a focus for action. If the civil 
society view reflects what the general public thinks, then the great potential of 
remittances for relief and recovery will not have an impact in promoting pre-
vention. It is worth stressing that at least the response capabilities in Honduras 
have been indeed strengthened and the loss of lives after subsequent disasters 
has been reduced, so moving to structural measures seems to be where the chal-
lenge remains.
Therefore, perhaps the most striking finding of the research is how prevention 
plays a minor role in the initial plans made during the emergency for the recov-
ery, and how easily it gets displaced from the agenda afterwards. The opportu-
nity to join the HIPC program was a perverse incentive against mainstreaming 
prevention. This shows that from the outset, the possibility of a robust link be-
tween disaster relief, recovery and prevention was greatly constrained. Retaining 
the momentum for prevention was mostly beyond COPeCO and donor capa-
bilities, but at least the latter were in the position of changing incentives. Actors 
involved in the promotion of BBB need to learn this lesson, and try to resist the 
temptation of attempting broader social transformations, when mainstreaming 
DRM is difficult enough.
Notes
 1 By that time, Spain had also started major projects in relation to the Millennium 
Development Goals. Clarification on this point was kindly obtained from Maria Bella 
and Fernando Bonilla of Spain’s Cooperation Office in Tegucigalpa.
 2 Despite a notable initial push and remaining a top donor, there is scarce information 
about Japan’s support after Mitch. An external effort in 2001 to gather information 
about JICA activities had already led to difficulties in accessing it (Challenge One 
Associates 2001). Aid provided from the embassy is particularly difficult to trace: the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) prepares yearly data books on Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) but these contain only very basic information. Besides this, 
reports of individual projects by JICA are available online—mostly in Japanese. The 
first available document about Mitch as a whole is a pamphlet for the tenth anniver-
sary (MOFA and JICA undated). This pamphlet, for instance, reports that contri-
butions were made through multilateral agencies of close to uS$30 million, which 
cannot be traced. The only other publication after this pamphlet is a review by JICA 
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and IDCJ (2016). Therefore, information about the interaction between the Hondu-
ran government plans and Japanese ODA is very limited.
 3 This was one of the first operations of the newly created Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs. The first uN House (i.e., a single building where all local 
uN agencies share offices) in the world was constructed in Tegucigalpa following the 
emergency.
 4 The FHIS is a national agency that helped in implementing reconstruction process.
 5 These were: the environmental Protection Agency, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, the Federal emergency Management Agency, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, the uS Department of Agriculture, the uS Geo-
logical Survey, the Department of Housing and urban Development, the Department 
of Transportation, the uS Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics 
and Law enforcement Affairs, the export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation and the Peace Corps.
 6 Telford et al. (2004) criticize this justification for using foreign contractors, affirming 
that competent local companies existed in Honduras. An interviewee from the office 
in charge of infrastructure suggested that, depending on the technologies used, foreign 
support for infrastructure construction was necessary, yet agreed with Telford et al.
 7 See http://copeco.gob.hn/que-es-copeco. According to an interviewee, before this, 
COPeCO was still under military management, although in 1990 it was separated 
from the armed forces.
 8 The share of the national budget for DRM has reportedly increased in recent years, 
seemingly connected to greater participation from the Ministry of Finance.
 9 CAMI was a uS$11 million program that provided trainings between 2001 and 2004 
to a wide spectrum of stakeholders, particularly at the community level (uSAID Of-
fice of Inspector General 2005). Funds came from the Mitch initiative. The project 
inspired subsequent work on risk management by OFDA.
 10 Fruhling (2002) found the same disconnect with prevention in Swedish cooperation 
projects.
 11 This is only a small fraction of all Hondurans in the uS (Suárez and Sánchez 2012), 
but it is likely to have played a role as a pull factor for subsequent migrants.
 12 A different question—beyond this study—would concern whether the decision to put 
everything under COPeCO’s roof was the best solution.
 13 One interviewee working on a NGO for the community DRR told me: ‘if you are not 
in the disaster area in the three first months, you would not get the contracts.’
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Introduction
Disasters are unfortunate events but provide opportunities to create a resilient and 
sustainable society. A more disaster-resilient society can be created by linking re-
lief, recovery, and long-term development. Recovery efforts address the needs of 
individuals affected by disasters, while development efforts aim to support each 
society’s autonomous path to self-improvement (Commission of the  european 
Communities 2001). Recovery efforts can contribute to the development of better 
socio-economic conditions in disaster-affected areas and strengthen disaster risk 
reduction (DRR). The added value of these efforts can be maximized by linking 
recovery and development.
The purpose of this study is to identify ways through which recovery and 
long-term development have been successfully linked as part of the continuum 
of crisis management after major recent disasters in Indonesia. The study exam-
ines (i) how disasters provided opportunities for the country to develop disaster- 
response mechanisms that help to build a resilient society, (ii) how integrating 
recovery activities into long-term development could contribute to building a 
more resilient society, and (iii) how donors could support such efforts in the wake 
of the Indian Ocean tsunami (IOT) in 2004 and Java earthquake in 2006. In 
terms of the continuum, gaps between relief and rehabilitation were generally 
avoided following IOT (Christoplos 2006, 80). Relief efforts following the Java 
earthquake were also rapidly completed and regarded as a success. The gap 
between relief and rehabilitation that commonly appears in disaster responses 
was avoided by donors and the Indonesian Government due to the provision 
of large-scale, flexible, and un-earmarked funding in the wake of IOT and 
Java  earthquake. Therefore, this study focuses on recovery, DRR and develop-
ment and, based on the findings from this, recommends practical approaches 
to address the challenge of the continuum by linking recovery and long-term 
development.
Methods for this study involved a review of project documents of donors, 
research papers, and studies. This was followed by semi-structured interviews 
with 20 experts and researchers from government and non-government organ-
izations, local governments, international organizations, and bilateral agencies 
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in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Aceh, Indonesia. Topics covered in the interviews 
included recovery activities and associated issues. Semi-structured interview sur-
veys and group discussions were also conducted with the affected people in three 
relocation sites and five communities in Yogyakarta and Aceh. All interviews 
were conducted in December 2015.
The following section describes the damage and impact of the two disasters. 
In subsequent sections I outline assistance from major donors, and examine the 
links between relief, rehabilitation and development, and its connection to do-




An earthquake of magnitude 9.0 occurred in the Indian Ocean off the coast 
of Sumatra Island on December 26, 2004, creating a massive tsunami. An es-
timated 230,000 people died in twelve countries across the Indian Ocean, and 
over 1.5 million people were displaced. In Indonesia, the devastation left some 
170,000 people dead or missing and 500,000 people displaced. The tsunami 
destroyed or severely damaged some 140,000 houses and as many as 750,000 
 people lost their livelihoods (BRR 2009).
Aceh was the worst affected province in the country. The regional economy 
relied on oil and natural gas, which accounted for some 40 percent of the re-
gional gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank 2006). Aceh’s GDP in 2003 
accounted for some 2 percent of the GDP of the country. Damage and losses 
caused by the tsunami were estimated at uS$4.5 billion, which amounts to al-
most the same as Aceh’s GDP. Housing was the largest sub-sector affected, with 
uS$1.4 billion damage and losses, accounting for some one-third of the total 
(Consultative Group on Indonesia 2005). The fisheries sector was also badly af-
fected, with an estimated 15–20 percent of fishermen dying and many of the 
facilities, boats, and fishing gear destroyed. The sector accounted for 6.5 percent 
of Aceh’s GDP in 2004 and provided employment to 100,000 people.
Before the tsunami, Aceh was also suffering from the effects of a 30-year con-
flict, which contributed to regional economic fragility. During the conflict, some 
10,000 people were killed, with infrastructure and basic services, such as health 
and education, destroyed. It is estimated that 35,000 people—predominantly 
women, children, and the aged—were displaced by the conflict when the tsu-
nami struck.
Vulnerable groups suffered most from the tsunami. Women were between 
1.2 and 2.1 times as likely to die as men in some regions. This is because men 
are physically stronger and are more likely to have learned to swim, and are 
therefore more likely to be able to escape from a tsunami. Furthermore, many 
women lost their lives trying to save their children and elderly relatives (Oxfam 
2014, 9). Death rates were higher for those under 15 and those over 50 (Cosgrave 
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2007, 6). Damage and loss assessments are considered to have been biased, since 
male-dominated teams conducted the surveys and relied on information from 
primarily male-headed households.
Java earthquake
The earthquake killed over 5,700 people in the central region of Java Island on 
May 27, 2006. Damage and losses were estimated at uS$3.1 billion (Consultative 
Group on Indonesia 2006). The affected area was a densely populated mix of 
urban and rural communities. Some 154,000 houses were completely destroyed 
and 260,000 suffered some damage. With nearly 1.2 million people losing their 
homes—a greater number than in the IOT—damage to private houses made up 
almost half of the total destruction and losses at uS$1.6 billion.
The 2006 earthquake also had an impact on local industry in Yogyakarta. 
Some 650,000 workers were affected by the earthquake. Many of them worked 
in ceramics, furniture, textiles, weaving, silver and leather manufacturing, 
as well as food processing, at small and medium enterprises and home-based 
 industries—some 30,000 enterprises were directly affected.
Impacts on development
While these two disasters had immediate socio-economic impacts on develop-
ment in Aceh and Yogyakarta, in the middle term, both areas managed to avoid 
impoverishment and unemployment. The dashboard on major development indi-
cators of the impacts of disasters in Figure 9.1 provides a clear indication of this.
Regional GDP was negative in Aceh in the year following the tsunami. As 
Figure 9.1a shows, growth rates of regional GDP were negative in five out of the 
seven years until 2010 and were over 3 percent lower than the National GDP. 
This is mainly because oil and gas production decreased. The growth rates of 
regional GDP excluding oil and gas were 7.7 in 2006 and 7.4 in 2007, higher 
than the national rates (World Bank 2008). The growth rate of Yogyakarta 
slightly decreased in the year of the disaster but recovered as rehabilitation works 
progressed.
unemployment rates in Aceh jumped to 30 percent just after the tsunami 
 (Oxfam 2005b, 4) and hovered at over 10 percent in 2005. Figure 9.1b shows that 
the rate declined from 2006 as recovery work accelerated. The unemployment 
rate of Yogyakarta shows a similar trend to Aceh.
Poverty rates in Aceh and Yogyakarta were stable following the disasters but 
soon returned to a decreasing trend. Some 1.2 million people—accounting for 
28.5 percent of the population—were living below the poverty line in 2004 in 
Aceh. Following the tsunami, an additional 325,000 people faced risks of fall-
ing below the poverty line, but most of them were able to rise out of poverty 
quickly (World Bank 2006). The rates in two provinces have been higher than 
the national poverty rates. Figure 9.1c shows how the gap between the Aceh and 





Figure 9.1  Trends and key indicators in Aceh and Yogyokarta (percent): (a) growth rate of re-
gional GDP; (b) unemployment rate; (c) poverty rate; (d) population growth rate.
Source: BPS, Statistics Indonesia.
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The growth rates of population in Aceh and Yogyakarta were negative in the 
year following the disasters but became positive in the subsequent years (Figure 9.1d). 
The population in Yogyakarta decreased in 2010 because of another disaster, the 
eruptions of Mount Merapi.
Overall, the data suggest that development was not seriously impacted by the 
disaster. While direct causality cannot be proved, the rest of this paper will ex-
plore how recovery contributed to this outcome.
Donor support
This section provides an overview of assistance by major donors by reviewing 
their activities following IOT and Java earthquake. This chapter focuses on the 
united States, Australia, Japan, and Germany, all of which actively tried to link 
recovery and development. Multi-donor funds were also included because of the 
large-scale of their assistance.
IOT is regarded as a rare case of a well-funded humanitarian emergency. 
The international community provided some uS$13.5 billion, with roughly 
40 percent from private individuals and organizations (Telford, Cosgrave and 
Houghton 2006, 80). In Indonesia alone, the government and international 
donors provided some uS$7 billion. This stands in clear contrast with the in-
ternational funding record of consistently failing to meet one-third of the hu-
manitarian needs outlined in uN-coordinated appeals over the past decade in 
the world (Development Initiatives 2014).
United States of America
The uS government provided over uS$400 million to Indonesia. The united 
States Agency for International Development (uSAID) spent uS$32 million as-
sisting over 580,000 people through the delivery of emergency food, hygiene 
kits, medical aid, and psychosocial assistance (Government Audit Office 2006). 
uSAID also supported programs that provided cash-for-work to clean up debris 
and damaged infrastructure (uSAID 2014).
The uS spent a total of uS$349 million on rehabilitation programs cov-
ering the following four areas: (i) Rebuilding shelter and key infrastructure 
(uS$245 million), including the Aceh road project, which extended about 
243 kilometers from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh, and construction of over 840 
houses (uSAID 2008); (ii) restoring livelihoods and enhancing employment 
opportunities; (iii) providing basic services and protecting the vulnerable: skills 
training and other educational opportunities with an emphasis on programs 
for women and youth; and (iv) strengthening capacity and governance: sup-
porting capacity building of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency 
of Aceh-Nias (BRR) and enhancing the agency’s service delivery. BRR was 
established in April 2005 as a specialized agency for coordinating recovery 
efforts.
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Australia
After IOT, Australia initially provided humanitarian relief of Au$42 million 
(uS$32 million), covering food, health, medical and emergency relief coordina-
tion, logistics support, water, health, education and child protection, and shelter 
(AusAid 2005).
Australia subsequently established the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for 
Reconstruction and Development with an Au$1 billion (uS$760 million), five-
year assistance package to Indonesia in 2005 to support reconstruction in and 
beyond the tsunami-affected areas. This remains the single largest aid contribu-
tion ever made by Australia. The package consisted of Au$500 million in grants 
(uS$380 million) and Au$500 million (uS$380 million) in concessional loans 
for infrastructure development. The funds were allocated in three areas: (i) emer-
gency preparedness and response, (ii) promoting broad-based economic growth, 
and (iii) rehabilitation (Australian National Audit Office 2006, 33).
After the Java earthquake stroke, the country supported recovery with an IDR215 
billion (uS$16.1 million) program, the largest bilateral donor activity. Australia also 
made an immediate contribution of IDR54 billion (uS$4.1  million) for emergency 
relief. The Australian Government initiated a Yogyakarta Central Java Community 
Assistance Program with Au$30 million (uS$23 million) to assist affected families 
and communities to return as quickly as possible to normality, covering household 
life, income producing activities, community schooling, and health services.
Japan
Japanese bilateral grant aids mainly supported rehabilitating facilities after 
the IOT. The post-evaluation report (Foundation for Advanced Studies on 
 International Development 2010) assessed fifteen grant aid projects, generally 
claiming high performance. The Japanese Government provided grant aids of 
JPY14.6  billion (uS$128 million) in January 2005. The projects were aimed at 
rehabilitating the water supply, roads, health posts, schools, orphanages, voca-
tional centers, drainage, and embankments. These works were completed more 
quickly than projects supported by other donors.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA), as a technical assistance 
agency, supported a wide range of rehabilitation projects, such as infrastructure 
reconstruction, livelihood restoration, community empowerment, and strength-
ening DRR capacity. JICA implemented 12 community-based projects to restore 
the daily lives of the affected people. Project activities were selected from the fol-
lowing areas according to community needs: (i) livelihood support: providing 
micro- financing, vocational training, and equipment; (ii) post-trauma syndrome 
disease support; (iii) water supply and sanitation, public health, and education; and 
(iv) community capacity building (Ishiwatari 2010).
In the case of the Java earthquake, the Japanese government provided emer-
gency assistance of uS$5 million: uS$4 million for tents, blankets, and plastic 
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sheets, uS$1 million for medical support and water and sanitation through in-
ternational organizations. The government allocated uS$7.7 million to support 
the rehabilitation of 10 schools and five health posts. JICA provided technical 
assistance to ensure the quality of reconstructed houses. The program covered 
formulation of technical standards, establishing an approval process for recon-
struction of houses, and capacity development. The agency also supported eight 
community-based programs for medical support, trauma care, education, water 
and sanitation, and livelihood rehabilitation through local NGOs.
Germany
The German government had a clear strategy to link humanitarian aid and de-
velopment cooperation in Aceh. Their ‘Development-Oriented emergency and 
Transition Aid’ strategy aimed to minimize the effects of the crises on people 
living in affected regions and to bridge the time gap between humanitarian aid 
and the implementation of development projects.
German Technical Cooperation (GTz), currently German Agency for Inter-
national Cooperation (GIz), started five programs in June 2005, six months after 
the tsunami: (1) health services, (2) vocational education, (3) civil and population 
registration, (4) economic recovery, and (5) governance. Technical cooperation 
programs of euR55 million (uS$59 million) aimed at enabling the affected peo-
ple to regain the base of their livelihood, and to attain self-reliance in a secure 
and conductive environment.
KfW Development Bank provided euR120 million (uS$129 million) to pro-
mote the reconstruction of the devastated areas following the tsunami. It covered 
rehabilitation of (i) houses and roads, (ii) provincial hospitals, and (iii) vocational 
training centers and secondary schools.
Multi-donor funds
The Government of Indonesia established the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and 
Nias (MDF) in April 2005 to coordinate donor support for the reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of affected areas. The fund aimed at filling gaps in recon-
struction needs that other donors did not cover. MDF pooled uS$655 million in 
contributions from 15 donors, including the european union (eu). MDF con-
tributed nearly ten percent of the total recovery funds in Aceh. This included 
23 projects in six outcome areas: (i) recovery of communities, (ii) reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of large infrastructure and transport, (iii) strengthening gov-
ernance and capacity building, (iv) sustaining environments, (v) enhancing the 
recovery process, and (vi) economic development and livelihoods.
MDF covered crosscutting elements, such as gender inclusiveness, environ-
mental management, and DRR. MDF achieved broad-scale capacity building 
of (i) communities in planning and decision-making, (ii) livelihood activities, 
(iii) local governments, (iv) civil society, (v) private sector, and (vi) women’s groups 
(european union 2014). MDF encouraged women to work in non-traditional 
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wage-based jobs in three projects related to waste management, community in-
frastructure, and roads. The eu, BRR, and the Governor of Aceh served as co-
chairs of the MDF, with the World Bank also taking on the role of trustee.
Later, the Java Reconstruction Fund ( JRF) was established in October 2006 
to respond to the earthquake and the tsunami in West Java province in July. 
Seven donors supported JRF with contributions totaling uS$94.1 million. The 
 Ministry of National Development Planning, the eu, and the World Bank jointly 
chaired the Steering Committee; and the World Bank served as Trustee of the 
fund. The closing date of the JRF was extended from December 2010 to Decem-
ber 2012 to assist with the reconstruction of communities impacted by the erup-
tions of Mount Merapi in 2011 ( Java Reconstruction Fund 2012). Some uS$77.4 
million or 82 percent of funds was spent on restoring housing and community 
infrastructure, while uS$17.2 million or 18 percent of the funds was used for 
recovery of livelihoods.
Linking relief and rehabilitation with 
long-term development
Drawing from this background of international contributions, this section reviews 
gaps in strategy, coordination and financing of recovery, and how recovery ef-
forts were linked with long-term development, highlighting some of the most im-
portant challenges. Disaster-response mechanisms had advanced in the period 
between the IOT and the Java earthquake. In the wake of the Java earthquake, 
seismic- resilient houses were rapidly reconstructed within two years by taking a 
community- driven approach developed in Aceh. These recovery efforts and the 
lessons learned from the disasters themselves, contributed to long-term develop-
ment by strengthening DRR. The direct support to recovery efforts and generosity 
of donors contributed to the success in linking recovery with long-term develop-
ment by combining structural rehabilitation and capacity building. For this, strat-
egies for housing, livelihoods and DRR were the most important, as described in 
the next subsection. However, weaknesses were apparent in these sectors, but also 
in overall strategies and coordination to realize the continuum, which suggest 
some lessons need to be learned. Finally, I include additional comments on per-
manent changes that increased resilience as a result of the development.
Transition from recovery to development: resilient 
recovery as a strategy
Reconstructing houses
THe IOT ReLOCATION PROGRAM
The government planned to restrict housing construction in at-risk areas and 
relocate houses to safe higher ground. One month after the disaster, in  January 
2005, the government formulated a reconstruction plan, or ‘Blueprint,’ and issued 
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the ‘President Act of a Rehabilitation Master Plan’ (Srivastava and Shaw 2014). 
This plan restricted housing construction in areas within 2 km of the shoreline. 
 However, the government was unable to promote relocation programs as origi-
nally planned. By this time, donors had already started formulating reconstruc-
tion plans through participatory and bottom-up methods at the community level, 
and many participants wanted to be allowed to remain in their pre-tsunami vil-
lages. Fishermen preferred to reconstruct their houses on the original sites, with 
easy access to the ocean, and women wanted to resume their former livelihood 
activities, such as drying and salting fish and selling the produce at the fish mar-
kets. Thus many NGOs and local communities reacted negatively to the govern-
ment’s plan for a buffer zone policy, generating tensions (Birkmann et al. 2010; 
Nazara and Resosudarmo 2007, 12). It was therefore difficult to enforce a buffer 
zone policy when regulating construction.
Relocation programs were implemented at selected sites, posing various prob-
lems. It was difficult to secure safe higher sites for relocation. Constructing new 
infrastructure, such as the water supply, electricity, drainage, and roads, at the 
relocation sites required a lengthy period and enormous costs. Social networks in 
communities were disrupted at the relocation sites (Hiwaki and Matsuyuki 2013; 
Huda et al. 2014). Moreover, this approach generated new vulnerabilities related 
to job security. People who lost their former livelihoods were unable to easily find 
new livelihood options.
From a longer-term perspective, people at the relocation sites continue to ex-
perience difficulties in terms of transportation, livelihoods, education, health, 
and others. Some newly constructed houses have remained empty, while others 
were sold to people who were unaffected by the disaster (Fan 2014; Featherstone 
2014, 6; Sakamoto and Kawata 2008). While the government initially arranged 
basic public services at the relocation sites, some services—such as the water sup-
ply and a nursery school—suspended operation. Such basic public services are 
necessary for improving the quality of life for the affected people
Aceh city has promoted resilient development instead of regulating it. Devel-
opment in coastal areas had resulted in enormous damage and losses in the tsu-
nami. Therefore, the governments have tried to move development centers to 
safer inland areas. Public facilities, such as hospitals, bus terminals, and markets 
were rebuilt inland and new roads were constructed to connect these areas with 
the city center. The facilities that have been constructed are attracting private 
development, such as shopping buildings and residential areas.
IOT HOuSING ReCONSTRuCTION
Housing reconstruction in Aceh was slower than other sectors. The lack of pro-
gress on housing and poor accountability led to public dissatisfaction, with many 
of those affected unable to access information on reconstruction programs.
The affected people and government organizations faced various crucial is-
sues, such as inflation in the price of construction materials, shortage of labor and 
materials, unclear land titles, and lack of established approaches for community 
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involvement. The local inflation rate reached 41 percent in December 2005, 
compared with 17 percent nationwide. Materials and resources for the recon-
struction work were brought from outside Aceh, since the conflict made it dif-
ficult to establish production bases. Besides this, some projects were completed 
without basic infrastructure, such as water and drainage (Asian Development 
Bank 2010, 14–15). The quality of materials and workmanship for some recon-
structed houses was below average (Boen 2008).
Government policy was changing to respond to the needs of the affected  people. 
Reconstruction of Aceh Land and Administration System program started in 
May 2005, six months after the tsunami. This program—led by communities— 
aimed at recording land titles and boundaries. BRR announced a regulation in 
June 2006 that landowners would be able to obtain permanent houses with floor 
areas of minimum 36m2. BRR revised this regulation latter so that tenants and 
non-landowners could also receive houses and land.
Formulating recovery plans is crucial for prompt recovery. There was a big dif-
ference in recovery speeds depending on the city—with differences of up to two 
and a half years. For example, Simeulue Prefecture completed rehabilitation of 
all houses within 49.8 months, the fastest among the affected areas. Banda Aceh 
City and Aceh Besar Prefecture took 75.3 months and 81 months, respectively, to 
complete rehabilitation programs. Where rebuilding houses at the original places 
was allowed and recovery plans were formulated at the initial stages, rehabilita-
tion progressed more quickly than other areas. The changes to the buffer zone 
policies in Aceh were a major cause of the delays (Sugiyasu and Murao 2012).
A wide range of international organizations, donors, and NGOs were in-
volved in reconstructing houses, leading to what was described as ‘competition 
among donors’ (Silva and Batchelor 2010). The donors were under pressure to 
spend money quickly and did not have sufficient time to produce deeper analysis 
 (Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton 2006). Some humanitarian agencies lacked the 
know-how and expertise to manage mass building programs (Oxfam 2005a, 11).
The donors took two approaches: a ‘community-driven’ approach, and a 
donor- driven, ‘constructed by contractors,’ approach. under the community- 
driven approach, communities took the initiative by building consensus on the 
layout of the village and houses and supervising construction work and funding. 
In the donor-driven approach, aid organizations appointed construction compa-
nies to construct houses with limited community involvement.
The community-driven approach provided better living environments and 
higher levels of satisfaction to the affected people (Affan et al. 2015; Silva 2010). 
This approach was more cost-effective than construction by private companies 
or the donor-driven approach. The community-driven approach was pioneered 
under the Rekompak project in Aceh and was able to achieve transparent and 
cost-effective results. Community infrastructure, such as village roads, bridges, 
irrigation, drainage, school, and town halls, was also rehabilitated. The ap-
proach contributed to the local economic recovery as well, since workers were 
employed and materials were procured locally (Aysan et al. 2007). under MDF 
programs, facilitators supported the communities in conducting these processes 
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and ensuring the quality of the work. Nearly 20,000 houses were reconstructed 
or rehabilitated up until 2011 under the MDF.
The rehabilitation programs fostered community participation by involving 
community members in decision-making and planning processes. However, lo-
cal participation in these processes is currently declining at the village level with 
women, in particular, increasingly excluded from participation (Thorburn and 
Rochele 2014, 47).
HOuSING IN JAVA
The community-driven approach, developed in Aceh, was adapted for use in 
 Yogyakarta. Over 280,000 houses, which were more resilient to earthquakes 
than before, were reconstructed within two years.
Limited damage to infrastructure, strong capacities of local governments, and 
high levels of participation among skilled construction laborers contributed to 
the quick recovery. Some ten families organized a community group to receive 
funding from the government and to manage reconstruction work. The commu-
nity groups conducted these processes by using community spirit, gotong royong, 
to support each other. The government provided cash subsidies to the affected 
people for 75 percent of the total cost of the reconstructed houses, and JRF and 
World Bank programs provided essential materials to the value of 11 percent of 
the reconstructed houses.
under JRF some 200,000 houses, 7,300 transitional shelters, and 15,400 seismic- 
resistant core houses were completed by March 2008 through the community- 
driven approach. A total of 310 villages developed community settlement plans 
incorporating DRR and used them to restore community infrastructure such as the 
water supply, roads, bridges, and retaining walls. The quality of the housing was 
good, with 96 percent of the houses meeting anti-seismic standards.
A simple technical standard and monitoring mechanism functioned to 
ensure the quality of reconstructed housing. The government developed the 
standard that covers ‘key requirements,’ such as methods of connecting iron 
bars and the ratio for the water-cement ratio in concrete (Ranghieri and Ishi-
watari 2014). JICA supported government agencies in developing these key 
requirements and in conducting training for carpenters and workers, with uni-
versities and government organizations on the ground. JICA also supported 
local governments in developing their capacity to monitor the construction 
process. The universities issued certificates to the trainees. Housing facilita-
tors, which the government employed mainly from local universities, were ex-
pected to monitor and supervise the quality of construction work. However, in 
reality, housing quality varied based on experiences and skills of the facilitators 
(Narafu et al. 2008).
The mechanism for quality control in construction of ordinary houses did not 
continue after the recovery stage. The mechanisms utilized for building resil-
ient houses functioned only for reconstruction projects and was not institution-
alized. Therefore, ordinary people can currently construct their houses without 
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undergoing the approval process that was applied during the reconstruction pe-
riod. The level of training activities for carpenters is also declining. The uni-
versity ceased conducting regular training sessions following the completion of 
recovery efforts.
Rehabilitating livelihoods
After the IOT, various programs for restoring livelihoods were implemented to 
support those who were affected, although uneven attention was given to this 
task within and between sectors. While in the fishery sector fishermen were able 
to recover lost assets, such as fishing boats, nets, and gear, limited support was 
provided for resuming aquaculture activities of rehabilitating fish and shrimp 
ponds (Featherstone 2014, 9). Furthermore, support to the wives of fishermen was 
delayed. Interventions designed to assist with the rebuilding of an industry or the 
private sector—crucial in creating job opportunities—received less support than 
other sectors (Fan 2014).
Follow-up support was essential in ensuring the sustainability of livelihood 
programs. Successful livelihood programs covered support for marketing of 
handicrafts, extension services for livestock, and business support for micro-, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises. While many women’s groups received 
handicraft training, most of them could not explore market opportunities. A sig-
nificant proportion of livelihood assistance was used for household consumption 
(Thorburn 2009).
Recovery work provided some job opportunities for affected people; however, 
many Acehnese people were unable to utilize these opportunities fully because of 
their low job-skills. Most of the skilled and semiskilled workers came from North 
Sumatra and other places in Indonesia (BRR 2009, 105).
The German Government took an integrated approach that lay between 
structural rehabilitation and capacity building. GTz supported the process 
by creating curricula and training teachers at vocational training centers, and 
KfW supported reconstruction of the buildings for the training centers  (Federal 
 Ministry for economic Cooperation and Development 2005, 15). The train-
ing courses also helped to reintegrate former combatants from the local armed 
groups and their family members, women, and disadvantaged youths into the 
society. GTz trained 1,100 ex-combatants for a civilian career.
uSAID took a similar approach to the German organizations by supporting 
the creation of the Aceh Polytechnic under a public-private partnership with 
the Chevron Corporation, Banda Aceh City, and the education ministry. The 
polytechnic was established to provide vocational training in applied technology, 
such as information technology, electronics telecommunication, and business 
accountancy. The polytechnic hosts 240 students per year, running three-year 
programs in four study streams (Boardman, Schorn and Dwatmadji 2012). The 
program provided assistance with curriculum development, staff recruitment 
and training, procurement of laboratories, workshops, classroom equipment and 
furniture, and economic feasibility.
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In the case of the Java earthquake, livelihood programs included capacity- 
building activities in addition to replacing assets and equipment. experiences in 
Aceh provided a lesson that simply replacing assets and equipment is insufficient 
to secure the sustainability of restored livelihoods.
The JRF livelihood programs in Java were linked with long-term develop-
ment. The programs focused on replacing assets, enhancing business skills, and 
improving access to finance, all of which were effective in improving beneficiar-
ies’ capacities. This program supported more than 15,000 micro-, small-, and 
medium-sized enterprises in total. More than 87 percent of micro and small en-
terprises succeeded in reaching their pre-earthquake operating capacities, sales, 
and profits. JRF programs targeted women and nearly 50 percent of the pro-
grams were managed by women’s groups. Moreover, the programs contributed 
to long-term development by promoting capacity building for microfinance in-
stitutions to ensure sustainability of outcomes. The program created a revolving 
loan fund under the government-owned financial institution that has continued 
circulating funds to promote economic recovery for more than ten years.
Major support started in the two years following the earthquake, when about 
half of the affected entrepreneurs reached the same level as pre-earthquake ca-
pacities ( Java Reconstruction Fund 2008). Since the government put a high pri-
ority on housing reconstruction, activities for livelihood support were delayed. 
Since resiliency to disasters varied according to the enterprise, careful measures 
were needed for rehabilitation. Resosudarmo, Sugiyanto and Kuncoro (2012) ar-
gue that (i) smaller enterprises are more resilient, (ii) an industrial cluster system 
provides necessary support, (iii) a higher quality of village infrastructure can sup-
port recovery, (iv) support should be provided as early as possible, and (v) donors 
should not give too much assurance of financial support.
Strengthening DRR
DRR was not properly integrated into rehabilitation programs at the early stages. 
In the two years following the tsunami, the Tsunami evaluation Coalition (TeC) 
recommended that donors should allocate more resources toward DRR (Telford, 
Cosgrave and Houghton 2006, 104). TeC was an ongoing learning effort and 
consisted of over 40 organizations: uN agencies, donors, NGOs, the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement, and research groups. The donors employed the 
recommendations issued by TeC for programs during recovery.
Government organizations gradually strengthened DRR through recovery. 
These government organizations promoted community-based activities, in-
corporating of public awareness raising and strengthening evacuation prepar-
edness. The government has constructed earthquake-resistant schools, and the 
Aceh city government started DRR education in schools and conducted regular 
drills (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 2014; Oxfam 2014). 
DRR has been integrated into curricula from elementary to high schools. This 
is regarded as a practical approach considering the scale of tsunamis and limited 
budget for investment. The Government constructed three evacuation buildings, 
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which are now also used during non-disaster periods as dual-use locations for the 
tsunami museum, the disaster research center of a university, and a polytechnic.
JICA supported a community-based recovery program covering structural 
measures and capacity development in ulee Lheue area, which is located along 
the ocean and was severely damaged by the tsunami. JICA constructed evacua-
tion centers where people in high-risk areas can escape from tsunamis. The local 
communities conduct evacuation drills and use the evacuation centers for var-
ious occasions including livelihood programs and community meetings during 
non-disaster periods. At the center, JICA is currently conducting an exchange 
program of practitioners and knowledge between Aceh and Higashimatsushima 
City, which was severely damaged by the Great east Japan earthquake and tsu-
nami in 2011.
The Tsunami Museum is playing a crucial role in DRR in Aceh. The mu-
seum opened in 2011 to (i) keep the memory of the disaster alive and raise public 
awareness regarding DRR, (ii) provide a recreation space for people, and (iii) 
provide evacuation places during times of disaster. The museum conducts exhibi-
tions on the tsunami disaster, recovery processes, and education on DRR. It has 
organized evacuation drills with local schools. The museum also contributes to 
local economic development, with some half a million people, including foreign 
tourists, visiting the museum annually.
Nonetheless, levels of DRR activities are declining following recovery. While 
various initiatives on DRR education have commenced, not all schools are pro-
viding DRR education. Some teachers still have limited knowledge and aware-
ness of DRR. In Aceh, wider roads were constructed in newly developed areas 
to allow evacuation routes and better protection from fires. However, recently 
narrow roads have been constructed in newly developed areas.
Similar educational efforts to mainstream DRR followed the earthquake on 
Java. Programs designed to build community capacity, which were initiated 
in Aceh, were implemented on a large scale in Java. The program started in 
the  Bantul Region—the area most severely affected by the Java earthquake— 
covering awareness-raising, DRR education in schools, and DRR planning. 
each village established a DRR forum consisting of community-based organi-
zations, Red Cross, civil society organizations, and volunteers to respond to dis-
asters. Moreover, the Gadjah Mada university started the Iza Kaeru Caravan 
program. This program covers disaster-management drills, which were devel-
oped based on lessons from the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in 1995, Japan.
Coordination for the transition
Coordination was a complicated task in Aceh, since a large number of organiza-
tions contributed in relief and rehabilitation. Some 300 NGOs were involved in 
the first two months of the response, while only 12 NGOs were engaged in Aceh 
before IOT (Bruset et al. 2009, 36). In the recovery phase, 463 organizations con-
ducted over 2000 projects. In particular, some 120 organizations implemented 
266 programs related to housing reconstruction (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008). 
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Local governments were expected to coordinate these activities but had limited 
capacity. They were already severely strained by the 30-year armed conflict and 
devastated by the loss of more than 4,000 lawmakers, civil servants, and village 
leaders. Some 20 percent of local government staff died as a result of the tsunami 
(Thorburn and Rochele 2014; Christoplos 2006, 39). The donors competed to 
secure resources, such as construction materials, local contractors, and transpor-
tation (Chang et al. 2011).
Immediately following the tsunami, the Ministry of National Development 
Planning coordinated various organizations and formulated a recovery plan. 
The government created a special ministry-level agency, BRR, in April 2005, 
which took over the coordinating roles from the ministry. The agency aimed 
to design policies, strategies, and action plans; and to coordinate domestic and 
international assistance. Since the housing construction was behind schedule, 
BRR took over management of housing programs from the Ministry of  Public 
Works. Overall, BRR is regarded as one of the best practices of specialized agen-
cies for coordinating recovery efforts, having coordinated more than 12,500 
 projects involving some 60 bilateral donors and multilateral organizations as 
well as 700 NGOs. In addition, it also carried out more than 5,000 of its own 
reconstruction projects.
BRR improved project implementation of MDF with strong leadership provided 
by the top management. BRR was a co-chair of the MDF Steering Committee and 
supported the MDF in coordinating the reconstruction. At an initial stage, project 
implementation of MDF was delayed because of the time-consuming process of 
donors’ disbursements to the fund, and the processing time for project approval 
and implementation by government organizations (uS Department of State 2015).
Donors also undertook their own coordination efforts. AusAID coordinated 
with Australian NGOs. AusAid established a humanitarian partnership agree-
ment with six major NGOs and the Red Cross Society to respond quickly to 
disasters and strengthen community resilience and preparedness in Australia 
( Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade 2006, 27; 
Mander-Jones, Collins and Besley 2015). The Australian National Audit Office 
(2006) reported that AusAID was able to avoid duplication with other donors. 
AusAID coordinated with other programs by closely monitoring activities of 
other major donors and collecting information. For example, AusAID financed 
collaborative programs for road reconstruction with the World Bank and hospi-
tal reconstruction with Germany. Regarding Japanese assistance with other do-
nors, a Japanese evaluation reported that no duplication was found—a result that 
can be attributed to the Indonesian Government’s coordination role (Foundation 
for Advanced Studies on International Development 2010).
Acquired capacities were evident in the aftermath of the Java earthquake. The 
Yogyakarta State Government played the leading role in coordinating recovery 
efforts, and no specialized agencies were established. The state government had 
sufficient capacity to implement recovery programs.
Strong community spirit contributed to recovery. Interviewees repeatedly 
pointed out the important role that local culture played in furthering the recovery. 
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Community members helped each other to reconstruct their communities and 
houses by drawing upon community spirit, gotong royong. The culture of gotong roy-
ong promoted positive values such as social harmony and mutual support during 
the recovery (Mardiasmo and Barnes 2015). Moreover, Sultan, the Governor 
of Yogyakarta, provided spiritual support and leadership to the affected people 
during the recovery period.
Financing the transition
As mentioned above, IOT was an exceptional case of a crisis funded in all its 
phases. The outpouring of international support meant that pooled funds played 
a major role in supporting the process. MDF successfully coordinated donor and 
government support in Aceh. Thus, the same mechanism—the JRF—was estab-
lished in the wake of the Java earthquake. This helped to reduce duplication and 
minimize transaction costs. MDF and JRF are regarded as effective post-crisis 
funding mechanisms. The eu and uK provided the majority of funding through 
the multi-donor funds of MDF and JRF. These funds also functioned as policy 
forums where donors and the government could discuss and harmonize their 
rehabilitation policies. The government provided strong leadership for coordi-
nating the funds.
Limited visibility and information by using channels from MDF were issues 
for the eu, which did not manage its programs directly. Since programs were 
conducted under the name of the MDF, this reduced the visibility of the eu for 
beneficiaries and organizations undertaking activities in the field. Quantifying 
output targets and generating information on the efficiency of implementation 
were challenges. Later the european Commission required the fund to improve 
the quality of information received from MDF (european Court of Auditors 
2008, 19–20).
Some other donors were reluctant to participate in the multi-donor trust funds. 
These donors had their own agendas and approaches, or were concerned over 




Recovery mechanisms have evolved through learning from the disasters in 
 Indonesia as shown in Table 9.1. Strategies for three sectors (i.e., housing, live-
lihoods, and DRR) observed in detail, allow a clearer understanding of their 
changes. In relation to the first disaster, there were two different challenges: relo-
cation from tsunami-affected areas and actual reconstruction. The latter is mostly 
considered a success story. The Indonesian government, through the National 
 Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), applied a community-driven approach as 
its national standard approach for reconstructing houses damaged by disasters. 
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Community members including women were involved in development planning 
and decision-making of recovery work. The Aceh and Yogyakarta experiences 
demonstrate that this approach contributes to resilient and quick recovery.
However, the Indonesian government did not succeed in regulating develop-
ment in risk areas in Aceh. Nowadays, the government is promoting relocation 
programs to cope with volcano eruptions and landslide disasters. These disasters 
change physical features, and those affected cannot return to the original sites. 
Moreover, local governments have not applied the mechanism of ensuring qual-
ity for new housing construction in Yogyakarta now that the recovery phase has 
been completed.
A potential livelihood crisis in Aceh was averted, and most issues of poverty 
that resulted from the tsunami were resolved, as discussed above. This was due to 
the following factors (Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton 2006, 67): (i) rehabilitating 
livelihoods for those affected by the disaster, (ii) engaging in reconstruction work, 
and (iii) using cash distributed in cash-for-work programs. Recipients were satisfied 
with the quick assistance in the early months after the tsunami. Short-term live-
lihood initiatives, such as distributing fishing boats, seeds, and large cash grants 
helped to provide prompt support for the affected people. Fishermen received fish-
ing boats, nets, and gear. When donor organizations did not engage in a consul-
tation process with the fishermen or involve cooperatives in producing the fishing 
boats and equipment, some items became unusable because of poor craftsmanship 
and the use of sub-standard raw materials (BRR and World Bank 2005, 113).
The cash distribution program, as a short-term measure, provided effec-
tive support for those who lost their livelihoods. The program contributed to 
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community rehabilitation as well. Various organizations implemented quick 
assistance including cash-for-work (CFW). The CFW programs, which mainly 
focused on clearing debris, had never before been implemented on the scale fol-
lowing the IOT. CFW conducted by the international aid organization Mercy 
Corps reached nearly 18,000 participants at its peak and disbursed over uS$1 
million a month in 2005 (Doocy et al. 2006). Oxfam involved some 40,000 peo-
ple in CFW by October 2005 (Oxfam 2005b, 7). Livelihood programs included 
capacity- building activities in addition to replacing assets or equipment in Yogy-
akarta based on lessons from IOT.
For DRR, Indonesia has been developing mechanisms for recovery by 
learning from previous disasters. This has been visible at the local level with 
an emphasis on the creation of local capacities and different educational ef-
forts at the community level, as well as technical assistance in relation to 
building codes. Local governments started DRR education and drills in Aceh 
and Yogyakarta. The level of these DRR activities has declined as time has 
passed.
underlying these efforts, there was governmental leadership to internalize les-
sons and coordinate the different actors and tasks that converged after the emer-
gencies. The government has improved legislation and institutions for DRR. The 
Indonesian parliament passed a new disaster-management law in 2007. This law 
shifted the policy paradigm away from emergency response following the dis-
asters to covering preparedness and prevention. BNPB was founded in 2008, 
and local agencies have subsequently been established throughout the country 
(Ishiwatari 2013).
BNPB has strengthened the capacity for disaster recovery. The agency de-
veloped its methodology and tools in the Indonesia-specific Post Disaster Needs 
Assessment (PDNA), which assessed damages and formulated rehabilitation and 
reconstruction plans for when future disasters occur. A ministerial decree was 
issued in 2011 to ensure that the Indonesian-specific PDNA will be conducted. 
Following IOT and the Java earthquake, they used a standardized international 
methodology. In addition, the agency is developing a mechanism for early re-
covery needs assessment with the support of united Nations Development Pro-
gramme (uNDP). This assessment aims at promptly rehabilitating people’s 
daily lives covering (i) governance, (ii) livelihood, (iii) community infrastructure, 
(iv) debris management, (v) DRR, and (vi) social coherence.
Provincial governments play leading and coordination roles for recovery. 
 Organizations that were located in disaster areas could effectively coordinate a 
wide range of recovery programs in Aceh and Yogyakarta. BRR is regarded as 
an exceptional case, since local governments have limited capacities in Aceh be-
cause of prolonged conflicts. Based on the success of the multi-donor funds, the 
 Government established a permanent disaster fund, the Indonesian Multi-Donor 
Fund Facility for Disaster Recovery (IDF), in 2010. With uNDP and the World 
Bank function as fund trustees, this fund will mitigate operational gaps that may 
occur during the several months required for the trust fund to establish operations.
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Reconsidering donor approaches
Good practices for linking recovery and long-term development by donors are sum-
marized in Table 9.2. These practices cover the combination of structural rehabilita-
tion and capacity building at the facility reconstructed and inclusion of DRR into the 
programs. Capacity building and DRR contribute to long-term development efforts.
The German government had a clear strategy with its ‘Development-Oriented 
emergency and Transition Aid’ for linking humanitarian aid and development 
cooperation in Aceh. This strategy contributed towards minimizing the effects 
of disasters on those affected and bridging the gap between humanitarian aid 
and development projects. The technical-assistance agency of GTz and lending 
agency of KfW from Germany jointly supported vocational, health, and educa-
tion sectors. German organizations have integrated long-term development into 
these programs. For example, GTz supported not only rehabilitating vocational 
training centers but also creating vocational skills. It supported capacity- building 
programs and DRR while KfW supported rehabilitating buildings. It was a dif-
ferent approach from other major short-term intervention programs, such as 
cash-for-work or fishing boat distribution.
uSAID partnered with an energy company to develop a post-secondary in-
stitution for vocational training. The institution building is used for evacuation 
shelter from tsunamis. JICA implemented a capacity-development program for 
community members in DRR with the construction of evacuation centers in 
Aceh. JICA also supported capacity building to reconstruct resilient housing by 
formulating a simple technical standard and establishing a monitoring mecha-
nism following the Java earthquake. JRF programs covered both structural re-
habilitation and capacity building to reconstruct houses and restore livelihoods 
in the wake of the Java earthquake. Strong community spirit supported these 
successful activities at the community level. The experience suggests that provid-
ing support for local government plans, when they are capable and committed 
to recovery and DRR, is the best way to link the phases of crisis management.
Table 9.2 Good practices of linking recovery and long-term development.
Recovery activities Combined between structural 
rehabilitation and capacity building
Including DRR
Indian Ocean tsunami
GTz: Vocational training center ü ü
uSAID: Polytechnic ü ü
JICA: DRR at ulee Lheue ü ü
Java earthquake
JICA: Capacity development for 
housing reconstruction
ü
JRF: Housing reconstruction ü ü
JRF: Livelihood restoration ü
Source: author.
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Conclusion
The IOT and Java earthquake provided opportunities for Indonesia to create a 
resilient and sustainable society. Indonesia has strengthened DRR and response 
mechanisms in legislative, institutional, and practical measures through learning 
from the disasters. Recovery activities in rehabilitating livelihoods and housing 
were integrated into long-term development. Different strategies to link recovery 
and DRR through development were evident through donor support but, above 
all, supporting the local government in the long term was the most important fea-
ture. The specialized recovery agency and provincial governments, which were 
located in ‘local’ disaster areas, were able to coordinate a wide range of programs 
with strong leadership and high-capacity institutions. Multi-donor funds were ef-
fective in coordinating donor organizations and filling gaps in financial sources.
Weak links were found in some areas between recovery and development. 
While programs to rebuild housing were successful, relocation remains a ma-
jor challenge. Local governments have not applied the mechanism of ensuring 
quality for new housing construction in Yogyakarta since the recovery phase was 
completed and the level of DRR education activities is declining as time passes.
Donors can help to maintain the momentum of local initiatives by including 
a development perspective in recovery policy. Donors should provide recovery 
assistance from a longer-term perspective and formulate recovery projects to 
contribute to long-term development. Moreover, donors should provide support 
for the establishment of mechanisms to promote integration between recovery 
and development. Depending on the level of commitment, donors can further 
explore cooperation through multi-donor funds and promote education efforts to 
improve sustainability. This implies going one step beyond the present coordina-
tion through the PDNA. Current post-disaster needs assessments mainly cover 
estimates of costs and assets destroyed in disasters. In addition to PDNA, other 
assessments can be conducted to identify programs and formulate a master plan 
to link recovery and long-term development, ensuring the prevention of future 
disasters.
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Introduction
This chapter explores how donors and bilateral cooperation agencies provided 
assistance following Typhoon Yolanda. By comparing approaches adopted by 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA), the united States Agency 
for International Development (uSAID) and the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) of the Government of Australia; this chapter explores how 
these three agencies addressed the challenge of realizing the continuum between 
humanitarian aid and development activities, focusing on their strategies, coor-
dination and funding utilized for this purpose.
The rationale for selecting these bilateral agencies is based on their total finan-
cial aid to the Philippines. The Financial Tracking Service (FTS)1 shows that 
the united Kingdom, the united States, Canada, Japan and Australia were the 
top five bilateral donors providing humanitarian assistance following Yolanda. 
However, the FTS only deals with humanitarian funding, so the authors referred 
to the OeCD.Stat database to complement the FTS data. In order to analyze 
the continuum, an important consideration would be the time-span of donors’ 
support to the Philippines and presence prior to Yolanda. Japan and the uS were 
clearly the first and second donors in the provision of ‘humanitarian aid’ on the 
basis of cumulative amounts disbursed over the past ten years (see  Figure 10.1). 
Australia, Canada and the united Kingdom have provided almost the same 
amount of humanitarian aid. Taking into consideration the relationship between 
humanitarian assistance and longer-term development, it is clear that Japan, uS 
and Australia are the top three donors (as the data bar for Australia indicates 
in the ‘All sectors’ column in Figure 10.1), and thus this paper focuses on their 
experiences.
This chapter comprises seven sections. In the next section, we provide a brief 
chronological review of the events after Yolanda. This is followed by an over-
view of the strategies for addressing the ‘continuum’ in the selected bilateral 
cooperation agencies and the challenges in implementing these strategies. The 
next section examines the coordination efforts, including that of the Office of 
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the Government of the Philippines (GOP). OPARR was a unique, ad-hoc body, 
set up by the President, and was active for just one year after Yolanda. However, 
as a coordination mechanism for Yolanda relief efforts, the presence of OPARR 
cannot be ignored because of its organizational nature and relationship with 
bilateral cooperation agencies. We review the funding situation, incorporating 
some additional comments about multilateral donors.
In order to add detail to the challenge posed by the continuum, we then include 
a section on housing assistance in Tacloban following Yolanda and the contribu-
tion by bilateral cooperation agencies. As an issue discussed by Higashiura and 
Gómez (see Chapter 7), and with reference to the arguments by Christoplos (2006) 
and GFDRR (2015a), housing and livelihoods have repeatedly been shown to be 
the most critical aspect in connecting relief with recovery. This point was also em-
phasized by Ishiwatari (Chapter 9) who examines the challenges of housing in the 
chapter on Indonesia. The last section of this chapter is a discussion of our findings 
concerning the strategy, coordination and funding underlying crisis management. 
Finally, we consider how contributions by bilateral cooperation agencies started to 
decline considerably earlier than the ongoing efforts of the affected government.
Data for this chapter come from interviews, email communications and second-
ary materials such as official documents and information from online news sites 
and government websites. The main interviews were conducted in October 2015 
and January 2016, and follow-up interviews were made in June 2016. These in-
terviews with official representatives from bilateral cooperation agencies provided 
the authors an opportunity to explore the interviewee’s reflections and to access 
Figure 10.1  Total cumulative amount of ODA (2005–2014): comparison between ‘all sec-
tors’ and ‘humanitarian aid’ (current prices, uS$, millions).
Note: According to OeCD.Stat criteria, ‘humanitarian aid total’ includes ‘emergency response, 
total,’ ‘reconstruction relief & rehabilitation, total’ and ‘disaster prevention & preparedness, total.’
Source: authors, based on data generated from OeCD.Stat.
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primary documents. Interviews with the Philippine governmental organizations, 
the Tacloban City government and the united Nations agencies provided a varied 
perspective for the analysis. Although the authors were unable to conduct face-to-
face interviews with uSAID, inquiries and communications were made by email.
Chronological review of typhoon Yolanda
Typhoon Yolanda, known internationally as Haiyan, made landfall on Leyte 
Island in Philippines before dawn of November 8, 2013. As one of the strong-
est storms ever recorded (OPARR 2014, 7), Yolanda caused a massive amount 
of damage to properties and infrastructures. According to the National Disas-
ter Risk Reduction and Management Council, the total number of dead and 
missing exceeded 7,000 people (NDRRMC 2013, 3), and the total damage and 
losses were initially estimated at uS$12.9 billion (ibid., 5). The combined strong 
typhoon and storm surge led to a large number of people losing their homes; 
thereby requiring large-scale housing reconstruction.2
The extent of the devastation prompted then President Benigno S. Aquino 
III to declare a state of national calamity through Proclamation No. 682 on 
 November 11, 2013 (OPARR 2014, 7). The GOP accepted the offer of interna-
tional assistance through a letter to the united Nations Resident Coordinator/
Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim (OCHA 2013).
Simultaneous with the emergency response operations, the GOP had already 
started planning for recovery. The President agreed on a basic recovery frame-
work presented by the National economic and Development Authority (NeDA), 
which published the initial recovery vision in ‘Reconstruction  Assistance in 
Yolanda: Build Back Better (RAY)’ on December 16, 2013 (Iuchi 2014). In par-
allel, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) conducted a post-disaster needs’ as-
sessment (PDNA) in December 2013 (OPARR 2014, 9). The PDNA presents a 
strategic framework for recovery grounded on Republic Act No. 10121, known as 
the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, and the 
President’s social contract to the Filipino People (ibid.). The President appointed 
a Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) on December 
6, 2013 to unify the efforts of government and other agencies involved in the re-
habilitation and recovery of Yolanda-affected areas (ibid., 10), and OPARR was 
established ( JICA 2015, 1).3 On August 1, 2014, OPARR submitted the Yolanda 
Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan (CRRP) to the President 
(OPARR 2016).The CRRP was based on policy guidance developed by RAY and 
was designed to implement projects, programs, and activities to meet the needs 
identified in the PDNA (OPARR 2014, 11).
In relation to the international community’s efforts, on 12 November 2013, 
the emergency Relief Coordinator at the united Nations formally activated 
an Inter-Agency Standing Committee System-wide Level 3 (L3) emergency re-
sponse to the typhoon (Hanley et al. 2014, v).4 The Philippines Humanitarian 
Country Team developed the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) on November 27, 
2013. The SRP was designed to support the GOP’s response to the immediate 
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humanitarian needs of the people affected by Yolanda, and complemented the 
Government’s RAY (Philippines Humanitarian Country Team 2013).
In implementing the SRP, twelve clusters were established. However, in the 
CRRP, the GOP developed another type of cluster for rehabilitation and re-
covery (details will be described later). There is no available information on the 
connection between the clusters of the Philippines Humanitarian Country Team 
and the clusters in CRRP. The authors did not observe any clear connection and 
involvement of bilateral cooperation agencies in establishing such a connection. 
They seem to run in parallel, separate tracks.
Although the SRP was initially planned to function for 12 months from the 
date of the disaster, the President declared the end of the response phase on 
July 4, 2014 (interview with the World Bank Manila office, October 19, 2015). 
Once the President of the Philippines stated that the response phase was over, 
some organizations with strict humanitarian mandates were caught off guard, as 
many relief needs remained unmet. The declaration of the President triggered 
the deactivation of most humanitarian clusters co-led by the uN and other inter-
national agencies, although several clusters including shelter and protection were 
extended until the end of November at the request of the government (Thomas 
2015, 16).
Strategies to address the continuum
Japan
Assistance from Japan was provided through two major routes: the embassy of 
Japan in the Philippines and JICA. These two offices collaborated with each 
other and shared details of their assistance. From the embassy, emergency relief 
items and emergency Grant Aid were provided. Approximately uS$30 million 
was allocated to nine international organizations (INGÉROSeC Corporation 
2015, 45). An additional uS$20 million from the Grant Aid for recovery and 
Table 10.1 Chronology of events following Typhoon Yolanda.
Data and year Event
November 8, 2013 Landfall of Typhoon Yolanda
November 12, 2013 Activation of IASC Level 3 response
November 27, 2013 SRP developed
December 6, 2013 establishment of OPARR: MO No.62
December 16, 2013 RAY published
July 4, 2014 Declaration of the end of response by President of the Philippines
August 1, 2014 CRRP unveiled
April 22, 2015 Termination of OPARR: MO No.79
December 2015 30% of projects for recovery & reconstruction completed 
(NeDA 2015)
May 2016 Presidential election. New president assumes office on 
July 1, 2016
Source: authors.
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reconstruction was disbursed to international organizations (data provided at the 
embassy of Japan in Manila, October 15, 2016).
From JICA, Japan Disaster Relief ( JDR) teams were dispatched, with these 
teams also providing emergency relief supplies. After that, an urgent Devel-
opment Study on Rehabilitation and Recovery from Typhoon Yolanda in the 
 Philippines was conducted. This urgent development study (kinkyu-kaihatsu-chousa 
in Japanese) was then implemented as a Development Study-Type Technical 
 Cooperation ( JICA 2015). It aimed to comprehensively support the process of 
recovery and reconstruction, implement early recovery and reconstruction for 
areas affected by Typhoon Yolanda, and work towards establishing a disaster- 
resilient nation/society, taking into account lessons learned from past disasters 
in Japan.
In addition to these settings, two new instruments were introduced in the 
Yolanda case: the Grant Aid Program for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
from Typhoon Yolanda, and Post-Disaster Stand-by Loans. The Grant Aid 
 Program was implemented based on a plan formulated through the urgent 
 Development Study ( JICA 2014a). The Post-Disaster Stand-by Loan is a type of 
general budget support (interview with JICA Headquarters, January 14, 2016) 
developed in March 2014. The Stand-by Loan encouraged the implementation 
of policy actions by GOP to reduce disaster risks and improve disaster-risk man-
agement capacity, as well as supporting quick restoration efforts by responding 
to temporary financial needs incurred when a large-scale disaster strikes ( JICA 
2014a). The Stand-by Loan was fully disbursed in February 2015 to support the 
Philippines’ post-disaster reconstruction and recovery plans in the areas affected 
by Typhoon Yolanda ( Japan Ministry of Finance 2015).
The Grant Aid Program was scheduled to be completed in February 2017. 
After the termination of the urgent Development Study and the Grant Aid Pro-
gram, some projects will continue to be supported by utilizing the existing JICA 
scheme. For example, the JICA Partnership Program will provide support to a 
livelihood support project for oyster farming on Leyte Island. Also, a Proposal 
Based Program in JICA’s Partnership with the Japanese Private Sector will sup-
port the development of a fishery industry on Samar Island, also affected by the 
disaster.
Australia
In the relief phase, the Inter-departmental emergency Taskforce was estab-
lished by the Australian government (interview with the embassy of Australia 
in  Manila, January 25, 2016). The task force was composed of the emergency 
Management Agency, Civil Military, Department of Health, the Federal Po-
lice and the Department of Defence. As instruments for the relief operation, an 
Australian Medical Assistance Team and DFAT Rapid Response Team were 
deployed. The Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) was activated as 
the primary mechanism for humanitarian funding for Australian NGOs. The 
agreement brings together the department and six pre-selected Australian NGOs 
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(Care, Caritas, Oxfam, Plan International, Save the Children and World Vision) 
(DFAT 2016).
In transitioning from the relief phase to the recovery and reconstruction, the 
embassy of Australia in Manila directly suggested components required for assis-
tance to DFAT headquarters (interview with the embassy of Australia in Manila, 
October 14, 2015). In other words, it is distinctive that the embassy led initiatives 
in developing Australian strategy for Yolanda assistance. Additionally, almost all 
of the financial support for recovery and rehabilitation were delivered through 
programs and partnerships of the Australian Government in the Philippines that 
already existed prior to Yolanda.
The details of the Australian contribution are as follows:
•	 Au$10 million: Construction of up to 500 classrooms through the Basic 
education Support Transformation Program with the Department of 
education (Deped).
•	 Au$3 million: Construction of up to 75 daycare centers through the National 
Community Driven Development Program with Department of Social Welfare 
Development (DSWD).
•	 Au$1.6 million: Community small grants to help approximately 570,000 
people restore livelihoods through the Philippine-Australia Community As-
sistance Program.
•	 Au$7.3 million: To help affected communities build back better through 
risk assessments, updated land use planning and building codes, early warn-
ing systems and emergency response teams in 12 local government units 
and 150 barangays benefiting 430,000 people through the Resilience and 
Preparedness towards Inclusive Development Program implemented by the 
Philippines Climate Change Commission (CCC) and uNDP.
The utilization of these existing programs was a significant aspect of the Austral-
ian intervention after Yolanda.
United States of America
uSAID’s Office of u.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) activated a field- 
based Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and corresponding  Washington 
DC-based Response Management Team (RMT) on November 9. DART con-
ducted assessments in affected areas of the Philippines, liaised with other human-
itarian and government actors in the country, and recommended appropriate 
response and recovery options. RMT served as a focal point to coordinate the 
united States Government’s humanitarian response, program relief activities, and 
provide support for DART. On December 18, 2013, DART and RMT demobi-
lized (uSAID 2014a, 6).
On June 9, 2014, uSAID/Philippines launched ‘uSAID Rebuild,’ a multi- 
component effort funded by the u.S. Government to support reconstruction and re-
habilitation activities in Typhoon Yolanda-affected areas (uSAID 2014b). uSAID 
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Rebuild has focused on restoring access to education, health services and promoting 
livelihood activities, as well as providing technical assistance to OPARR (ibid.). Since 
the overhaul of OPARR, uSAID has continued to provide technical assistance to 
NeDA and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) (interview with 
staff of uSAID Rebuild Project—Technical Assistance to DBM, June 20, 2016).
Challenges for ‘continuum’ approaches
Interviews with bilateral cooperation agencies revealed that ‘continuum’ strate-
gies faced challenges in relation to the broader context of Official Development 
Aid (ODA) policies of each donor country.
In the case of Japan, the affected area did not correspond to areas identified 
by the Country Assistance Policy for the Philippines (e-mail, JICA Manila of-
fice, November 25, 2015). Instead, Metro Manila and Mindanao Island were 
prioritized in the Country Assistance Policy for longer-term development. Leyte 
and Samar Islands, which were among the most devastated areas, received lower 
prioritization in the existing Japanese ODA policies—a situation that did not 
change after the disaster.
In Australia, a reform of ODA policies in September 2013 following the change 
of government influenced assistance after Yolanda (interview with the embassy 
of Australia in Manila, January 25, 2016). The reforms reduced the ODA budget 
by 40 percent, in what was called the ‘Global Cut.’ While the new ODA pol-
icy emphasized Asia and the Pacific, Indonesia, Viet Nam and the Philippines 
were less prioritized. As a result, the total amount for recovery and rehabilita-
tion decreased from Au$36.3 million as of March 2014 to Au$23.0 million as of 
 October 2015. Furthermore, the new cabinet considered mobilization of funds for 
climate change issues intensively, and preferred to utilize military assets in pro-
viding assistance. In the case of the government of Australia, two things should 
be noted: assistance in the case of Yolanda occurred just after the change of the 
cabinet. Secondly, it was the first big operation following the structural reforms 
by which AusAID, the Australian aid organization, was merged into DFAT.
Contrary to Japan and Australia, the uS showed a different tendency. uSAID 
provided humanitarian relief and recovery assistance based on assessed needs 
and was not bound by limitations related to bilateral or multilateral arrangements 
(e-mail, uSAID Manila office, February 1, 2016). In other words,  uSAID was 
not constrained by limitations on what it aimed to do in its assistance.  Japanese 
assistance was constrained by its Country Assistance Policy and Australia ODA 
had just suffered from the Global Cut.
Coordination for the continuum
Japan
In terms of coordination within the Japanese government, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Finance, the embassy and JICA (both at its headquarters 
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and the Manila office) participated in the relief process. However, arrangements 
for the recovery and reconstruction were mainly determined inside JICA and the 
engagement of other agencies was very weak.
There was coordination by the embassy in relation to its funding allocation. 
The embassy disbursed funds to international organizations, although some 
Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects were allocated to 
provide assistance such as provision of fire trucks and ambulances to the De-
partment of Interior and Local Government, as well as school-building by the 
NGO IsraAid. According to the embassy, they gathered information from other 
donors, but did not discuss these projects with them individually (interview with 
the embassy of Australia in Manila, January 25, 2016).
In the case of JICA, it was clear that there was limited coordination with other 
bilateral donors. JICA made a significant effort to provide livelihood support 
through direct collaborations with Local Governmental units. The authors found 
that such direct collaboration had nothing to do with other bilateral donors’ be-
havior. Moreover, based on the urgent Development Study, JICA sought to collab-
orate with the united Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, something that 
proved to be impossible (interview with JICA Manila office, October 14, 2015). 
There was no information on collaboration attempts with other international or-
ganizations. JICA utilized an existing program, the JICA-DOH (Department of 
Health, GOP) project for Strengthening Maternal and Child Health Services in 
eastern Visayas, to provide equipment ( JICA 2014b). This shows that JICA closely 
consulted with DOH, but did not discuss their operations with other agencies.
Australia
In Australia, the Inter-Departmental Task Force was organized during the relief 
phase. However, coordination in the recovery and reconstruction was limited 
between DFAT headquarters and the embassy in Manila. Inside DFAT, several 
sections—such as education, gender and infrastructure—collaborated with each 
other.
As described in the strategy section above, it was remarkable in the case of 
 Australia that almost all of the financial support for recovery and rehabilitation 
was delivered through existing programs and partnerships between the Australian 
 Government and the Philippines. The total amount of all of recovery and rehabil-
itation assistance was Au$23 million. Of this, Au$21.9 million (95.2% of the total 
amount) was provided through existing programs and partnerships (data provided 
by the embassy of Australia in Manila, January 25, 2016). In terms of coordination, 
Philippines government agencies such as Deped, DSWD and CCC, were included 
in the Australian assistance program. It is very clear that the Australian embassy 
coordinated its engagement through pre-existing programs in its Yolanda assistance.
United States of America
The uS followed the strong OFDA leadership and close coordination and com-
munication with the Department of Defense in providing relief. This allowed the 
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u.S. Government to present one strategy and one united front to assist the people 
of the Philippines in response to the destruction of Typhoon Yolanda (uSAID 
OFDA, 2015, 15). The ‘One Team’ reference indicates the close coordination be-
tween defense, diplomacy and development departments of the u.S.  Government 
to bring about a responsive and immediate range of assistance activities to the 
affected populations (uSAID information based on e-mail from uSAID Manila 
office, February 1, 2016). OFDA is responsible for leading relief and response ef-
forts by the u.S. Government and serves as the coordinator for a range of the uS 
Government capabilities. After the relief and early recovery phase was complete, 
reconstruction and recovery efforts were coordinated by the bilateral uSAID 
mission, thus while all entities continued to operate in a coordinated fashion, the 
reconstruction and recovery implementation were led by uSAID team out of the 
Manila office. The same team continues to coordinate recovery and resilience 
activities in the affected areas, however under a less structured arrangement than 
DART, which was specific to the relief phase.
In the case of uSAID, they utilized an existing project: Be Secure (Water Secu-
rity for Resilient economic Growth and Stability) (e-mail, uSAID Manila office, 
 February 1, 2016). According to uSAID, the initial design of the Be  Secure pro-
ject was focused in Basilan, Iloilo, Maguindanao and Misamis Oriental  Provinces 
and Tuguegarao City; but the project had a pre-existing disaster- recovery com-
ponent included that would allow uSAID to respond to a hydrological disaster in 
any part of the country. under this specific activity, uSAID was able to initially 
mobilize the project to start working with local water districts, schools, and health 
clinics to identify water systems that were damaged and needed repair after the 
typhoon. As it became clear that the Leyte Island would need longer-term assis-
tance, uSAID was able to undertake a contract modification that added Leyte 
as a focal site for all Be Secure activities, allowing uSAID to broaden its engage-
ment in Leyte under the project to include activities like support to the Provincial 
 Disaster Risk Reduction Management Office, although climate change projects 
and a feasibility study for a bulk water supply were downscaled.
Similar to Japan and Australia, there were no clear examples of uS coordina-
tion with other bilateral donors. In the relief phase, the main coordination issues 
were concentrated on several uS governmental agencies, and the modification of 
the Be Secure project meant uSAID did not undertake active coordination with 
other bilateral donors.
Coordination system in the GOP
In terms of coordination following Yolanda, the establishment of and role played 
by OPARR cannot be ignored, as it was mandated to provide coordination for 
bilateral cooperation agencies. By virtue of Memorandum Order No. 62, the 
President appointed the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery 
on December 6, 2013 to unify the efforts of Government and other agencies 
involved in the rehabilitation and recovery of Yolanda-affected areas (OPARR 
2014, 10). To facilitate its role as over-all manager and coordinator of rehabilita-
tion, recovery, and reconstruction efforts by government departments, agencies, 
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and instrumentalities in the affected areas, five clusters on a national level 
were organized. GOP referred to these five clusters as the ‘Rehabilitation and 
 Recovery Clusters.’ They were different from the cluster approaches used by 
the international community for relief. The five clusters were as follows: infra-
structure (chaired by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)), 
 livelihoods (Department of Trade and Industry), resettlement (Housing and 
 urban and Development Coordinating Council), social services (DSWD) and 
the support cluster (DBM and NeDA). OPARR was dissolved on April 22, 2015 
and its functions were transferred to NeDA (President of the Philippines 2015). 
In addition, OPARR engaged with the provincial governors and city mayors.
Several issues in relation to the short-lived efforts of OPARR deserve mention. 
Based on our interviewee responses, in terms of its practical aspects, coordina-
tion led by OPARR was not as well organized as expected, and it was seen as 
lacking in the strong authority necessary to proceed. The head of OPARR stated 
in an interview that there was so much responsibility given to the position with 
no commensurate authority (Alpad 2015).
Additionally, as OPARR was a temporary bureaucratic setting in the na-
tional governmental system, an officer described its existence as ‘not normal’ 
(interview with a staff of Office of Civil Defense staff in Quezon, June 20, 2016). 
According to the existing legal framework, NeDA was appointed as an overall 
responsible agency in the thematic area of disaster rehabilitation and recovery 
(OPARR 2014, 27). In addition to our findings, local media also reported on a 
petition questioning the legal status of OPARR (Sabillo 2014; Torres-Tupas 2014; 
Rappler 2014), with the Supreme Court ultimately dismissing the petition (PNA 
2014). There was also a ‘squabble’ between the head of OPARR and the city 
mayor of Tacloban, one of the most devastated municipalities. The mayor argued 
that the city did not receive necessary support from the national government; 
however, the head of OPARR denied this claim.
In terms of the relationship between OPARR and bilateral agencies, the tech-
nical support provided to OPARR by uSAID, as well as JICA’s approach and 
attitude are noteworthy. uSAID funded and deployed about 100 technical staff 
to monitor and evaluate programs, projects and activities in recovery and recon-
struction (interview with the staff of uSAID Rebuild Project—Technical Assis-
tance to DBM, June 20, 2016). OPARR had only about 20 personnel in Manila 
to directly support PARR. Consequently OPARR would have faced enormous 
difficulties in monitoring and evaluating the recovery and rehabilitation pro-
gress at regional and local level without uSAID assistance. After the transfer of 
OPARR’s functions to NeDA, uSAID continued to provide support and dis-
patched consultants to NeDA and DBM. However, following the termination 
of OPARR, the scale of the uSAID’s assistance has gradually decreased and 
uSAID support for NeDA and DBM ended at the end of June 2016.
JICA approached OPARR primarily as part of its preparatory process for the 
urgent Development Study (interview with JICA staff member in Manila, June 
20, 2016). In implementing the study’s projects, one of JICA’s partner agencies 
in the Filipino government was the DPWH. JICA closely consulted with the 
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DPWH to develop these projects. Usually, consultations with the partner agency 
are sufficient for project preparation. In the case of Yolanda, however, DPWH 
communicated carefully with OPARR, and DPWH requested that JICA makes 
sure its plan was understood by OPARR.
The establishment of OPARR clearly demonstrated strong governmental initi-
ative. On the other hand, the existing literature illustrates the negative reputation 
of OPARR. Thomas (2015, 12) argued that OPARR had not been empowered. 
Pedrosa (2016, 53) concluded that the Government’s creation of OPARR, meant 
setting up an additional yet unnecessary bureaucracy to the entire rehabilitation 
effort. GFDRR (2015b, 31) stated that OPARR did not possess the full authority 
and mandate to influence outcomes. Although it is too early to comprehensively 
evaluate OPARR’s performance, and further discussion on the existence and 
meaning of OPARR is necessary, it might be concluded that OPARR did not 
have a big impact on the continuum following Yolanda, with reference to existing 
documents and findings by the authors in this chapter.
Summary of coordination
Japan, Australia and the US all utilized pre-existing programs for the purpose 
of coordinating their strategies beyond relief. When compared to JICA and 
 USAID, however, it is remarkable that the Australian government mainly used 
pre- existing programs and partnerships in terms of budget allocation, so coordi-
nation was organized within a limited number of agencies. The existing programs 
and partnerships included the Philippines governmental bodies as counterparts 
for each bilateral cooperation agency. This means that coordination with the af-
fected government was fluid and active. Instead, coordination between bilateral 
agencies was relatively passive.
Funding
Bilateral funding
In total, Japan provided approximately US$630 million to relief efforts (data pro-
vided by the Embassy of Japan in Manila, the Philippines, October 15, 2016), while 
Australia contributed approximately US$50 million (data provided by the Embassy 
of Australia in the Philippines, January 25, 2016), and the US allocated approxi-
mately US$143 million (e-mail, USAID Manila office, February 1, 2016). The GOP 
has already disbursed approximately US$2,300 million from FY 2013 to FY 2015, 
based on data as of October 31, 2015 by the Department of Budget Management. 
Although it is very difficult to find a summary of all the costs of recovery, the CRRP 
estimated the summary of cluster funding requirements as the total investment re-
quirement, and the amount is 170,916,432,664.63  Philippines pesos (approximately 
US$3.6 billion; OPARR 2014, 23). Based on this temporary calculation, 22.9 per-
cent of the amount (US$3.6 billion) was covered by funding from these three coun-
tries and the GOP covered 63.9 percent. Compared to the amount of GOP funding 
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and bilateral and multilateral funding  (introduced in the next section), support by 
bilateral and multilateral agencies seems to be influential on the crisis management.
In terms of funding tendencies, the uS and the Australian governments allo-
cated a larger amount toward the humanitarian response. In the case of  Australia, 
two-thirds of the total amount, including expenditures on the military and the 
provision of medical services, was invested in the response. In the case of the uS, 
a detailed amount was not available to the authors.5 Based on open information 
by the Philippines government, almost all of the ‘received’ funds were catego-
rized according to the response purpose, such as military assets, relief goods and 
logistics.6 In the case of Japan, except for the expenditure of JDR and Japan Self 
Defense Force, the funding for recovery and reconstruction was greater than that 
for the humanitarian response.
Roles of multi-lateral cooperating agencies: 
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank
In addition to bilateral assistance, the World Bank made a decision to provide 
credit support. The Second Disaster Risk Management Development Policy Loan 
with a Catastrophe-Deferred Drawdown Option (CAT-DDO 2) provided uS$500 
million to strengthen investment planning and regulations to reduce disaster risks 
and help manage the financial impacts when disasters strike (World Bank 2015). 
Although the CAT-DDO 2 does not directly support recovery or reconstruction 
projects related to Typhoon Yolanda, it can be interpreted to allow indirect sup-
port for GOP efforts towards recovery and reconstruction.7 Moreover, the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank provided funding for existing government pro-
grams and mechanisms to disburse much-needed financing to local government 
units in the  Philippines for reconstruction and rehabilitation (GFDRR 2015b, 22). 
The World Bank provided uS$479 million and the Asian Development Bank pro-
vided uS$372.1 million to the National Community-Driven Development Pro-
gram (ibid., 22).
The Multi Donor Trust Fund did not show any clear contribution to recovery 
and reconstruction. Initially, the trust fund aimed to assist RAY financially, and 
the secretariat was the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2014, 7). However, it did 
not work as planned. One of the reasons for this malfunction was that contri-
butions from DFID (Department for International Development of the united 
Kingdom) were earmarked for investment in micro, small and medium enter-
prises (based on information provided by World Bank Manila office, October 
19, 2015). The uS, Japan and eu showed some interest in pledging support for 
the fund. However, as the documentation process was delayed, and each organ-
ization was facing the end of the fiscal year, they ultimately did not pursue this.
Close-up on housing and the continuum 
in tacloban City
Typhoon Yolanda caused huge human losses. It also resulted in a large number of 
internally displaced persons with over 900,000 families displaced (OPARR 2014). 
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Damage to housing was severe, with 600,000 houses completely destroyed 
(NeDA 2013). This damage created huge demands for new housing, including 
temporary shelters, as well as necessitating relocation from coastal areas in order 
to reduce exposure to future risks. Tacloban City was one of the areas most dev-
astated by the typhoon and, following the disaster, a large-scale relocation was 
undertaken to move coastal residents into new permanent housing provided on 
higher land (Iuchi and Maly 2016).
The guidance note of the Global Cluster for early Recovery described how 
‘for affected people the shelter recovery process starts immediately at the onset of 
the crisis’ (GCeR 2016, 38). A policy note developed by the Shelter in Recovery 
Working Group of the Global Shelter Cluster states that ‘there is the need to 
ensure that there is a continuum of support throughout the entire process from 
emergency to recovery, and not just during the first weeks or months, when an 
emergency has a higher media profile. This continuum of support may need to 
continue over the lifetimes of different Clusters or other coordination forums, 
and to have clear strategic connections with national-government development 
policies, once there are no further humanitarian needs’ (Global Shelter Cluster 
Working Group on Shelter and Recovery undated, 1). Also, in relation to bilat-
eral donors, the policy note indicated:
Humanitarian organizations should ensure national ownership of the early 
recovery process through the fullest possible engagement of national and 
local authorities in the planning, execution, and monitoring of recovery ac-
tions. By doing so, they may build capacity, and also strengthen accounta-
bility systems so that the population can hold governments, local authorities, 
and their international donors to account in the implementation.
(Global Shelter Cluster Working Group on 
Shelter and Recovery undated, 3)
These were—at least in theory—principles upon which all stakeholders could be 
involved in the housing sector, starting from active engagement by national and 
local authorities. Henceforth, these principles are somewhat contradicted by the 
actual practices of local actors and donors.
Housing issues in Tacloban City from the local viewpoint
This section illustrates issues in housing assistance from the viewpoint of a local 
government and local people. According to the city authority, over 54,000 homes 
were damaged by the typhoon and 48 percent of damaged houses were completely 
destroyed (figures presented here based on a lecture by officers of Tacloban City, 
October 12, 2015). As a result, about 14,500 families urgently needed housing as-
sistance, and were tagged as having lived in unsafe zones. The city has 138 ba-
rangays, with 36 of them marked as being very high-risk.8 These are located in 
coastal areas, which experienced a four- to five-meter surge during Yolanda. The 
city prioritized the 40,500 families in the 36 high-risk barangays in order to trans-
fer them to the Tacloban North resettlement area.
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However, significant progress has not as yet been achieved. First, transition 
from temporary shelters to permanent houses was delayed mainly due to lack of 
an adequate water system. Second, development of the resettlement area has also 
been delayed. The city authority has provided some reasons for that delay:
1  the water system has not been fully prepared in the resettlement area;
2  the slow pace of construction of the houses; and
3  livelihood in the resettlement area was not well provided for (from a lecture 
by officers of Tacloban City, October 12, 2015).
As a result, Iuchi and Maly (2016) revealed that, as of October 2015, about 80 
percent of the initial target of beneficiary households had not been relocated to 
temporary housing or permanent houses. In addition to people living in tempo-
rary and permanent housing provided by the government or other actors, the 
majority of other residents from areas targeted for relocation went back to live in 
their original neighborhoods in self-built temporary housing.
Reconstruction endeavors are still ongoing, and the local government has 
struggled with many difficulties. Iuchi and Maly (2016) made the observation 
that the Tacloban City Government has taken on the central coordination 
role. They conclude that, at the time of writing, Tacloban City has coordi-
nated and advanced housing reconstruction by managing various actors who 
are representing international agencies, national governments, NGOs, and civil 
society organizations.9 So far, they have successfully built partnerships with non- 
governmental actors during both the temporary and permanent phases of hous-
ing relocation, thereby leveraging various means of support to provide housing 
to a larger population.
According to local people, representatives of barangays indicated that prob-
lems with the water supply and livelihood have hampered resettlement. Iuchi and 
Maly (2016) summarized the complicated situation from the perspective of local 
residents. They argued that the housing choices were not equally provided to ben-
eficiaries, the lack of utilities such as electricity and water in resettlement areas 
hampers smooth relocation, and most households have decided to wait back in their 
communities. A resident living in a temporary house said to us that the procedures 
for selecting households to be relocated were unclear. Another interviewee told us 
that two rainy and typhoon seasons was too long to stay in a temporary house.
Furthermore, a new embankment development taking place in Tacloban neg-
atively influenced the perception that housing issues were a priority in the city. 
The embankment construction (to a height of about 4.5 meters) is a project led by 
the national government with the aims of lessening damages from future disas-
ters. Yet, according to the media (Philippines Today 2015; Sunstar 2015), some 
residents in the affected areas are worried that the construction will further delay 
their relocation to permanent houses. They claim that housing should be given 
higher priority than developing the new embankment.
In summary, as seen from the viewpoint of the local government and the local 
people, housing assistance needs remain largely unmet in the affected area.
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Efforts by bilateral cooperation agencies
In the relief phase, many bilateral cooperation agencies allocated funds to provide 
emergency shelters. Although data on this is not exclusive to Tacloban City, the 
FTS includes the following countries as contributing to emergency shelters: Can-
ada, Denmark, Germany, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China, Ireland, Japan, Korea, New zealand, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the united Kingdom, and the uS (based on FTS data provided by 
OCHA Philippines office, October 14, 2015). However, funding for emergency shel-
ters did not fully cover the requested amounts. Based on FTS, as of April 6, 2016, 
the emergency Shelter Cluster, and the Camp Coordination and Camp Manage-
ment Cluster had received 46.4 percent (approximately uS$80 million) and 55.2 
percent (approximately uS$ 4.4 million) of their funding requirements, respectively.
In transitional housing in Tacloban City, based on Iuchi and Maly (2016), it 
is noteworthy that uSAID provided temporary housing through funding to an 
NGO, CRS (Catholic Relief Service). The CRS project lasted two years, ending 
in December 2015 (uSAID 2015).10 We did not find evidence of Japanese or 
 Australian involvement in the provision of transitional housing assistance.
In terms of permanent housing, there was hardly any assistance provided by 
bilateral cooperation agencies in Tacloban City. There, the National Housing 
Authority is the largest distributor of permanent housing (lecture by officers of 
Tacloban City, October 12, 2015). While not a bilateral effort, the only example 
available is an eu-funded uNDP project to develop resilient houses, through 
which fifty-five houses are under construction. The residents of the houses will be 
people who lived in Barangay 61 before Haiyan. These residents are required to 
be involved in the construction of the houses and the houses will be provided to 
them for free, on the condition that they cannot sell, give or lend them to others. 
The residents do not need to pay land fees and are not able to own lands (inter-
view with uNDP Tacloban Office, October 13, 2015).
In sum, while there was multilateral support for emergency shelters, there 
was only one example of transitional housing and no particular support for per-
manent solutions—although it is possible that donors have indirectly supported 
housing through loans. In terms of coordination, there were no active bilateral 
actors in Tacloban, so all efforts ran through local governments or implementing 
partners. Despite being one of the most crucial sectors, bilateral donors have not 
committed to providing permanent housing assistance, even though there is still 
huge demand for such assistance. In other words, it is obvious that there was no 
strategy, coordination, or funding for the longer-term continuum goal of provid-
ing housing assistance.
Challenges underlying the housing continuum
The finding that the housing sector is mainly coordinated by the local govern-
ment (a positive finding earlier in this chapter), while at the same time unable to 
muster cooperation support from the major donors, deserves further attention. 
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On the side of the local institutions, it is not surprising that progress of recovery 
and reconstruction by the Philippine government has been slow, despite being 
a middle-income country with a relatively strong national government (ICAI 
2014, 3; Carden and Clements 2015). Several authors pointed out that the na-
tional government has faced deficiencies in disaster management (Luna 2001, 
224;  Victoria 2003, 1; Bankoff and Hilhorst 2009, 691). Furthermore, the prob-
lem of absorptive capacity should be considered.11 The Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies (2015) argues that the absorptive capacity of the Philip-
pines government is low. Particularly, public construction projects tend to be 
delayed (Manasan and Mercado 2001). This point is relevant to recovery and 
reconstruction, since a lot of activities toward recovery and reconstruction are 
construction efforts.
Moreover, reflections by those governmental officials interviewed for this re-
search indicate that it takes a longer time than initially planned for the affected 
government to implement recovery and reconstruction efforts. An officer in the 
national government stated that ‘many things can happen beyond the CRRP.12 
Another officer in a different central government office noted that ‘the CRRP 
goes beyond time frame of JICA.’ Based on our surveys, major bilateral cooper-
ation agencies showed scaling down of assistance to the typhoon-affected areas. 
even for the best performing donor in this sector—the uS—assistance finally 
ended in June 2016. The national authorities are required to proactively monitor 
and evaluate the progress by themselves. Thus, reconstruction endeavors are on-
going, and time frame—including all of the processes of response, recovery and 
 reconstruction—requires more than the three years in the Philippines. Thus, 
sharing the same time-scale of the actual recovery phase is another factor that 
hinders support to the continuum.
Olshansky, Lewis and Laurie (2012, 176) noted that governmental capacity to 
solve problems, provide resources, and take actions is insufficient, at least com-
pared to normal times, because of ‘time compression’ characteristic of the re-
covery. In consequence, recovery and reconstruction were likely to be delayed 
and take more time than expected due to the limitations in governmental ca-
pacities. In the Yolanda case, it is a reality that unmet needs still exist in the field 
and it will require a significantly longer period of time to solve such problems. 
However, three years after the disaster, the presence of external agencies in the 
affected area seems to be gradually falling away. While three-year efforts might 
be considered sufficient for transitional activities by bilateral actors, the scale of 
the actual recovery is much longer.
It must be acknowledged, nonetheless, that challenges specific to the housing 
sector are beyond the reach of donors. Discussions with the National Housing 
Authority and the uN-Habitat Tacloban Office revealed two constraints:
1  limitations generated by the procurement process, the capacity of construct-
ing machine transportation and bad weather conditions; and
2  coordination problems between resettlement and programs for livelihood—
another crucial sector.13
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The authors consider it likely that bilateral cooperation agencies in the  Philippines 
are already aware of these challenges and this is a reason why they have hesitated 
to become involved in permanent housing assistance. This view is not new, but if 
it influences the overall time scale of crisis management plans, it is a weak point 
in their commitment to realizing the continuum.
Finally, as far as this survey is concerned, nobody foresaw the influence of the 
presidential election of 2016.14 The political situation in the Philippines is very 
complex and it is hard to see whether the new government will continue the 
CRRP strategies developed by the outgoing administration. In fact, the CRRP, 
described ‘the medium-term phase’ as covering the period the year of 2015 to 
2016 (OPARR 2014, 16), coincidently timed to match the end of the previous 
presidential term. The timing considerations in Manila and Tacloban are there-
fore different as well. The important thing is that there are no detailed descrip-
tions for guiding recovery and reconstruction activities after the period of June 
2016. At the time of writing, we can hardly assess whether the presidential elec-
tion had any substantial impacts on the planning of recovery by bilateral coop-
eration agencies. As far as we are aware, open discussions have not been held by 
the new presidential administration and bilateral cooperation agencies regard-
ing the planning for Yolanda reconstruction. The on-going projects provided by 
the bilateral agencies were determined in the time of the former administration. 
 Additionally, it is also difficult to consider whether bilateral cooperation agencies 
are able to help supporting the affected areas between the governmental ad-
ministration changes, since the new administration has not presented their own 
guiding principles for reconstruction. We recognize these points as major topics 
to be further elaborated in other articles.
Conclusion
Typhoon Yolanda brought about huge losses and damage to the Philippines in 
November 2013. In the three years since the disaster, progress toward recovery 
and reconstruction has been limited, with only about 30 percent of work com-
pleted as of December 2015 (NeDA 2015). Housing assistance, in particular, has 
been delayed: in Tacloban City only about 10 percent of the permanent houses 
that are needed have been completed (based on a lecture by officers of Tacloban 
City, October 12, 2015).
In principle, it could be said that the three largest donors to the Philippines were 
well positioned to substantially contribute to achieving the continuum—at least 
from the viewpoint of their strategies, coordination and funding. The prompt 
engagement by the three donors and activities over the past three years did re-
duce the gap between relief and recovery. The donors studied here dispatched 
large-scale emergency response teams and provided assistance for recovery and 
reconstruction by utilizing existing projects that had already been active prior 
to Yolanda. This use of existing projects and contacts seems to be the strongest 
facilitating factor from both the point of view of strategy and coordination. The 
balance of the allocated funding between the response and the recovery phases 
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was not equal, and most of the funding by Australia and the united States of 
America went to the response. However, all of the donors presented in this chap-
ter have substantially invested resource and paid careful attention to ensure that 
the phases were not fragmented.
In the cases of uSAID and DFAT, most of the support for the recovery pro-
cess ran smoothly through their existing programs. By so doing, they supported 
the strategy put forward by the government in the PDNA. The main feature of 
JICA’s strategy was a strong awareness of the importance of seamless assistance. 
JICA developed its own assessments following the results of its own assessment. 
In comparison to the Australian Government’s approach, the JICA scheme uti-
lized pre-existing JICA instruments but this does not mean JICA used activities 
that existed before Yolanda—with the notable exception of the health project. 
 JICA’s own plan was closely discussed with line ministries with which it holds 
close relations, so there are no reasons to think that there was interference be-
tween their strategies. The difference in the size of the contributions for the re-
covery may explain the need for JICA’s own assessment.
Following on from this strong relationship with local institutions, other types 
of coordination seem to lose relevance. The authors did not observe specific co-
ordination mechanisms for achieving continuum in any of the three agencies. In 
other words, coordination was minimal, and took place within the existing na-
tional framework. However, coordination in relation to the relief phase seems to 
still require meaningful contact with relevant agencies in each government. On 
the other hand, the establishment of OPARR clearly showed that the  Philippines 
government took strong initiatives towards coordination; however OPARR 
did not have any big impact on the continuum of crisis management. uSAID 
directly gave assistance to OPARR and JICA contacted it individually. But, it 
cannot be said that OPARR played any notable roles in coordination between 
bilateral actors.
There were some additional factors that inhibited contributions toward real-
izing the continuum. Some were internal to the donors: for example, political 
changes affected the scale of assistance in the case of Australia (‘Global Cut’). It 
is also noteworthy that the mega-disaster did not affect the priorities of JICA in 
the country. In that sense, by utilizing a close-up focus on one of the most crucial 
sectors in connecting phases of crisis management (i.e., housing), it became evident 
that strong commitment was not necessarily followed by support. uSAID showed 
a certain degree of contribution in providing transitional housing, and multilateral 
support was available for relief housing, yet bilateral agencies did not provide any 
remarkable assistance in working towards permanent solutions. In other words, 
while the overall picture of working for the continuum seems positive, specific 
sectors seemed to have been left behind. While the intricacies of the housing sector 
may explain the lack of support, it seems that a variety of different factors and pre-
conceptions of the lengthier time scale required for the recovery play against the 
possibility of more realistic planning. Assuming that future crisis management in 
other parts of the world is also likely to take place in middle income countries with 
unconsolidated governance capacities, as in the Philippines, it would be pertinent 
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to explore ways for donors to push forward more realistic middle- and long-term 
plans, and to contribute to difficult sectors. At the same time, they need to evaluate 
the impact of expensive relief efforts that consumed most of the funding.
Notes
 1 FTS is a web-based, searchable contributions’ tracking system, which reflects all 
humanitarian funding reported to the united Nations Office of Coordination for 
 Humanitarian Affairs (ReliefWeb 2008, 23).
 2 According to the World Bank, the value of damaged physical assets, both public and 
private, accounted for 3.7% of GDP (World Bank 2015, 12). In case of Japan, for refer-
ence, the World Bank’s estimate of the direct economic losses for the Great east Japan 
earthquake accounted for 4% of GDP (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014, 264).
 3 The Presidential Assistant role was filled by Senator Panfilo Lacson, who had a rank 
equivalent to a cabinet secretary (GFDRR 2015b, 9). 
 4 The concept of ‘levels’ for categorizing humanitarian crises is new. The level concept 
was introduced in the agreement of the Transformative Agenda of IASC in December 
2011 (IASC 2011). It was the first time that Level 3 was issued in the Philippines.
 5 The figure of ‘uS$143 million’ was obtained from e-mail communication with uSAID 
office. However, according to the uSAID website, the latest amount for ‘uSG Humani-
tarian Assistance for Typhoon Yolanda/ Haiyan to date in FY 2014’ is uS$90,864,627.
 6 Information here is from the FAiTH database (Foreign Aid Transparency Hub) man-
aged by GOP (see www.gov.ph/faith/full-report, www.officialgazette.gov.ph/faith).
 7 Almost all of the CAT-DDO 2 assistance is provided in the manner of technical as-
sistance (World Bank 2015). This assistance reduces the policy implementation costs 
of the Philippines government, and the government is able to divert the surplus re-
sources toward on-going recovery and reconstruction activities.
 8 ‘Barangay’ is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines.
 9 Thomas (2015, 17) and Paragas, Rodil and Pelington (2016, 28) both provide support 
for Iuchi and Maly’s (2016) argument: Tacloban City has proactively promoted the 
relocation and resettlements by coordinating with uNDP in provision of livelihoods.
 10 For those who lost their homes completely, the CRS project provided new shelters 
and built up new communities for relocation. Beyond housing assistance, uSAID and 
CRS launched water, sanitation and hygiene, and disaster risk-reduction activities 
throughout Tacloban City.
 11 Based on the united Nations Asian and Pacific Development Institute, absorptive ca-
pacity may be defined as the ability of a country or sector of the economy to effectively 
use the available or additional resources given to it in a productive manner (uNAPDI 
2011). The absorptive capacity is considered as an obstacle that limits aid effectiveness 
(ODI 2005).
 12 CRRP is the official and most comprehensive guiding document issued by the Gov-
ernment of the Philippines. Its timeframe has three stages: the short-term (within 
one year after the calamity, i.e., 2014), the medium-term (covering the period 2015 
to 2016) and the long-term (no specific description of the length of this time period is 
offered by CRRP).
 13 Data from a 2012 survey demonstrate that the average household income in the se-
verely affected provinces was only 75% of the national average (OPARR 2014, 7). 
Although the same data on the average household income is not available, the World 
Bank says that across all the affected areas, half of the income derived from the main 
livelihood activities was reportedly lost as a result of typhoon Yolanda, with the most 
affected areas experiencing 80–90% losses (World Bank 2015, 51). In particular, these 
vulnerable provinces require continuous external support.
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 14 It has been reported by the Philippines media that President Duterte stated that he 
was not able to accept the delays in housing construction, and has placed strong pres-
sure on line ministries to make great progress before the end of March 2017 to reduce 
delays in housing provision to affected people. At the time of writing this chapter, it is 
unclear if his statement has influenced bilateral cooperation.
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The main goal of this book was to examine the extent to which the continuum, 
an effort to link relief, recovery and prevention—and sometimes development as 
well—has been realized in managing two specific types of humanitarian crises: 
disasters and armed conflicts. We undertook this project from the perspective of 
crisis management, looking particularly at the involvement of bilateral donors. 
As we have seen in all of the case studies, the challenge of the continuum has 
been addressed, one way or another, by all stakeholders, regardless of whether 
they were humanitarian or developmental, multilateral, bilateral or local. They 
achieved this through strategies devised by each of them as well as through joint 
work. Therefore, it is safe to say that the continuum is a shared concern not only 
at the headquarters’ level of organizations involved in humanitarian crisis man-
agement but also in practice.
The case studies also showed a variety of visions of and approaches to the 
continuum, providing evidence of important divisions between epistemic com-
munities engaging in crisis management—i.e., humanitarians, developmental 
actors, peacebuilders, disaster risk reduction specialists, emergency relief special-
ists, sector-based institutions working on recovery, and so on. Such divisions are 
present even within each type of crisis, which partly explains why the continuum 
remains a central concern. In this concluding chapter, we will first examine the 
case studies for each of the two types of crises by following the framework for 
comparison introduced in Chapter 2—strategy, coordination and funding—to 
illustrate how international actors’ approaches to the continuum have evolved 
and to classify issues specific to disasters and conflicts. Second, we contrast the 
two crisis contexts in order to highlight similarities and differences between in-
ternational actors’ approaches. Following this, we synthesize the findings of the 
whole project, discussing some enabling and hindering factors in pursuing the 
continuum. These factors, together with the multilayered model initially sug-
gested, can be of help in advancing agreement in particular settings and, more 
generally, in the development of a global policy of crisis management. We also 
discuss some of the limitations of our research and the general model, including 
fundamental issues that may continue to complicate discussions about the con-
tinuum. Based on these observations, we close with some policy implications in 
the final section.
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Crisis management after disasters: challenges for 
long-term prevention despite strong local ownership
In Chapter 7, Higashiura and Gómez pointed out ways that global strategies 
for linking different phases of the continuum have changed over the last 20 
years, particularly after the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005. Among the 
three cases of disasters in Part III of this volume, only Chapter 8, on Hurri-
cane Mitch in Honduras, deals with a period before this, when the concept 
of disaster risk reduction (DRR) was still in its embryonic stages. This case 
shows how difficult it was to integrate and mainstream prevention into the 
overall process of disaster management. Despite partial realization of the con-
tinuum thanks to the ownership of the government and international support 
in strengthening disaster management institutions, the case demonstrates how 
prevention can easily slip out of the post-disaster agenda of both donors and 
governments when there is limited knowledge and experience of how DRR 
should work.
Second, the case of Indonesia after the Indian Ocean tsunami and Java earth-
quake (Chapter 9) illustrates how the government, society and donors can learn 
useful lessons from earlier disasters. Drawing from the tsunami experience, the 
Government of Indonesia, with support from donors, developed national in-
stitutions that resulted in more effective disaster response management. They 
introduced livelihood support and housing programs through which recovery 
was linked with long-term development and DRR, thus successfully and ef-
fectively realizing the continuum. The case study, however, reminds readers 
of the difficulties of sustaining DRR as attention toward preventive activities 
tends to decline once the recovery is seen as accomplished by the public.
Finally, the case of the Philippines after Typhoon Yolanda (Chapter 10) fur-
ther emphasizes the importance of local ownership—especially that of the 
 government—in efforts toward realizing the continuum in disaster management. 
The establishment of specially mandated national institutions helped to link do-
nor support directly with national programs. This also increased the efficiency of 
the assistance provided by donors, although relief still received most of the inter-
national attention. Recovery after Yolanda has taken a long time, particularly in 
relation to housing, for which bilateral donors have not been able to provide much 
support. The authors consider this to be an important gap between needs on the 
ground and the provision of support from outside.
While the impact of global action to unify strategies to disaster manage-
ment is visible throughout the cases, the internalization of DRR is a vital but 
often-missed element in realizing the continuum in the case of disaster manage-
ment. In Honduras, the disaster did not create enough momentum to internalize 
DRR broadly across national institutions. The case also shows that it is necessary 
for external actors to possess knowledge about the practice of DRR in different 
sectors in a way that elicits a commitment to crisis management in the long term. 
This should, hopefully, empower actors with deeper understanding and better 
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engagement with local institutions. From this viewpoint, even if not intended, 
the long-term commitment of the Japanese government and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency ( JICA) in Tegucigalpa is partly rooted in the master plan 
produced in 2000 for addressing landslides in the area which, after fifteen years, 
was still of help in informing action. Generating such long-term plans with a solid 
technical base can be even more helpful for bilateral actors to avoid the alterna-
tive of returning to patterns where they only provide peaks of support during 
expensive relief operations—as was the case in the Philippines.
The long-term approach to the management of crises caused by natural disas-
ters thus relies on the consolidation of knowledge about how to implement DRR, 
particularly at the local level. In Honduras, formulating the reconstruction plan 
based on the idea of ‘transformation’ showed how ambiguity played against the 
intentions of reducing vulnerability to disasters. ‘Build back better’ became more 
relevant in Indonesia and then was reutilized as the paradigm underpinning the 
operation in the Philippines. In this way, efforts triggered by disasters have be-
come more focused on actually preventing future disasters. Jibiki and Ono, how-
ever, find that most of the resources from bilateral donors are still concentrated 
on the relief phase. It seems, therefore, that efforts through the international 
DRR movement, as understood in the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action, have 
not been sufficient to change the mindset of shock-driven action. Will the Sendai 
Framework for Action be any different? It remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the 
fact that—except for Japan—bilateral work for DRR remains mainly on the hu-
manitarian agenda does not seem to augur well.
Looking at crisis management from the point of view of coordination under-
scores the fundamental role of local government. A common thread in all three 
cases describing disaster crises is the strong presence of local governments, which 
are ready to be at the forefront of management operations, allowing coordination 
issues to be addressed flexibly. even in the case of Honduras, where Hurricane 
Mitch directly hit the capital city, the case study showed how the government was 
functional—at least at the level of planning—and actively coordinated with the 
international community during the recovery process. In practice, however, all 
actors were free for some time to implement programs as they wished.  Chapter 9 
describes how the Indonesian government used the disaster to create DRR in-
stitutions, which performed well two years later when the earthquake occurred 
on Java Island. The case of the Philippines showed how moving from relief to re-
covery was driven by local and national planning efforts, which bilateral donors 
supported in different ways. Such local ownership becomes an important, if not 
the main, driving force of the process in relation against which the realization—
or not—of the continuum must be assessed, instead of the isolated efforts of each 
of the bilateral donors or other external actors.
This strength of local institutions has important implications for the ways that 
bilateral actors participate in the management of crises. In particular, the rele-
vance of donor coordination decreases inasmuch as the government commands 
the process. At one extreme, research in Honduras highlights the successful story 
210 A. Hanatani, O. A. Gómez and C. Kawaguchi
of donor coordination, where they consolidated a group that heavily influenced 
the recovery process and generated a dynamic process of frequent exchanges 
between major stakeholders that supported the implementation of their commit-
ments. Given that, at the field level, there was a lot of freedom to put forward 
each actor’s initiatives, this coordination structure was useful for distributing 
tasks and creating synergies. On the other extreme, the donors consulted by 
Jibiki and Ono (Chapter 10) said there was no need to establish any coordination 
mechanisms between themselves following Yolanda. The national government 
activated a specific institution for the reconstruction, came up with a plan for the 
recovery process, and donors contributed as they saw fit. No horizontal commu-
nication was necessary.
An unintended consequence of the decrease of coordination between donors 
appears to be that it makes it easier for external supporters to opt out from the full 
picture of the crisis management process. A central government officer, reflecting 
on his experiences of Yolanda (see Chapter 10), argued that the timeframe for 
action by donors was different from that of locals: donors were already moving 
out even though the major problem of housing had hardly been addressed. It is 
now common knowledge that recovery and prevention are phases that take many 
years—even decades—during which different complications emerge as other pri-
orities arise and the context changes. And while it is difficult in principle to expect 
international agencies to be able to commit resources for such a long period, at 
least in the case of Honduras, the engagement in the coordination group resulted 
in a space for periodic conversations that has continued until today. In other 
words, there seems to be a trade-off between comprehensive crisis support from 
abroad and the strong local ownership needed to replace external coordination.
Overall, strategy and coordination issues in the case studies hint at the arche-
typical problem of action against disasters: how to move attention from relief 
to prevention or, from the point of view of funding, how to channel disaster re-
sponse resources from the international community into the mid- and long-term 
management of crises instead of just short-term, photogenic relief. The cases 
showed that major donors were not particularly enthusiastic about common trust 
funds for longer-term action. This is an important consideration in ensuring that 
resources remain fungible. Instead, the focus is on supporting short-term needs, 
while middle and long-term planning is usually managed by multilateral actors.
In fairness, some of this multilateral support does indeed take place due to 
the fact that much of the recovery process is dependent on loans. This partly ex-
plains the different Japanese cooperation approach: early surveys of development 
needs after disasters can be used to inform future grants and loans. The logic of 
loans, however, does not seem to apply to the relief phase. Thus, the incompatible 
logic concerning the nature of funding following disasters remains at the heart of 
the fractured approach of donors: the Office of uS Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) vs. country offices in the united States, european Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations (eCHO) vs. Directorate-General for Interna-
tional Cooperation and Development (DeVCO) in the european union, and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vs. JICA in Japan. So, while acknowledging that 
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the onus for success is placed on local institutions, coherence at the donor level 
in crisis management could be of help in generating change at the international 
level. In this sense, during the preparations for the 2016 World Humanitarian 
Summit, it was suggested that support for disaster relief should be excluded from 
humanitarian budgets, mostly in connection with concerns over resource scar-
city. Although such a proposal did not make it to the final outcome, it is worth 
considering how streamlining the system according to the type of crisis—instead 
of dividing it up at the convenience of the supply side—would improve the way 
disaster management is supported worldwide.
Can local actors help in engendering this paradigm change? A factor that 
may be decisive seems to lie in the nature of the local institutions for managing 
crises and how they evolve and consolidate. Stronger local institutions could have 
the power to capture the resources made available during the peak of attention 
for relief and then distribute them better through the full process of crisis man-
agement. The Indonesian government at least managed something like this due 
to the abundance of resources provided for the tsunami recovery. In the three 
countries covered by the research, the institutions in charge of promoting DRR 
are particularly strong at dealing with relief, usually linked to defense or civil 
protection institutions. However, while they make great efforts to go beyond re-
lief, their strength remains in providing a first response. Gathering momentum 
for ownership of DRR at line ministries remains an elusive quest. A change of 
mindset could be supported by donors through their work in development. This 
is an argument that has been made throughout all the years of DRR activism 
but, as mentioned above, the actual practice seems to favor relief and prepar-
edness for better relief as easier options. What is more, major catastrophes, such 
as the ones reviewed in this volume, do not have the power to change mindsets 
and mandates to internalize DRR in line ministries, as might be expected. Thus, 
the question of how to put the full continuum at the center of crisis management 
remains without a definitive answer.
Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that these conclusions, like the case stud-
ies themselves, are based on the overall picture of management in the disasters 
analyzed. If you move the framework to the micro-management of the operation, 
disasters are very chaotic situations and bureaucracies take time to react so it is 
probable that doubts about the reduced need for coordination will persist and the 
optimistic view of local leadership will also be questioned. This is partly a limita-
tion of our research design, which is centered on donors, their strategies, coordi-
nation and financial problems, and could be better supplemented with bottom-up 
views. Still, it also reflects the assumption that the problem of the continuum 
becomes a relevant preoccupation only at the macro-level.
Crisis management in armed conflicts: challenges to 
overcome the linear peacebuilding template
The case studies in Part II related to armed conflict discussed in this book took 
place between 1999 and 2017. This was a period when the concept of post-conflict 
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peacebuilding had already been mainstreamed as a crisis management ap-
proach. While interventions have followed a post-conflict peacebuilding tem-
plate, little attention has been given to the observed obstacles in the achievement 
of the continuum. First, the settings and strategies applied in the management 
phases for addressing these armed conflicts utilized linear peacebuilding strate-
gies, attempting to compartmentalize each segment of the whole peacebuilding 
process after peace agreements were reached. However, such approaches are 
problematic since they go against the cyclical nature of conflict and disregard 
the simultaneous presence of various actors such as humanitarian, development 
and political and security actors.
In the case of Timor-Leste and South Sudan after the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), the international community applied a typical peace-
building approach, starting from peacekeeping to electoral support for inde-
pendence, and eventually transferring international recovery assistance to the 
new state development plan. These approaches closely equate peacebuilding to 
new state-building. In both cases, it was quite natural and necessary to build a 
functional state apparatus in order to promote conflict prevention. Moreover, in 
both cases, the same intervention template was applied: a multi-functional uN 
peacekeeping operation maintained security that progressed to a politically sup-
ported state-building, while humanitarian and development agencies simultane-
ously conducted relief, recovery and development operations with the financial 
support of donors. As observed in both cases, state-building transpires through 
peacebuilding mechanisms, and, as it becomes difficult to intertwine relief with 
recovery, conflict prevention is also left behind.
On the strategy level, efforts in Timor-Leste and post-CPA South Sudan were 
made to coordinate separate planning processes for relief (Consolidated Inter- 
Agency Appeal) and recovery ( Joint Assessment Mission). However, in practice, 
this proved challenging, partly because of the conflict between coordination and 
humanitarian principles, as we discuss below. Moreover, conflict prevention at the 
community level in both Timor-Leste and South Sudan was not really considered 
in the management process. In both cases, it is assumed that development by itself 
will result in conflict prevention. The case of South Sudan was one exception to 
this, in which the uSAID’s STAR program was implemented at the project level, 
combining relief, recovery and conflict prevention. It should be noted that STAR, 
between 1998 and 2002, was a community-level project, aligned with uS strate-
gic interests toward new state-building. This program shows that intertwining re-
lief, recovery and conflict prevention is not impossible, at least at the project level.
Timor-Leste is considered to be one of the first attempts to integrate recovery 
and development in the early stages of peacebuilding. Learning from  Timor as 
well as Kosovo and Afghanistan, the post-2005 CPA experience of South  Sudan 
is considered an experimental case on the nature and extent of donor and aid 
organization support for effective crisis management under complex aid coordi-
nation mechanisms. On the other hand, the Syrian crisis case study confirmed 
that applying a peacebuilding approach with new state-building is almost impos-
sible under a strong national government and a relentless relief operation. Thus, 
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the first two cases indicate that peacebuilding is based on the assumption of a 
state-building myth—in other words, the idea that building a liberal state is the 
best way of managing, mitigating and even preventing conflict. This implicitly 
brings some linearity, as suggested by Hoshino and Kawaguchi in Chapter 3. It is 
yet to be seen whether the new concept of ‘sustaining peace,’ which embraces all 
phases and actors in multilayered activities, will change this assumption in order 
to realize a non-linear crisis management approach to deal with armed conflict.
The second major finding concerning phases and strategies is that different 
variations of conceptualizing the ‘transition between phases’ influenced how in-
ternational organizations and donors approach peacebuilding and the contin-
uum. In the case of Timor-Leste, the term ‘rehabilitation’ was used in many of 
JICA’s programs in the early intervention period as a way to define the transi-
tion. On the other hand, in South Sudan, transition activities were referred to in 
different terms: ‘rehabilitation’ during the 1990s, ‘transitional or early recovery 
and reconstruction’ in the post CPA period after 2005, and ‘resilience’ in the 
post-2013 crisis. It is interesting to see that these activities were done through 
joint-work inside of donor agencies. In the case of Syria, ‘resilience’ is a key term 
for the continuum. Responding to the Syrian crisis, from the early stages, the uN 
called for the strengthening of resilience in achieving the twin goals of providing 
life-saving relief and strong individual- and community-level capacity to recover 
quickly. The eu and DFID also recognized ‘resilience building’ as an important 
goal in parallel with life-saving relief. As suggested in Chapter 2, a resilience 
approach in the case of Syria could be a way to reduce the emphasis on phases 
but still push for a more meaningful connection between different activities. The 
practical consequences are, nonetheless, yet to be seen.
The last point for phases and strategies concerns state ownership of crisis man-
agement as an obstacle to realizing the continuum. For example, in the case of 
Timor- Leste, the exclusion of conflict prevention activities from the peacebuilding 
process was a result of the government’s strong preference for a shift away from a 
post-conflict transition to a development phase—also seen in Honduras. Another 
example is South Sudan, where relief and conflict prevention were missing from 
the peacebuilding strategy before and after independence, although life-saving 
support was generously and continuously provided throughout. It should be em-
phasized that international aid allowed such exclusions as part of its encourage-
ment of the government’s ownership of the process and the pre-eminence placed 
on state-building. As a result, aid may be one of the contributors to greater power 
concentration at the central government level, which could eventually lead to 
power struggles. This case illustrates that, when state-centric peacebuilding ap-
proaches are adopted, respecting ownership and associating with untrustwor-
thy governments needs to be balanced. Otherwise, it will be difficult to promote 
strategies encompassing multilayered relief and recovery, and conflict prevention 
will most likely be left behind or confused with development, as suggested above.
Another parameter for consideration is coordination of different actors to-
wards the aim of the continuum. The existence of multiple actors is recognized 
in all cases. There are international and bilateral actors working on diplomacy, 
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security, humanitarian relief, development and more specific segments such as 
children, women, health, etc. There are also military units such as the uN Peace 
Keeping Operations. In this respect, major coordination issues are different for 
conflict and post-conflict settings. In conflict, as in Syria and Southern Sudan 
before the 2005 CPA, international organizations such as OCHA, uNHCR, 
uNICeF and WFP and relevant NGOs were the main actors; hence, coordina-
tion among them was a priority. A more problematic coordination for the South 
Sudan and Syrian cases is the coordination with parties to the conflict. Since 
international organizations and NGOs have to coordinate with conflict actors 
to reach people, there are always concerns about the violation of humanitarian 
principles, particularly neutrality and impartiality. In the case of Syria, the au-
thor argued that strong criticism of uN agencies with respect to humanitarian 
principles may undermine necessary coordination between uN agencies and in-
ternational NGOs. This was similar to Operation Lifeline Sudan.
On the other hand, post-conflict coordination includes three different systems 
for humanitarian action, planning recovery and national development. These were 
observed in the cases of Timor-Leste and South Sudan after the 2005 CPA. First, 
the humanitarian cluster system and the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CAP) 
were composed of international organizations and NGOs for humanitarian cri-
sis response. Second, the development aid coordination systems, such as the Joint 
Assessment Mission, were composed of the World Bank, uNDP and other inter-
national organizations, plus bilateral donors and the provisional government for 
recovery and development. Third, the domestic aid coordination system gradually 
became the national development strategy following independence. efforts to coor-
dinate these coordination systems were observed, although it is difficult to conclude 
that they led to gains in the continuum. This is because each coordination system 
is already complex, and therefore additional harmonization between coordination 
systems without an overarching strategy becomes a burden for field staff.
Secondly, coordination within donors was a common trend, as seen in the cases 
of Timor-Leste and South Sudan. The uS has developed, in principle, a well- 
systematized inter-governmental agency and departmental coordination system. 
On the other hand, the eu’s experience of creating a new fund for the recovery 
and rehabilitation program in South Sudan showed that flexible coordination/
cooperation between the humanitarian and development agencies is possible 
even when standardized coordination mechanisms have not been institutional-
ized yet. It is important to note that even a well-prepared intra-governmental 
coordination system does not necessarily result in realizing the continuum. In 
that sense, compared with the uS and eu, the Japanese seamless approach does 
not attempt to connect governmental actors at the donor level through transition 
funds but rather smoothly transfers projects and programs in early recovery to de-
velopment through close coordination with local government, as seen in the case 
of  Timor-Leste and South Sudan. Moreover, the chapter on Timor-Leste also 
showed how Australian engagement in the early post-conflict phase was, similar 
to Japan, flexible and responsible in assisting every sector from relief to develop-
ment, including the police training program, to make transformation smooth.
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The third finding on actors and coordination concerns the participation of 
the local community. The case studies found that local people—especially local 
NGOs and communities—are often outside the coordination mechanisms, which 
are controlled by local authorities and international actors. In Syria, local coun-
cils and NGOs emerged to fill the power vacuum and provided social services 
in the area to become indispensable partners for international actors to provide 
relief. The so-called ‘local’ popular committees were formed for the assessment of 
local needs, the coordination of aid, and its distribution in government-controlled 
areas. These committees, however, have to work under the regime’s tight con-
trol. The government controls their activities through mandatory registration and 
taxes, as well as restricting access to certain areas. This means that international 
humanitarian agencies are limited to conducting operations only by remote man-
agement, leaving local actors at the center of on-the-ground coordination—yet 
the political and security implications of so doing deserve more attention.
The need for capacity-building training for local people has been mentioned in all 
case studies, confirming that the continuum requires not only the efforts of interven-
ers but also the involvement of locals. For instance, in Timor-Leste, the establishment 
of an overarching coordination mechanism—the sector working groups—became 
a burden to some relevant ministries whose capacities were not fully functional. In 
Timor-Leste, as in South Sudan, it is no surprise that capacity-building assistance is 
essential for state-building, especially for the central government.  Capacity-building 
projects in Timor-Leste—such as the Land Law Program by uSAID, the capacity- 
building project for roads and infrastructure by JICA, and the Police Development 
Program by Australia—show how bilateral donors recognize the key role of this 
component of aid. The involvement of local actors requires embedding capacity- 
building elements into the projects from a sustaining-peace perspective.
Finally, the issue of funding is worth considering. As observed in the case of 
South Sudan, transition funding at the program level was provided through 
STAR by uSAID and Humanitarian Plus by DeVCO. This case shows how 
bilateral donors recognized that a ‘more-than-relief’ program was needed. using 
development funds, they prepared a multi-year funding program that contained 
several small projects implemented by NGOs. These were related to capacity 
building for service delivery, reconstructing basic health and washing facilities, 
maintaining livelihoods and so on. Compared with the uS and eu, Japan does 
not have such transition funds available; however, JICA developed a kind of 
quick-impact project while conducting its assessment for a long-term development 
program. This was utilized for various infrastructure reconstruction projects in 
the early phase of the CPA interim period. JICA did the same in Timor-Leste 
during the post-conflict phase between 2000 and 2006.
Another example of transition funding can be seen in the response to the 
 Syrian crisis. While the uN and donors called for strengthening resilience to 
achieve the two goals of life-saving relief and individual- and community-level 
resilience building, the author pointed out that dividing available resources be-
tween emergency relief and resilience building remains difficult for international 
assistance agencies. In this regard, DFID, as well as the uS Department of State 
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and uSAID, have allocated a certain portion of funds to resilience-related projects 
inside Syria to filling the funding gaps. It is interesting to note that humanitar-
ian aid by DFID is utilized through the uN agencies, while uSAID and the 
uS  Department of State contributed more funds to NGOs to conduct resilience- 
related projects than uN agencies did. Finding ways of establishing flexible tran-
sition aid, and transferring and connecting this aid to the goal of realizing the 
continuum in partnership with local actors, remains an unresolved problem.
Comparing crisis management in 
disasters and armed conflict
From the crisis-specific analyses above and the case studies as a whole, it is evi-
dent that the management of armed conflicts and disasters presents similarities as 
well as differences. Making these clear is of great help in understanding the extent 
to which a general model of the continuum can be determined, and from which 




Strategies still linear inasmuch 
as they are politically driven
Strategies still linear and rely on 
the myth of state-building as 
part of the continuum
A concrete description of 
phases exists but, without 
the specific know-how of 
the continuum by sector, 
implementation is difficult
Donors have their own transition 
activities between phases but 
such a transition comprises gap-
filling across all sectors without 
a single definition
Local ownership results in 
support limited to relief
Local ownership of relief may 
hinder the inclusion of relief 




No humanitarian dilemma, so 
competition for resources by 
implementing partners
Coordination with conflict actors 
(including government/local 
authority) is problematic; the 
humanitarian dilemma is 
evident
Strong local ownership means 
there is no need for other 
coordination mechanisms
Multiple coordination mechanisms 
require inter-mechanism 
coordination that leaves the 
local community at the margins, 
in part because of lack of 
capacity
Funding Going back to mostly relief will 
result in fractured funding 
and emphasis on donor 
internal coordination
Character of the ‘transition’
 funding still unclear (can easily 
revert to development as usual)
Source: authors.
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point separate analyses are necessary. A summary of the observations is included in 
 Table 11.1. It should be kept in mind, however, that generalizations cannot be made 
from just six case studies, but they do offer precious insights for future research.
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, through all the cases, it was possible to 
identify strategies and actions employed to advance the continuum. Such strategies 
comprise some of the phases included in the general model in Chapter 2, which de-
scribed progress in overcoming disasters and conflicts. The empirical investigations 
demonstrated the overlap of the phases embedded in our model; however, the strat-
egies for both types of crises show that some sense of linearity remains ingrained 
in the management of multiple phases. The linearity of phases is more evident and 
standardized in the way that disaster management is described. Peacebuilding also 
appears conceived as a linear progression between relief, transition and peace. An 
exception to this is the ‘transition,’ as an early phase of peacebuilding, that tries to 
embrace a non-linearity in which all kinds of state-building and relief activities are 
mixed. Transition remains, nonetheless, an unclear concept as a phase.
In this sense, an important finding is that the linearity of crisis management 
aims at normality as the final stage—not prevention. This is an outstanding com-
monality across both types of crises, underscoring how difficult it is to undertake 
any type of prevention activity in any kind of setting. In both cases, political rea-
sons seem to play a prominent role: a post-conflict setting seeks to graduate from a 
position as fragile state and move into development and the prospects of a brighter 
future; disaster-affected governments also want to show that the emergency is 
over, allowing the national agenda to refocus on normal priorities such as poverty 
reduction and economic growth. In the case of disasters, emerging institutions 
specifically in charge of DRR could be identified as alternatives to make gains in 
prevention from relief and recovery efforts. The existence of such offices—usually 
mandated to cover the whole disaster management cycle—offer the possibility of 
gradual gains on the prevention front, despite relief remaining at the core of their 
work. In other words, disasters are a kind of crisis that results in the development 
of new institutions to manage them. On the other hand, political struggles dur-
ing peacebuilding transitions seem to be the breeding ground for a relapse into 
conflict. Donors and international actors do not appear particularly ready to deal 
with such risks because they are also dragged down by political agendas. Such 
power struggles belong to the realm of domestic politics, in which international 
actors are advised to refrain from meddling. There are no new national institu-
tions created to manage conflict prevention—state-building itself is at the center.
Interestingly, relief is also a phase that could be loosely tied to the continuum, 
particularly under strong national ownership. This is because national govern-
ments will push to finish relief as soon as possible. This is partly why humanitar-
ians have traditionally opposed being integrated into uN missions, do not seek 
to be included in peacebuilding strategies, and the Central emergency Response 
Fund forbids any project from going beyond relief. Their mandate to care for 
the more vulnerable indicates skepticism about the capacity of national recovery 
programs to leave no one behind. In the case of disasters, DRR offices are in a 
better position to progressively connect relief with recovery but, even in these 
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cases, international relief actors may cry foul because of the duration of the relief 
phase—as in the Philippines. In armed conflicts, independent relief operations 
seem to remain the standard procedure; however, the progression through the 
disaster cases shows a slow but continuous process towards a locally integrated 
continuum.
Providing money alone for crisis management is, in most cases, insufficient and 
both types of crisis settings show that specific knowledge of the critical sectors and 
activities underlying each of the phases is required. Recent advances in the gov-
ernance of disasters are particularly unambiguous in this respect, as specific tools 
and a knowledge-base for recovery has been consolidated through different inter-
national initiatives. The challenge in peacebuilding is that, as far as state-building 
is the ultimate goal, the entire spectrum of government and international organ-
izations’ activities can be included in the master plans for transition or recovery. 
Such settings can easily allow international actors to go back to their traditional 
programs and projects, without necessarily tailoring them to the post-conflict set-
tings. This is also another reason that makes prevention particularly difficult, as 
some activities—such as security sector reform—can fall through gaps between 
relief and ‘business as usual’ state-building, as shown in Timor-Leste.
Regarding differences between the two types of crises, the possibility of trust-
ing local governments and institutions seems to be the fundamental difference. 
Strategies and coordination structures look very different if national partners 
are put at the center of the operation because, if they are not, any other ar-
rangement would almost immediately become fragmented. As mentioned above, 
humanitarian actions after armed conflicts are based on the assumption that 
local institutions lack neutrality because they are part of the problem, and thus, 
international organizations providing relief strive to act independently in order 
to remain neutral. Activities that go beyond relief in these settings are likely to 
be particularly difficult to accomplish either because it is impossible to concili-
ate differences with local regimes, or because empowering sub-national actors 
results in separatist movements that may fuel confrontations, as in South Sudan 
and Syria. In the case of disasters, there are no reasons not to partner with lo-
cals, perhaps with the exception of overwhelmed authorities at the peak of an 
emergency; even in those cases, however, the probity of international assistance 
should be carefully analyzed, as assuming by default that local governments are 
incapable of managing the situation can also be a cause of tensions, as described 
above. In consequence, disaster management can result in a competition between 
all types of implementing partners that are trying to obtain access to all kinds of 
resources—humanitarian or developmental—while donors make commitments 
to contribute to local plans.
The different implications of local ownership after each type of crisis deserve 
to be examined. The case of the Philippines suggests that coordination among in-
ternational supporters will become unnecessary as everyone coheres to the gov-
ernment’s strategy. However, the magnitude of support required after a conflict 
does not override the need for coordination, particularly if the creation of a new 
state is one of the consequences of the end of a conflict. Indeed, the full process of 
Conclusion 219
peacebuilding is usually presented as one gradually moving towards handing over 
full control of the state apparatus to local actors. The Syrian case seems to be an 
exception, since, under a strong government and without regime change, it does 
not seem feasible to follow a similar pattern to that of Timor-Leste or South Su-
dan. This suggests that, while the crisis management model seems generalizable to 
different kinds of fast-onset disasters, specific models for different types of conflicts 
may be necessary. In this sense, we suggest that a human-centered principle, such as 
the one underpinning our research, should be used for developing new crisis man-
agement models instead of simply focusing on a state-centric crisis management.
All in all, disasters and armed conflicts seem similar inasmuch as they are 
crises for which the sequential management of phases is warranted. While the 
details of the activities may be different, the general flow is similar and thus, it 
is possible to find efforts such as the World Bank applying tools originally de-
veloped for disasters to conflict recovery situations. However, the backbone of 
the coordination underlying such management is radically different, challenging 
the advancement of common tools for crisis management; that is, coordination 
with local actors presents fundamentally different challenges. This could partly 
explain why the humanitarian-development nexus remains an across-the-board 
issue of concern and shows little signs of progress despite decades of attention. 
General strategies and advances in disasters suggest that the nexus is indeed an 
issue that can be worked out, but coordination analysis shows that this is prob-
ably not the case. This argument may not, however, be the most important, as 
flows of funding are clearly keeping the conversation alive at the global apex of 
governance, while actors working at the local, implementation level continue to 
point out how irrelevant this discussion can be in the field.
the multilayered model reconsidered
Enabling and hindering factors
It is now possible to reconsider the model proposed in Chapter 2 in light of the 
evidence. While the broader proposition regarding the continuum as the heart 
of crisis management holds across the case studies, there are at least three factors 
that can be considered as possible guides for the study of the continuum after 
crises occur. These three major factors are summarized in Table 11.2.
The first major factor influencing the continuum is country ownership. The 
strong leadership of a local government can be a deciding factor for success in 
realizing the continuum. It is the government of the affected country that even-
tually takes charge of the situation and is expected to coordinate different sources 
of assistance, including their own, and tailor them according to the changing 
needs of suffering populations (Honduras, the Philippines, Indonesia). Without 
their commitment to take full responsibility for the situation, there cannot be any 
sustained management of each crisis.
Second, efforts to implement the full crisis management process require lo-
cal capacity and a knowledge base. While the continuum framework offers an 
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overall guide for the management process, the specific sectors and activities un-
derlying international cooperation strategies have their own dynamics and com-
plexities. Security sector reform in Timor-Leste and housing in Indonesia and the 
 Philippines are examples of critical types interventions without which any talk of 
the continuum would be incomplete. The capacity to devise and implement spe-
cific strategies for multiple sectors in parallel is thus a fundamental challenge to 
the continuum, with the awareness that processes for each sector have their own 
phases, actors and institutions. International cooperation capacity to cover the 
full range of activities is seriously limited, both in the sectors that can be covered 
and the time-span during which support can be sustained. That is why here, as 
in most international cooperation, capacity building is stressed as a major com-
ponent in post-disaster and post-conflict support. The main issue is whether the 
capacities created are the ones required, a supposition that seems dubious in both 
types of crises when promoting prevention is the main goal.
Finally, despite the limitations, multiple actors do come into action when crises 
break out. Paradoxically enough, the existence of multiple donors with varied 
mandates and priorities can help to establish a continuum of crisis  management—
if they start engaging early enough after the emergency period and make a com-
mitment toward complementing ongoing efforts for more than the relief phase 
(Timor-Leste, Indonesia). This is partly a reflection of the nature of situations that 
exist after the crisis, where multiple needs exist in different locations at the same 
time. It is also a reflection of the gap between the needs on the ground and the 
Table 11.2 Factors affecting success of the continuum.
Factors Enabling role Hindering role
Country ownership Government leadership 
in crisis management 
(Indonesia, the  
Philippines)
Politicization of assistance 
(South Sudan, Syria)
Low priority given to 
prevention due to political 
implications and other 
agendas (Timor-Leste, 
Honduras)
Local capacity Well-informed policy 
based on past experience 
of crisis management 
(Indonesia)
Low experience of managing 
aid (Timor-Leste, South 
Sudan, Syria)
Limitations in procurement 
and knowledge for recovery 
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priorities of governments, who are always tempted to demonstrate that situations 
are under control and/or things are progressing well—while this may not neces-
sarily be the case (Timor-Leste). Some form of coordination for these multiple lay-
ers of action can be fundamental for the continuum. Once again, we can conclude 
that, depending on the type of crises, tools and mechanisms to promote effective 
coordination are likely to differ, thus limiting the possibilities of generalization.
The above-described factors can also hinder crisis management. Strong coun-
try ownership does not necessarily lead to realization of the continuum, at least 
in the same way as in disaster settings. This was most conspicuous in the case of 
Syria, where politicization of interventions from both the government and donors 
is a common phenomenon, thus inhibiting unlimited access to desperate popu-
lations and the need for the impartial provision of emergency relief.  Recovery 
and development assistance, which is normally provided under ‘development 
 principles’—respect of country ownership, alignment with country strategy and 
priorities—is placed under even stronger strain because of such politicization 
(South Sudan, Syria). even after disasters, the push for local governments to 
 ‘finish’ phases instead of recognizing the overlapping nature of the crisis man-
agement can have a similar disruptive effect.
In cases where continuum is realized between relief, recovery and develop-
ment, prevention is not part of the picture. Prevention is displaced from the 
agenda from the very beginning (Honduras), neglected (Timor-Leste, South 
 Sudan), given a low priority as time goes by (Indonesia), or too early to discuss 
(Syria). Mainstreaming prevention in the process of crisis management through 
capacity building and know-how creation will continue to be an issue in realizing 
the continuum in its full spectrum. Finally, in contradiction to what was observed 
above, the existence of multiple actors in the post-emergency period does not 
guarantee success in addressing the continuum automatically. The absence of 
adequate coordination as well as an excess of coordination mechanisms, without 
deep knowledge of the multiple issues and the context can mean that good inten-
tions easily turn into chaos, duplication and even harm.
Further limitations of the model and the research
The present research attempted to shed light on how the continuum in human-
itarian crisis management has been addressed. It was informed, in particular, 
by bilateral donors, based on a detailed analysis of major disasters and armed 
conflict crises that have taken place over the past two decades. The research has 
elucidated that, while it is difficult to observe cases of well-managed coordination 
among humanitarian and development donors (i.e., the continuum of actors), it is 
still possible to observe cases where efforts are being made to cover ever- changing 
needs in the affected areas, although including prevention remains problematic. 
Hence, the continuum of phases has somehow been achieved.
In almost all of the cases studied here, local ownership—especially that of 
the legitimate government—was vitally important for the realization of the con-
tinuum, without which the continuum of crisis management is hard to achieve. 
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This provides a good reason for donors to support capacity building with partner 
governments for better management of crises, whether this occurs prior to or 
after the eruption of the events in question. However, there is no guarantee that 
governments will always represent the needs of the society in the correct way. 
Sometimes the government is concerned more with national economic manage-
ment (Honduras), or is tempted to show to the general public that things are back 
to normal and are moving forward (the Philippines, Timor-Leste) in spite of the 
situation for the affected communities. It is therefore important to discern what 
is really meant by ‘local’—be it at the level of government, civil society organ-
izations or society in general—and how local politics, culture, conditions and 
processes affect the continuum. Our research started with a strong focus on in-
ternational cooperation actors, but only through the fieldwork did we realize how 
important deeper knowledge of the local process was. Although authors tried to 
supplement the original research, inquiries that start from the local point of view 
and evaluate external assistance from their perspective are required. The chap-
ters of this book mainly focused on the government as the one that represents the 
‘local,’ except for the case of Timor-Leste. As a result, the multiplicity of local 
actors still needs to be addressed.
In this sense, another limitation of this research, or a limitation of the concept 
of the continuum itself, is the relationship between the continuum as an input for 
crisis management and the resultant state of society as an outcome of such an ap-
proach. In other words, what impact would realizing the continuum have on the 
society if it is realized? This question relates to what is intended to be achieved, 
for whom, where, and in what timeframe, in the process of achieving the con-
tinuum. In the discussion of the continuum, this ‘for what’ question is taken for 
granted and seldom answered or even asked. But it deserves serious attention as 
all the interventions need to be evaluated against their intended objectives and 
goals. For instance, as the disaster cases suggest, looking only at donor activities 
would make little sense when the process in the affected societies shows a differ-
ent time-frame for managing the crisis. Perhaps at the level of linking relief and 
recovery, it is easier for several stakeholders who are inquiring about the con-
tinuum to converge on a similar discussion and time-frame. However, if we are 
to achieve prevention as an ultimate goal, the strength of the concept seems to 
weaken considerably. We did not address this question squarely in our research, 
partly due to time limitations and also to our original focus on donors’ perfor-
mance. Still, the implications of moving the question to affected societies is an 
important part of the research agenda, which underlies efforts to localize aid in 
the outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit. Such research would greatly 
enrich future crisis management initiatives.
the continuum after the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit
The humanitarian-development nexus remains a major issue discussed in rela-
tion to crises. The outcome of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit—as well 
as the interest from the new uN Secretary-General in promoting ‘sustaining 
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peace’—also supported the old idea of the continuum. Traditional agencies 
have come with good intentions to find new ways of working but a feeling of 
déjà vu is in the air. In order to avoid waste of resources and energy, a more 
cautious reading of these experiences over two decades is warranted. Chapter 2 
showed that periodical reviews of the continuum usually present a dire pic-
ture of little progress despite all these years of efforts. One problem is the very 
definitions of terms such as the continuum, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development (LRRD), and resilience. These terms can be pointing in different 
 directions—for example, donors’ performance vs. actual social process in af-
fected societies—that are difficult to grasp from the single perspective of donors 
and international cooperation, as we suggested above. However, even by focus-
ing solely on international cooperation, advances can be identified from which 
to extract some general lessons in order to keep moving forward. We emphasize 
three imperatives:
1  Recognize that crisis management is not linear.
2  Put ‘local’ at the center.
3  Prevention starts from crisis day one and efforts should be sustained.
We expand on each of these points below.
Recognize that crisis management is not linear
A collective approach to crisis management should not be mistaken for a linear 
process that leads from crisis to normality. every person, every family, every 
community and every city goes through this process at different speeds and along 
different paths. Activities for relief, recovery and prevention of future crises do 
not follow a clear sequence but overlap and thus require everyone’s commitment. 
Nevertheless, non-linearity does not mean that crisis management through 
phases is unnecessary because phases play a fundamental role in how societies 
realize progress and how actors confront recurrent hazards to prevent relapse 
into crisis. The balance between contiguity and continuity of phases and actors 
remains a central challenge that all actors should acknowledge. In order to ad-
vance on this front, non-linearity needs to be reflected in all aspects, including 
strategy, coordination and funding.
Put ‘local’ at the center
Societies affected by humanitarian crises are in the best position to respond, 
recover, prepare and prevent further relapses into calamity. This is not only a 
re-statement of the national responsibility principle but also an empirical obser-
vation. No matter how much the international community is prepared to provide 
external support, it will never be more than second best. Local actors should 
be making decisions throughout the whole crisis management cycle: assessing 
needs, setting objectives, and planning implementation, as well as monitoring 
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and evaluating outcomes. Ownership combined with capacity building empow-
ers people and the different institutions originally in charge (or created in re-
sponse) to come up with the best possible solutions. Strategies and coordination 
mechanisms for external support where the local is not at the center are a recipe 
for trouble. It is true that, depending on the type of crisis (e.g., armed conflict), 
putting the local at the center can be challenging and may require very careful 
arrangements so as not to result in additional harm to the most vulnerable—for 
instance, barriers that affect humanitarian access. Nonetheless, the centrality of 
the local remains a fundamental guiding principle.
Prevention starts from crisis day one and efforts should be sustained
Ideally, prevention should precede a crisis but, in practice, it usually comes after. 
The actual institutions and capacities for dealing with future threats are formed 
through the process of relief and recovery. Framing crises as opportunities is very 
common, but the actual process of bouncing back better is not automatic. Preven-
tion and preparedness for future emergencies in places where they have occurred 
in the past receives less attention across the management of all types of crises, 
both in terms of knowledge and funding. This trend needs to be reoriented to-
ward promoting an understanding of how the momentum for change that crises 
create can be used in mainstreaming long-term prevention through institutions, 
technology and capacity building. It is natural for relief-recovery activities to aim 
toward at least restoring lost assets and rebuilding original functions to pre-crisis 
levels; still, the opportunity to enhance preparedness for an effective response 
and to build back better should not be missed.
There are two further issues for which we cannot draw any definitive conclusions, 
but that our study suggests are vital for understanding what crisis management 
supported by international actors entails. Both are related to discerning views 
about what crisis management implies in different contexts. One issue is the fix-
ture of mandates and mindsets when engaging in crisis work. Through our pre-
liminary overview, we noticed that coordination is frequently discussed, bringing 
along the idea that stakeholders have some fixed capabilities that need to be uti-
lized as efficiently as possible. However, the cases here suggest that changing 
approaches, and innovating, despite mandates as circumstances change, may be 
more meaningful in the long run. Such changes can be seen in the creation of 
OCHA, the gradual involvement of uNDP, the World Bank and donors in crisis 
work, and the transformation of the WFP into a logistic powerhouse. Further 
transformations should not be easily discarded.
The other issue is whether it is convenient to have a single box for crisis man-
agement as a whole, or if different boxes by types of crisis would bring better 
prospects for improvement. The emergence of the DRR community suggests 
the latter, but the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit seems to maintain that 
separate humanitarian (and development) categories are the best way to organ-
ize international efforts for crisis management. As we have seen in theory and 
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practice, localizing assistance is not compatible with a supply-side model, so we 
are tempted to suggest a different approach based on the specific demands of 
each type of crisis. Humanitarian actors argue that getting subsumed into crisis 
management can negatively affect the actual attention that the world gives to 
forgotten and protracted crises, which is a powerful reason for caution. In the 
meantime, what seems most feasible is a hybrid system whereby, after each crisis, 
nationally owned sub-systems such as those for disasters or pandemics evolve at 
the same time that supply-side humanitarian and development communities re-
invent themselves. For the sake of advancing prevention, however, still there is no 
single recipe, so there is much room for innovation and experimentation.
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Kuala Lumpur, Tsunami Forum in  
(2007) 131
Kuncoro, A. 174
Land Law Program (LLP) 60
Laurie, A. J. 200
Lehtinen, Terhi 84
Lewis, D. H. 200
Lichtenstein, J. 149
linearity 28, 29; model 29
Linking Relief  Rehabilitation and 
Development (LRRD) 5, 18, 27, 76, 
223; by european union 19–20
LLP see Land Law Program (LLP)
LRRD see Linking Relief  Rehabilitation 
and Development (LRRD)
Machar, Riek 78, 97n4




Master Plan for National Reconstruction 
and Transformation (PMRTN) 146, 
147, 151
Maxwell, Daniel 75
Mayardit, Salva Kiir 78
Mazarr, Michael 118
McAllister, Ian 12, 130
McGoldrick, Claudia 114
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
55, 153
Ministry of  Defense (MOD) 46
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan 
10, 22, 27, 76, 82
Ministry of  Transport Communications 
and Public Works (MTCPW) 62
Morazan, Pedro 27
multi-donor fund (MDF), Indonesia 168–9
Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) 84–6
Multi-hazard Disaster Risk Assessment 24
multi-mandate approach 32
multi-national pooled fund for Southern 
Sudan (MDTF-SS) 85
Nascimento, Daniela 117
National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition  
Forces 104
National Development Plan (NDP) 55
National Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Council 187
National Priorities Process (NPP) 56
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
3, 4, 7, 66–7, 76, 146
North Sea floods (1953) 129
Nusra Front 104, 105, 121n4
O’Brien, Stephen 105
Ocean Tsunami, India see Indian Ocean 
tsunami (2004)
OCHA see Office for the Coordination of  
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
OeCD see Organisation for economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(OeCD)
OFDA see Office of  uS Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA)
Office for the Coordination of  
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 4, 27, 
78, 120
Office of  Presidential Assistant for 
Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) 
185–6, 194
Office of  Transition Initiatives (OTI) 21; 
Timor-Leste 58, 59, 68
Office of  uS Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) 20, 26, 45, 58
Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
47, 52; budget 3; implementation of  22; 
sectoral disbursements by donors 57
Ogata, Sadako 21
232 Index
OLS see Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
Olshansky, R. B. 200
‘One Humanity: Shared Responsibility’ 7–8
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) 79–80, 
83, 84
Organisation for economic Co-operation 
and Development (OeCD) 6, 40, 47, 52
Organisation for economic Co-operation 
and Development/Development 
Assistance Committee (OeCD/DAC) 
Report 77
Oslo Pledging Conference (2005) 85
‘Oslo Principles’ 129
OTI see Office of  Transition  
Initiatives (OTI)
Overseas Development Institute 24
Paris Declaration on Climate Change 
12–13
PBC see Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)
PBSO see Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO)
peace: and conflict, intervention models 
between 40, 40; ‘continuum’ in post-
conflict transitions to 39–40, 40
peacebuilding 40–3, 42, 52; deficiency 
of  44; and humanitarian relief  in 
continuum 43–5; model, continuum in 
linear 84–91
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),  
uN 41–3
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) 42
peacekeeping 41, 134, 212; operations 42, 46
peacemaking 41
Peake, Gordon 51
Physicians for Human Rights 105
PMRTN see Master Plan for National 
Reconstruction and Transformation 
(PMRTN)
police program, Australia 64–6
Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) 
54, 65
Population, Refugees, and Migration 
(PRM) 81
Post-Conflict unit, World Bank 5, 6, 21
Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), 
uN 134, 179
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
148, 155
Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation 
and Recovery (PARR) 203n4
‘Principles and Good Practice of  
Humanitarian Donorship’ 6
Protracted Relief  and Recovery 
Operations 19
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review (QDDR) 117
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), uNHCR 18
Red Cross see International Committee of  
the Red Cross (ICRC)
Red Cross/Red Crescent see International 
Federation of  the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC)
Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 64
rehabilitation programs 129, 150, 166, 
171–2, 174; in South Sudan 75, 83, 84, 
95–6, 214
Relief  Advisory Committee 129
Relief  Association of  Southern Sudan 
(RASS) 80, 83
‘Relief  to Development’ 18
‘relief  to development continuum’ model 5
‘Report of  the Panel on united Nations 
Peace Operations’ (uN, 2000) 40
Resilience approach 5, 23–4, 25, 26, 27, 
94, 213; european union (eu) 31
resilience, defined 102
Resolution 46/182 4, 9
Resosudarmo, B. P. 174
‘Restoring Humanity: Global Voices 
Calling for Action’ 7–8
Rotmann, Philipp 46
Sánchez, W. J. 150
Schrikkema, B. 150
SDP see Strategic Development Plan (SDP)
seamless assistance approach 18, 27; Japan 
21–2, 83, 202
Secretary of  State-Security (SoSS) 65
Sector Investment Programs (SIPs) 55
Sector Working Groups (SWGs) 55
Security Council 42; and General 
Assembly in April 2016 43; uN 104, 
107, 223
Security Sector Reform (SSR) 65
Sendai Framework for Action in Disaster 
Risk Reduction 13
SHARP see Syria Humanitarian Assistance 
Response Plan (SHARP)
SIPs see Sector Investment Programs (SIPs)
Smillie, Ian 18
South Sudan 12, 48; aid coordination 
mechanisms 85; bilateral ODA by 
sector for 78; ceasefire agreement 78; 
comparative analysis 83–4, 89–91, 
90, 93–5; crisis and aid in 76–9; 
donor engagement 80–3, 86–9, 91–3; 
Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) 
Index 233
94; North–South conflict 77; operation 
lifeline Sudan (OLS) 79–80; rehabilitation 
program 84; third conflict in 2013 77–9; 
violations of  human rights 79; violent 
conflicts and independence 76–7
Sparrow, Annie 113
Sphere Project 6–7
SRRA see Sudanese Relief  and 
Rehabilitation Association (SRRA)
SSR see Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Stabilization unit, uK 46
Steets, Julia 18, 22
Steinacker, Lea 46
Stites, elizabeth 116
Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 56
Study on the urgent Rehabilitation Plan in 
east Timor (SuRPeT) 62
Suárez, G. 150
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A) 77, 80, 81, 83, 84
Sudanese Relief  and Rehabilitation 
Association (SRRA) 79–80, 97n6
Sudan Transitional Assistance for 
Rehabilitation (STAR) program 80–1
Sugiyanto, C. 174
SuRPeT see Study on the urgent 
Rehabilitation Plan in east Timor 
(SuRPeT)
Sustainable Development Goals 12
‘sustaining peace’ 43, 44
SWGs see Sector Working Groups (SWGs)
Syria: anti-regime groups 103–4; 
assistance operations inside 106; 
authorities 109; capacity-building 
programs 116; civil war see civil war, 
Syria; eu regional strategy for 111; 
food assistance 113; Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) 104; Humanitarian 
Response Plan inside 113; Independent 
International Commission of  Inquiry 
on 107; Operational Plan 2011–2016 
117; refugee crisis 105, 106; response 
by international community 106–13; 
Syrian crisis 12, 48, 79, 102, 111; uS 
humanitarian assistance inside 112; 
‘Whole-of-Syria’ approach 108
Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response 
Plan (SHARP) 102, 106, 107
Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) 107
Syrian National Council (SNC) 103–4
Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) 110
Tacloban City, housing in 196–201
TeC see Tsunami evaluation 
Coalition (TeC)
Tegucigalpa water system project 149
TeP see Transitional employment  
Program (TeP)
Timor-Leste 12, 48, 51, 52–4; aid to, from 
perspective of  continuum 56–9, 57, 
61–4; conflict prevention 59–60, 67–8; 
humanitarian crises 53–4; infrastructure 
and economic sectors 62–3; international 
support to 55; national and international 
strategies 54–6; NDP 58; ODA 
disbursements to 53; Office of  Transition 
Initiatives (OTI) in 58, 59, 68; peace and 
order 66–8; uN missions in 68
transformative agenda 5
Transitional employment Program  
(TeP) 59
Tsunami evaluation Coalition (TeC) 174
Tsunami Forum, in Kuala Lumpur  
(2007) 131
Tunisia, ‘Arab Spring’ in 103
Typhoon Yolanda, in Philippines: 
bilateral funding 195–6; challenges 
for ‘continuum’ approaches 191; 
housing continuum 196–7, 199–201; 
chronological review of  187–8, 188; 
Tacloban City 196–7; coordination 
for continuum 191–3; coordination 
system in the GOP 193–5; efforts by 
bilateral cooperation agencies 199; 
Global Cluster for early Recovery 197; 
Government of  the Philippines (GOP) 
186, 187, 193–5; Humanitarian Country 
Team 187; multi-lateral cooperating 
agencies 196; National economic and 
Development Authority (NeDA) 187; 
Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 187–8; 
strategies to address continuum 188–91
united Nations International Children’s 
emergency Fund (uNICeF) 19, 79, 82
united Kingdom (uK): Conflict, Stability 
and Security Fund (CSSF) 118; DFID 
111, 111; Global Conflict Prevention 
Pool (GCCP) 6; Stabilization unit 46
united Nations (uN): agencies 107, 108, 
113; Department of  Political Affairs 
(DPA) 42; Development Programme 
(uNDP) 16, 19, 24; Disaster Relief  
Coordinator 4; ‘General Assembly 
Resolution 46/182 (1991) 17, 18, 28, 
107; High Commissioner for Refugees 
(uNHCR) 5, 16, 21; humanitarian 
operation 48; Human Rights Council 
103; institutionalizing humanitarian 
action in 4; Integrated Mission in 
234 Index
Timor-Leste (uNMIT) 54; interim 
authority 52; Mission in Sudan (uNMIS) 
85; Office for the Coordination of  
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 4, 78; 
Office for Project Services (uNOPS) 
62; Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) 
41–3; peacekeeping operations 42; post-
disaster needs assessments (PDNA) 134; 
Relief  and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near east (uNRWA) 
105; Security Council 39, 104, 107, 
223; Security Council Resolution 
688 (1991) 4; Supervision Mission 
in Syria (uNSMIS) 104; Secretary-
General’s report, core responsibilities 
8; Transitional Administration in east 
Timor (uNTAeT) 54 ‘united Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines’ 41
united States (uS): coordination for 
continuum 192–3; donor engagement 
80–1, 86–8, 92; donor support  
to Indonesia 166; humanitarian 
assistance inside Syria 112; relief  to 
development by 20–1; strategies to 
address continuum 191–1
united States Agency for International 
Development (uSAID) 10, 20, 21, 23, 
24, 26, 109; aid to Timor-Leste 56–9, 
57; conflict prevention 59–60; evaluation 
of  LLP 60; uSAID-OFDA 76
uSAID see united States Agency for 
International Development (uSAID)
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Program 
(WASH) 109
WFP see World Food Programme (WFP)
WGA see whole-of-government approach 
(WGA)
Whittall, Jonathan 118
whole-of-government approach (WGA) 
26, 46
WHS see World Humanitarian Summit 
(WHS)
Woodrow, Peter J. 12
Work Plan and Poverty Reduction 
Strategic Paper (PRSP) 86
World Bank: Joint Assessment Mission 
(JAM) 55; Post-Conflict unit and Post-
Conflict Fund 6
World Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction 17
World Development Report (2011) 6
World Disasters Report (1999) 130, 145
World Food Programme (WFP) 19, 61, 79
World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) 
(2016) 7–9, 12, 16, 17; continuum  
after 222–5
Yanguas, P. 152
Yogyakarta: earthquake 164; gross 
domestic product (GDP) 165; growth 
rates of  population in 166; impacts on 
development 164; poverty rates in 164
Yoshikawa, Lynn 20, 135
zelaya, Manuel 143
